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Preface
This idea of publishing an issue of Pertanika JSSH as “Special Issue in Accounting and Finance” was 
mooted in the year 2012. The call for papers for the issue received an overwhelming response. 
As per Pertanika’s stringent guide for peer-review, each manuscript was reviewed by a minimum 
of two reviewers. 
The nine articles in this special issue cover two major areas of study. The first group of articles is on 
banking and finance. The second group of articles covers issues related to corporate governance. 
There are five articles on banking and finance, while the other four are on corporate governance 
related to board directorship and ownership studies. 
The first group of articles looks at cost, revenue and profit efficiency of Islamic and conventional 
banks in Malaysia. Their findings show that Malaysian Islamic banks have lower levels of cost 
and profit efficiency compared to conventional Malaysian banks. These articles also study the 
profitability and dividend policy of Malaysian banks. The results show that leverage is the major 
determinant of dividend policy and profitability lagged dividend payout. The focus of these 
articles extends to international markets, considering four Asia-Pacific countries and the US 
banking industry. The findings of the articles reveal that earnings affect share prices significantly. 
Among all the financial risks, credit risk is the most important factor in determining share prices. 
Of course, other than banking, the derivative market is important to the efficiency of capital 
markets. This is the focus of one of the papers, which studies the trading influence of shares 
derivatives on the Malaysian spot market. The study indicates that stock index futures cause cash 
index with no feedback in reverse direction during periods of financial crisis and recovery; this 
confirms the spillover effect of derivative markets on spot markets.
The second group of studies is on the effect of a board of directors and ownership structure on 
the performance of companies. These articles show a significantly positive relationship between 
the director-auditor link and non-audit services fee. This has led the researchers to examine 
the roles of independent members on the board and that of CEO duality on firm performance. 
Their findings indicate that the dual leadership structure is more effective with a larger board 
size and longer duration of operation. Firms that are family managed are always interesting 
for both practitioners and academicians. It is interesting to find that firms managed by families 
have a significantly larger board size and a higher number of non-independent directors and 
executive directors. The family-managed firm appoints directors who have significantly more 
working experience. The findings of these articles also indicate that the compensations paid 
to the executive directors of family-managed firms are significantly higher than those paid to 
executive directors of non-family-managed firms. The results also suggest that family-managed 
firms have not utilised their assets efficiently to generate their sales compared to their non-family 
business counterparts. Lastly, the results show that the number of interlocking companies, inter-
industry interlocking directorates and interlocking created by independent directors is significant 
and positively related to corporate performance. 
It is obvious that the findings of these articles, although significant and timely, are still limited 
in dealing with a sector as vast and complex as banking, finance and corporate governance. The 
principal purpose of this special issue is to quench the thirst of researchers to have their research 
published. It is our desire that this special issue will be the beginning of a series of publications 
for academicians in the field of Accounting and Finance. 
The compilation of this special issue that covers banking, finance and corporate governance is 
an undertaking of many months of hard editorial work and strong support of its contributors. 
We are indebted to all our contributors for their in-depth research work and to the reviewers 
and editors who compiled, edited and prepared this special issue for publication. We would also 
like to thank the Dean, Prof. Dr. Mohd Shahwahid Othman, Deputy Dean, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Alias 
Rustam, and the Head of the Department of Accounting and Finance for their encouragement 
and guidance, numerous helpful suggestions and excellent coordination that contributed towards 
bringing this publication to reality. 
We are equally thankful to Dr. Nayan Deep S. Kanwal, Chief Executive Editor and Ms. Erica Kwan 
Lee Yin, Publication Officer, Journal Division. Last but not the least, Mr. Hafizd who assisted in 
compiling the issue, and all our anonymous reviewers for their hard work and patience in bringing 
this special issue to print.
Cheng Fan Fah 
Guest Editor
October 2013
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ABSTRACT
The objective of this study is to compare the cost, revenue and profit efficiency of Islamic 
and conventional banks in Malaysia over the period 2006 to 2009. To represent the 
Malaysian Islamic and conventional banking sector, a sample of 39 banks were selected to 
participate in the study. The level of efficiencies was measured using the Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) method, which applied the intermediation approach. The result shows that 
the levels of cost and profit efficiency for Malaysian Islamic banks are lower compared to 
the Malaysian conventional banks. The difference levels between cost and profit efficiency 
in the Malaysian banking sector are not influenced by revenue efficiency but, rather are 
subject to influence by internal and external factors. 
Keywords: Cost efficiency, revenue efficiency, profit efficiency, Malaysian Islamic bank, Malaysian 
conventional banks
INTRODUCTION
Like all banks in general, the Islamic bank 
is an intermediary and trustee of the money 
belonging to others, but the difference 
between the Islamic bank and conventional 
banks is in how profit and loss is shared 
with depositors. The element of mutuality 
in Islamic banking gives its depositors 
as customers some ownership right in an 
Islamic bank (Dar & Presley, 2000).While 
the conventional banking system follows 
the familiar, longstanding interest-based 
principle, Islamic banking is based on the 
principles of interest-free transactions and 
Profit-and-Loss (PLS) sharing in their 
business role as intermediaries (Arif, 1988). 
The main factor that distinguishes 
Islamic banking from conventional banking 
is that transactions are administered without 
involving the element of riba. Riba , or 
Fakarudin Kamarudin and Mohamed Hisham Yahya
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an increase or growth, is prohibited in 
Islam, and this is acknowledged by all 
Muslims. The prohibition of riba is clearly 
mentioned in the Quran, the Muslim holy 
book, and in the traditions of Prophet 
Muhammad (sunnah). Some insist that riba 
is the increase imposed on the debtor at 
the maturity of the debt in case the debtor 
fails to settle the debt but wants to roll it 
over. Debtors say so because they think the 
predominant from of transactions involving 
riba was sale on credit, in which case, the 
(deferred) price is higher than the spot 
price in lieu of deferment, and the need for 
an explicit increase arises only in case of 
further postponement of payment. 
Nevertheless, most scholars believe 
that riba covers the interest stipulated at 
the time of the contract in the case of loans 
as well as the subsequent increase in the 
case of a loan or debt that arises when sale 
on credit is rolled over because the debtor 
does not pay it at the time stipulated in the 
contract (Badawi, 1964). Technically, riba, 
in a loan transaction, denotes any increase or 
premium advantage obtained by the lender 
as a condition of the loan. This means that 
earning an income is haram in Islam, and 
Muslims are thus forbidden from giving 
or receiving riba. More importantly, the 
principal objective of the establishment of 
Islamic banks is to cater for the needs of 
Muslims engaged in banking transactions 
in accordance to the rulings set in the Al 
Quran and Hadith (Haron and Azmi, 2009). 
The business management of the banks is 
governed by the concepts of justice and 
fairness towards the interests of society as 
a whole.
Globalisation has improved financial 
institutions over the world through greater 
deregulation and liberalisation. Islamic 
Banking is the one of the most fast growing 
institutions and has become competitive 
against conventional banking. The practice 
of Islamic banking is now spreading world-
wide, from Malaysia to Bahrain to Europe 
and the USA. 
The International Monetary Fund 
reported in 2005 that the number of Islamic 
financial institutions had increased from 
75 to over 300 from 1975 to 2005, and 
that it was being practised in more than 75 
countries. The total assets of the Islamic 
financial institutions are estimated to be 
US$250 billion, which is rising at a rate of 
about 15 % per year, three times the rate for 
conventional banks. According to Ghafour 
(2006) and Dubai Islamic Bank (2006), the 
size of the assets of the world-wide Islamic 
banking industry is estimated to have grown 
to an excess of $265 billion from merely 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in the 
1970s.
Since Islamic financial institutions 
have so rapidly evolved, we expect the 
efficiency of the banks has also improved. 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) suggest that 
studies focused on the efficiency of financial 
institutions have become an important part 
of banking literature since the early 1990s. 
A study by Berger et al. (1993b) suggests 
that if banks were efficient, they could 
expect improved profitability, better prices 
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and better service quality for consumers, 
and that greater amounts of funds would be 
intermediated. 
The general concept of efficiency covers 
three components, namely, cost, revenue and 
profit efficiency (Adongo et al., 2005; Bader 
et al., 2008). Evidence of bank efficiency 
could be produced by discovering these three 
types of efficiency concept. However, few 
studies have examined the comprehensive 
efficiency that consists of these three 
components. Most previous studies have 
mainly focused on the efficiency of cost, 
profit or both (cost and profit efficiency 
combined) (Bader et al., 2008). 
Studies on bank efficiency that ignore 
revenue have been criticised (Bader et al., 
2008). This is mainly because most of the 
studies have only revealed the levels of 
cost efficiency, which are higher than profit 
efficiency, but they have not identified the 
causes. According to Chong et al. (2006), 
banks desire maximising profit to maximise 
shareholders’ value or wealth. However, the 
main problem contributing to lower profit 
efficiency comes from revenue inefficiency 
(Kamarudin et al., 2013; Sufian et al., 2013). 
Ariff and Can (2008) find that inefficient 
revenue affected the difference between 
cost and profit efficiency, but they do not 
investigate further on the revenue efficiency 
and on the reasons for such an occurrence. 
A study which investigates the causes of 
inefficiency was done by Maudos et al. 
(2002), Rogers (1998) and Berger et al. 
(1993a), who find that revenue inefficiency 
was caused either by mispricing of outputs 
or the giving of wrong choice of output. 
Therefore, instead of focusing on profit 
efficiency of Islamic and conventional 
banking alone, it would be better to compare 
profit efficiency with cost efficiency as 
well in order to identify the existence 
of revenue efficiency. By employing 
the non-parametric Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) method, we have analysed 
cost, revenue and profit efficiencies of 
Malaysian Islamic and conventional banks 
over the period from 2006 to 2009. The 
preferred non-parametric Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) methodology allowed us 
to distinguish between three different types 
of efficiency, which are cost, revenue and 
profit efficiencies. This information could 
be useful to several parties and may have 
several implications for regulators, bankers, 
investors and academicians.
The article begins with a brief overview 
of the Malaysian Islamic banking sector. 
This is followed by Literature Refiew, where 
we provide a review of related studies. Data 
and Methodology discusses the methods 
employed in the study and the variables 
employed in the panel regression analysis. 
We present the empirical results in next 
section. The article is concluded in last 
section, which also provides discussion on 
policy implications.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are some documented studies that 
compare the performance of Islamic banks 
with their conventional counterparts. 
Nevertheless, those studies focus on 
Fakarudin Kamarudin and Mohamed Hisham Yahya
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profitability with the help of financial ratios 
and are constrained by the time span and the 
number of Islamic banks (Samad & Hassan, 
1999; Iqbal, 2001). The previous studies 
mostly concentrate on the technical and 
pure technical and on scale efficiency (Isik 
& Hassan, 2002; Hassan & Hussein, 2003; 
Yudistira, 2004; Tahir & Haron, 2008). 
Despite the significant importance of this 
area, documented studies that address cost, 
revenue and profit efficiency are very few 
(Yudistira, 2004; Hassan, 2005; Brown and 
Skully, 2005). 
Technical Efficiency, Pure Technical and 
Scale Efficiency
Technical efficiency (TE) measures the 
proportional reduction in input usage that 
can be attained if the bank operates on the 
efficient frontier, or when the effectiveness 
of the limited set of inputs is used to produce 
a maximum of outputs. On the other hand, 
the allocative efficiency (AE) measures the 
proportional reduction in costs if the bank 
chooses the right mix of inputs to be used 
(English et al., 1993; Al-Sharkas et al., 
2008). TE is related to managerial factors, 
while AE is often associated with regulatory 
factors (Isik & Hassan, 2002). Pure technical 
efficiency (PTE) is the measurement of 
technical efficiency devoid of the scale 
efficiency or the firm’s size efficiency (SE) 
effects (Sufian, 2004; Coelli, 1998). 
Based on the literature, it can be said 
that most international Islamic banks 
face a similar problem, where their pure 
technical inefficiency (PTIE) outweighs 
scale inefficiency (SIE) (Sufian et al., 2008; 
Hassan & Hussein, 2003; Yudistira, 2004; 
Saaid, 2003). In other words, although 
Islamic banks have been operating at a 
relatively optimal scale of operations, 
they were managerially inefficient in 
exploiting their resources. On the other 
hand, the opposite is true for international 
conventional banks. Most of these studies 
have presented inefficiency from the scale 
side (wrong scale of operations).
Islamic and conventional banks in 
Malaysia experience a similar situation, 
namely, that the TE of both types of bank 
is not dominated by scale efficiency, but 
rather, it is dominated by PTE (managerial 
efficiency). Based on previous observation 
recorded in the literature, the contra findings 
discovered between studies on international 
Islamic banks and Malaysian Islamic 
banks (Samad, 1999; Katib, 1999; Tahir & 
Haron, 2008; Sufian, 2007), the technical 
inefficiency (TIE) of international Islamic 
banks is dominated by PTIE (managerially 
inefficient) while the TIE of Malaysian 
Islamic banks is dominated by SIE 
(inefficient bank’s size). 
Cost Efficiency, Revenue Efficiency and 
Profit Efficiency
Many studies have conducted cost and 
profit efficiency tests on practices by the 
conventional banks rather than by Islamic 
banks and have discovered that the different 
levels between cost and profit efficiency 
are caused by the inefficiency generated by 
revenue procurement (Chu & Lim, 1998; 
Rogers, 1998; Maudos et al., 2002; Berger 
& Mester, 2003).
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Cost efficiency means that a firm is 
able to minimise the costs of inputs while 
producing the same amount of outputs 
sold at certain prices (Berger & Mester, 
1997; Ariff & Can, 2008). Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) claim that most of the 
previous studies focused on cost efficiency 
(Srinivasin, 1992; Linder & Crane, 1992; 
Shaffer, 1993; Berger & Humphrey, 1992; 
Rhoades, 1993; Pilloff, 1996; Resti, 1997), 
and suggest that research on revenue and 
profit efficiency has been scarce. Most 
ignored the influence of revenue and profit 
on the efficiency of banks (Akhavein et al., 
1997; Bader et al., 2008).
Profit efficiency is also a firm’s 
maximisation of profit since it takes into 
account both the cost and revenue effects on 
the changes in output scale and scope. Profit 
efficiency measures how close a bank comes 
to producing maximum profit, given an 
amount of inputs and outputs and a level of 
their prices (Akhavein et al. 1997; Akhigbe 
& McNulty, 2003: Ariff & Can, 2008). 
Thus, profit efficiency provides a complete 
description of the economic goal of a bank, 
which requires banks to reduce cost and 
increase revenue. Furthermore, according 
to Berger and Mester (2003) and Maudos 
and Pastor (2003), profit efficiency offers 
more useful information on management 
efficiency.
Revenue is defined as how effectively 
a bank sells its outputs. Maximum revenue 
is obtained as a result of producing the 
output bundle efficiently (Rogers, 1998; 
Andogo et al., 2005). In fact, revenue 
efficiency is decomposed of technical and 
allocative efficiency which are related 
to managerial factors and is regularly 
associated with regulatory factors (Isik 
and Hassan, 2002). English et al. (1993) 
posit that in order to ascertain revenue 
efficiency, banks should focus on both 
technical efficiency (managerial operations 
that explore production possibilities) and 
allocative efficiency (bank producing 
revenue-maximising mix of outputs based 
on certain regulations).
Another way to improve revenue 
efficiency as proposed by several studies is 
for banks to produce higher quality services 
and charge higher prices and struggle to 
avoid any improper choice of input and 
output quantities and mispricing of outputs 
(Andogo et al., 2005; Rogers, 1998). 
The revenue inefficiency could be well 
identified via the profit function because this 
function combines both the cost and revenue 
efficiency to evaluate the profit efficiency 
(Lozano, 1997; Akhevein et al., 1997). The 
revenue efficiency would totally affect the 
efficiency of the profit even though the cost 
efficiency is high. In essence, the revenue 
efficiency would be the major factor that 
influences the efficiency on profit. Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997, Akhavein et al., 1997, 
Bader et al., 2008, Sufian et al., 2012a and 
Sufian et al., 2012b state that there have 
been limited studies done on the revenue 
efficiency of banks. 
Nevertheless, several studies point to 
factors that may influence the differences 
between cost and profit efficiency levels 
(e.g. De Young et al., 2004; Akhigbe & 
McNulty, 2005; Andogo et al., 2005; Sufian 
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& Chong, 2008; Sufian & Habibullah, 2009; 
Kosmidou, 2008; Delis et al., 2008; Sufian 
& Habibullah, 2010). These studies suggest 
that the difference levels of cost and profit 
efficiency may be the influence by internal 
(bank-specific characteristics) and external 
(macroeconomics) factors. The internal 
factors include size of banks, asset quality, 
capitalisation, market power, management 
quality and liquidity, among others. 
Meanwhile, the external or macroeconomic 
factors consist of economic growth, inflation 
and banks’ concentration ratio, among 
others. 
The above literature reveals the 
following research gaps. First, the majority 
of these studies have mainly concentrated 
on conventional banking sectors of the 
Western and developed countries. Second, 
empirical evidence directly related to 
developing countries, particularly for the 
Islamic banking sector, is scarce. Finally, 
virtually nothing has been published on 
cost, revenue and profit efficiency and their 
determinants in the Malaysian Islamic and 
conventional banking sectors. In the light 
of these knowledge gaps, this paper seeks 
to provide new empirical evidence on cost, 
revenue and profit efficiency with regards to 
the Malaysian Islamic and the conventional 
banking sectors.
 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This study gathers data from all Malaysian 
Islamic and conventional banks from 2006 
to 2009. The primary source for financial 
data is obtained from the BankScope 
database produced by the Bureau van Dijk 
which provides the banks’ balance sheets 
and income statements. The data were 
collected from 39 banks (17 Islamic banks 
and 22 conventional banks) as presented in 
Table 1.
Data Envelopment Analysis
The level  of  revenue eff iciency is 
measured using the Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) method which applies 
the intermediation approach. It constructs 
the frontier of the observed input-output 
ratios by linear programming techniques. 
The linear substitution is possible between 
observed input combinations on an isoquant 
(the same quantity of output is produced 
while changing the quantities of two or 
more inputs) that was assumed by the 
DEA. Charnes et al. (1978) were the first 
to introduce the term DEA to measure the 
efficiency of each decisionmaking unit 
(DMU) obtained as a maximum of a ratio 
of weighted outputs to weighted inputs. 
The more the output produced from given 
inputs, the more efficient is the production. 
According to Bader et al. (2008), the DEA 
technique is extensively used in many recent 
banking efficiency studies (Drake et al., 
2006; Sufian & Habibullah, 2009). 
This study employs estimates efficiency 
under the assumption of variable returns to 
scale (VRS). The VRS model was proposed 
by Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984). The 
BCC model (VRS) extended the CCR model 
that was proposed by Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1978) by relaxing the constant 
return to scale (CRS) assumption. The 
resulting BCC model was used to assess 
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the efficiency of DMUs characterised by 
VRS. The VRS assumption provides the 
measurement of pure technical efficiency 
(PTE), measuring the efficiency of the 
DMU’s managerial. The PTE measures the 
efficiency of the DMU’s pure managerial 
without being contaminated by scale. 
Therefore, VRS results may provide 
more reliable information on the DMU’s 
efficiency rather than the CRS (Coelli, et 
al., 1998; Sufian, 2004). The DEA Excel 
Solver developed by Zhu (2009) under the 
VRS model is adopted in order to solve the 
revenue efficiency and also cost and profit 
efficiency. 
The cost, revenue and profit efficiency 
models are given in Equations (1) – (3). As 
can be seen, the cost, revenue and profit 
efficiency scores are bounded within the 0 
and 1 range (Table 2).
By calculating these three efficiency 
concepts (cost, revenue and profit), we may 
observe the Islamic and conventional banks 
on these efficiency levels and, in addition, 
more robust results may be obtained.
TABLE 1 
List of Malaysian Islamic and Conventional Banks During the Years 2006-2009 
No. Islamic Bank No. Conventional Bank
1 Affin Bank 1  Affin Bank Berhad
2 Alliance Bank 2  Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad
3 Al-Rajhi Bank 3  AmBank (M) Berhad
4 Arab-Malaysia (AmIslamic Bank) 4  Bangkok Bank Berhad
5 Asian Finance Bank 5  Bank of America Malaysia Berhad
6 Bank Islam Malaysia 6  Bank of China (Malaysia) Berhad
7 Bank Muamalat 7  Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Malaysia) Berhad
8 Commerce Tijari (CIMB) 8  CIMB Bank Berhad
9 EON Bank Islamic 9  Citibank Berhad
10 Hong Kong Bank (HSBC) 10  Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Berhad
11 Hong Leong Bank 11  Hong Leong Bank Berhad
12 Kuwait Finance House 12  HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad
13 Maybank 13  J.P. Morgan Chase Bank Berhad
14 OCBC 14  Malayan Banking Berhad
15 Public Bank 15  OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Berhad
16 RHB Islamic Bank 16  Public Bank Berhad
17 Standard Chartered Bank 17  RHB Bank Berhad
  18  Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad
  19  The Bank of Nova Scotia Berhad
  20  The Royal Bank of Scotland Berhad
  21  United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd.
  22  EON Bank
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (2009)
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TABLE 2 
The cost, revenue and profit efficiency models
Frontier Type Cost Efficiency  
(Eq. 1)
Revenue Efficiency  
(Eq. 2)
Profit Efficiency 
(Eq. 3)
VRS
Source: Zhu (2009) 
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Variables Used in DEA
According to Cooper et al. (2002), there is 
a rule required to be complied with in order 
to select the number of inputs and outputs. 
A rough rule of thumb which could provide 
guidance is as follows:
n ≥ max {m x s, 3(m+s)}
where,
n is a number of DMUs
m is a number of inputs
s is a number of outputs
B e c a u s e  t h i s  s t u d y  u s e s  t h e 
intermediation approach, two inputs, two 
input prices, two outputs and two output 
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price variables are chosen. The overall 
selection of the variable of banks’ input 
and output is based on Ariff and Can (2008) 
and other major studies on the efficiency of 
banks (Sufian & Habibulah, 2009; Bader 
et al., 2008; Isik & Hassan, 2002; Hassan, 
2005). The two input vector variables 
consist of x1: deposits and x2: labour. The 
input prices consist of w1: price of deposit, 
w2 and price of labour. 
The two output vector variables are y1: 
loans and y2: investment. Meanwhile, two 
output prices consist of r1: price of loans 
and r2: price of investment. The summary of 
data used to construct the efficiency frontiers 
are presented in Table 3.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
This study first tested the rule of thumb on 
the selection of input and output variables 
suggested by Cooper et al. (2002). Since 
the total number of DMUs (39 banks) in 
this study is more than the number of input 
and output variables (2 inputs x 2 outputs 
@ 3 [2 inputs + 2 outputs]), the selection of 
variables is valid since it complies with the 
rule of thumb and allows the efficiencies of 
DMUs to be measured.
Next, by calculating all three efficiencies 
concepts (revenue, cost and profit), we may 
observe Islamic and conventional banks at 
these efficiency levels and further obtain 
more robust results. Table 4 and Fig.1 
illustrate all efficiency concepts, namely, 
cost, revenue and profit efficiency for 
Malaysian Islamic and conventional banks.
Malaysian Islamic Bank
Table 4 shows the mean for cost efficiency, 
revenue efficiency and profit efficiency of 
73.4 %, 74.5 % and 67 % respectively for 
the Malaysian Islamic banks. Another way 
of interpreting this result is to suggest that 
these banks have slacked (inefficient) by not 
fully producing the outputs efficiently using 
the same input (revenue inefficiency) and 
by not fully using the inputs efficiently to 
produce the same outputs (cost inefficiency). 
TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Inputs, Outputs, Inputs Prices and Outputs Prices
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
x1 41.86 243,132.00 29,596.4545 46,432.68774
x2 0.60 2,554.00 239.6037 414.31223
y1 2.41 185,783.20 19,998.3287 33,016.50439
y2 1.65 61,677.50 5,655.2189 10,090.18753
w1 0.00 0.10 0.0254 0.01056
w2 0.00 2.27 0.0264 0.18375
r1 0.01 2.51 0.1371 0.25546
r2 0.00 15.16 0.6732 1.24391
Note: x1: Deposits (deposits and short term funding), x2: Labour (personnel expenses), y1: Loans (net 
loans and interbank lending), y2: investment (total securities), w1: Price of deposits (total interest expenses/
deposits), w2: Price of labour (personnel expenses/total assets), r1: Price of loans (interest income on loans 
and other interest income/loans), r2: Price of investment (other operating income/investment) 
Fakarudin Kamarudin and Mohamed Hisham Yahya
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Banks are said to have slacked if they fail 
to fully minimise the cost and maximise the 
revenue (profit inefficiency). The levels of 
cost inefficiency, revenue inefficiency and 
profit inefficiency are shown as 26.6 %, 25.5 
% and 33 % respectively. 
Findings are noted in which on the 
average, the Islamic banks are found to be 
more revenue efficient. They managed to 
utilise their inputs to generate revenues and 
profits. For revenue efficiency, the average 
bank could generate 74.5 % of the revenues 
than it was expected to generate. Hence, 
there is only a slack of 25.5 %, meaning 
that the average bank lost an opportunity 
to receive 25.5 % more revenue, giving 
the same amount of resources, or it had to 
produce 25.5 % of its outputs with the same 
level of inputs. 
As for cost efficiency, the results mean 
that the average bank had utilised only 
73.4 % of the resources or inputs in order 
to produce the same level of output. In 
other words, on the average, the Malaysian 
banking sector had wasted 26.6 % of its 
inputs, or it could have saved 26.6 % of its 
inputs to produce the same level of outputs. 
Therefore, there was substantial room for 
significant cost savings for these banks if 
had they employed their inputs efficiently.
Noticeably, the highest level of 
inefficiency is on the cost side, followed by 
profits. Similarly, the average bank could 
earn 67 % of what was available, and lost 
the opportunity to make 33 % more profits 
when utilising the same level of inputs. 
Consequently, profit efficiency (67 %) is 
lower than cost efficiency (73.4 %) due to 
higher revenue efficiency (74.5 %) levels. 
Therefore, the higher revenue efficiency 
seems to have contributed to the lower profit 
efficiency or higher profit inefficiency levels 
compared to cost efficiency levels. 
Malaysian Conventional Banks
The empirical findings presented in Table 4 
seem to suggest that Malaysian conventional 
banks have exhibited a mean of cost 
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Fig.1: Graph on Cost, Revenue and Profit Efficiencies for Malaysian Islamic and Conventional Banking 
Sectors in Period 2006-2009
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efficiency, revenue efficiency and profit 
efficiency (inefficiency) of 89.7 % (10.3 
%), 75.5 % (24.5 %) and 85.6 % (14.4 %) 
respectively.
For cost efficiency, the results mean that 
the average bank utilised only 89.7 % of the 
resources or inputs to produce the same level 
of output for conventional banks. In other 
words, on the average, conventional banks 
wasted 10.3 % of their inputs, or they could 
have saved 10.3 % of their inputs to produce 
the same level of outputs. If the conventional 
banks had fully utilised their inputs, they 
could have saved on costs.
Nevertheless, it is noted that on the 
average, conventional banks were more cost-
efficient in utilising their inputs compared to 
their ability to generate revenue and profit. 
For revenue efficiency, the average bank 
could only generate 75.5 % of revenue, 
less than what it was initially expected to 
generate. Hence, revenue was lost by 24.5 
%, meaning that the average bank lost an 
opportunity to receive 24.5 % more revenue 
given the same amount of resources, or it 
could have produced 24.5 % of its outputs 
given the same level of inputs. 
Obviously, the inefficiency is on the 
revenue side, followed by profit. Similarly, 
the average bank could earn 85.6 % of what 
was available, but lost the opportunity to 
make 14.4 % more profits from the same 
level of inputs. Even though the cost 
efficiency is highest in conventional banks, 
the revenue efficiency is found to be lower, 
and this led to higher revenue inefficiency. 
When both efficiency concepts (revenue 
and cost efficiency) are compared, the 
higher revenue inefficiency is seen to have 
contributed to the higher profit inefficiency. 
In conclusion, the empirical findings 
from this study seem to suggest that 
conventional banks have exhibited a higher 
efficiency level for all three efficiency 
measures [e.g. cost efficiency (89.7 % vs. 
73.4 %), revenue efficiency (75.5 % vs. 7.45 
%), and profit efficiency (85.6 % vs. 67 %)]. 
In essence, revenue efficiency seems to have 
played the main factor that led to the lower 
or higher profit efficiency levels. Besides, 
results for the conventional banks show 
that the level of profit efficiency is lower 
than that of cost efficiency due to the lower 
revenue efficiency or higher inefficiency 
level from revenue. Meanwhile, the level of 
profit efficiency is lower than cost efficiency 
due to the higher revenue efficiency level 
from revenue for the Islamic banks.
The levels of cost, revenue and profit 
efficiency on conventional and Islamic 
banks were performed by a series of 
parametric (t-test) and non-parametric 
(Mann-Whitney [Wilcoxon]) and Kruskal-
Wallis tests. Coakes and Steed (2003) 
suggest that the Mann-Whitney (Wilcoxon) 
is a relevant test for two independent 
samples coming from populations having 
the same distribution. The most relevant 
reason is that the data violate the stringent 
assumptions of the independent group’s 
t-test, so it was decided that Mann-Whitney 
tests should be used. This study uses 
parametric and non-parametric tests in order 
to obtain robust results.
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Robustness Tests
Table 5 shows the robustness tests 
results from the parametric and non-
parametric tests of the data. The results 
of cost efficiency from the parametric 
t-test show that Malaysian Islamic banks 
exhibit a lower cost efficiency mean than 
conventional banks (0.734<0.897), and it 
is significantly different. Meanwhile, the 
profit efficiency reported that the Islamic 
banks also show a lower profit efficiency 
mean than conventional banks (0.67<0.856) 
and that it is significantly different. The 
results from the parametric t-test were 
further confirmed by non-parametric Mann-
Whitney (Wilcoxon) and Kruskall-Wallis 
tests. Therefore, this suggests that the cost 
and profit efficiency of Islamic banks was 
lower than for conventional banks.
However, an interesting result is 
obtained regarding the revenue efficiency 
of Malaysian Islamic and conventional 
banks. The results from the parametric 
t-test indicate that revenue efficiency of 
the Islamic banks was lower compared to 
that of conventional banks (0.745<0.755). 
However, the results should be interpreted 
with caution since the difference is not 
statistically significant at any conventional 
levels. The results seem to suggest that the 
revenue efficiency of the conventional banks 
is not as efficient as that of Islamic banks. 
Furthermore, this revenue efficiency has not 
significantly influenced the levels of the cost 
TABLE 5 
Summary of Parametric and Non-Parametric Tests on Malaysian Islamic and Conventional Banks
Test groups
 Parametric test Non-parametric test
Individual tests t-test Mann-Whitney Kruskall-Wallis
   [Wilcoxon Rank-Sum] test Equality of Populations test
Hypothesis MedianIslamic =  
   MedianConventional   
Test statistics t(Prb>t) z(Prb>z) X² (Prb > X²)
Mean t Mean Rank z Mean Rank X²
Cost Efficiency       
Islamic banks 0.734 –5.835*** 59.86 –4.593*** 59.86 21.097***
Conventional bank 0.897 92.90 92.90
Revenue Efficiency
Islamic banks 0.745 -0.238 76.60 -0.470 76.60 0.221
Conventional bank 0.755 79.97 79.97
Profit Efficiency
Islamic banks 0.670 –4.415*** 63.85 –3.805*** 63.85 14.481***
Conventional bank 0.856  89.82  89.82  
***, ** indicate significance at the 1 % and 5 % levels respectively
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and profit efficiency in both types of bank. 
Both the non-parametric Mann-Whitney 
(Wilcoxon) and Kruskall-Wallis tests also 
indicate the same. This study concludes that 
only cost and profit efficiency have higher 
levels in Malaysian conventional banks 
rather than in Islamic banks. 
CONCLUSION
The study was carried out with the main 
purpose of identifying the levels of the cost, 
revenue and profit efficiency in Malaysian 
Islamic and conventional banks over the 
period 2006 to 2009. To recap, a few studies 
have examined the comprehensive efficiency 
that consists of these three components 
of cost, revenue and profit efficiency. 
Most of the previous studies have mainly 
focused on the efficiency of cost or profit 
or both. Therefore, by examining overall 
efficiency including revenue efficiency, 
more robustness results can be produced in 
order to identify the most efficient banks in 
Malaysia. 
The non-parametric Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) methodology was applied 
to distinguish between the three different 
types of efficiency, which are cost, revenue 
and profit efficiency. Furthermore, this study 
has performed a series of parametric (t-test) 
and non-parametric tests (Mann-Whitney 
[Wilcoxon] and Kruskall-Wallis) in order 
to obtain robustness results. 
The results of this study show that 
they are statistically significant in terms of 
difference on cost and profit efficiency levels 
between Malaysian Islamic and conventional 
banks. The study discovers that the cost and 
profit efficiency for Malaysian Islamic 
banks are at the lower levels compared to the 
Malaysian conventional banks. In addition, 
the difference levels between cost and profit 
efficiency in the Malaysian banking sector 
are not influenced by the revenue efficiency 
level since the insignificant results are 
discovered but it may be due to the internal 
(bank-specific characteristics) and external 
(macroeconomics) factors.
The research concludes that Malaysian 
conventional banks are more efficient since 
both cost and profit efficiency show higher 
levels than for Islamic banks. Findings from 
studies on these efficiency concepts provide 
guidance and better information and fill 
in the gaps in current literature, therefore, 
benefiting regulators, the banking sector 
itself, investors and academicians when 
they have to make decisions for the future. 
In addition, to ensure the competitiveness 
of the Malaysian Islamic and conventional 
banking sectors, the other determinants 
on internal and external factors need to 
be considered as well. Thus, from the 
regulatory perspective, the performance 
of banks will be based not only on their 
efficiency but also on the other potential 
determinants. 
Moreover, in view of the increasing 
competition attributed to the more liberalised 
banking sector, bank management as well 
as policymakers will be more inclined to 
identify and find an effective and efficient 
way to obtain the optimal utilisation of 
capacities. Therefore, the resources will 
fully utilise and eliminate wastage during 
the production of banking products and 
services. 
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ABSTRACT
The financial crisis of 2008 had a great impact on the banking industry of the United States. 
This paper looks at the impact of the financial risks on the share revaluation of commercial 
banks in United States. It is expected that the earnings announcements will affect investors’ 
decisions to trade in bank shares. The Earnings Response Coefficients (ERCs) are applied 
in this paper to ascertain whether the estimated financial risks have incremental information 
content beyond the reported earnings. The findings support the notion that investors in the 
United States do look beyond the reported numbers and look for credit, market and price 
risk significantly in the earnings response valuation among other financial risks variables.
Keywords: Bank earnings, financial risks, market risks, price risks, abnormal returns
INTRODUCTION
There are about 150 top financial institutions 
in the United States of America, of which 
50 play an important role in facilitating 
economic growth. This is in line with 
the long-established theory that financial 
intermediation plays a critical role in the 
allocation of resources, mobilisation of 
savings, and diversification of risk and, 
therefore, has an important impact on the 
economy (Francis & Hunter, 2004). The 
previous “credit crunch” of 2006 and the 
more recent 2008 financial crisis caused 
a serious problem for the US economy 
and seriously affected its banking sector’s 
net income, market valuation, shareholder 
equity and capital market liquidity.
This paper investigates the impact of the 
risk structure of commercial banks on share 
revaluation in the United States and uses 
the Earnings Response Coefficients (ERC) 
to measure the impact from changes to the 
financial risk and market and price risks of 
these banks. 
Credit risk, interest risk, solvency risk 
and liquidity risk are used as measurements 
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of financial risk with the addition of a market 
and price risk. The analysis uses abnormal 
returns and the unexpected annual earnings 
model.
Credit risk is the probability of not 
receiving cash flows from assets (loans and 
investments) as promised. Interest rate risk 
refers to the negative impact on the net cash 
flows and the values of assets and liabilities 
originating from changes in interest rates, 
while liquidity risk indicates the ability of 
a banking institution to fund its financial 
needs. Liquidity risk is actually the by-
product of the aforementioned risks since 
liquidity problems originate from credit 
and interest rate risks. Finally, solvency risk 
relates to the capital cushion that the bank 
has to offer to protect its depositors and 
borrowers from declines in assets values. 
There is no question that some risks 
have to be taken to gain adequate returns. 
The trade-off between risks and returns is 
an important decision in the assets-liabilities 
management of banks. Managers may 
sacrifice risks to gain better performance. 
The big question is: How much risk should 
the bank take in order to gain extra earnings? 
Additionally, how much value is in the 
earnings per risks trade-off?
In the past, banks have developed risk-
return models that allow more sensitive 
assessment of the relationship between risk 
and earnings/profit that leads to shareholder 
value in terms of share price. One of the 
models is the risk adjusted returns model. 
Therefore, this study tries to link the 
traditional earnings response model to 
returns to measure investors/shareholders 
valuation on assets. The earnings response 
measures the magnitude and direction of the 
valuation. This study includes risks as the 
additional control variables. 
This study, hence, is an extension of 
many previous studies on ERC which aims 
to investigate the earnings response query to 
banks in the US. It follows the established 
risk-adjusted returns and regression 
methodology in measuring the effect of 
financial risk on shares revaluation for US-
based banks. The assessment summarises the 
impact of risks on US banking institutions on 
different levels before crisis that indirectly 
reflect the recovery ability of these banks 
after the US financial crisis.
The paper is divided into five sections. 
The section that follows this first section 
or the Introduction is Literature Review, 
which reviews literature on the risks-and-
returns relation. Section Methodology 
deals with the research design, hypotheses 
and methodology employed in this study. 
The findings of this study are presented 
in Findings while this paper ends with 
conclusions and limitations in Conclusion. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Many studies in the past have documented 
that earnings levels and earnings changes are 
associated with positive abnormal returns 
(Latane & Jones, 1979; Foster et.al, 1984; 
Bernard & Thomas, 1989). Furthermore, 
Ariff and Cheng (2011) state that there is 
strong evidence that the earnings response 
coefficients (ERC) are highly significant in 
several investigations over 40 years on the 
relation between abnormal returns of stocks 
and accounting earnings.
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Two latest studies on stock price 
reaction to earnings announcements are 
Iqbal and Farooqi (2011) and Johnson and 
Zhao (2011). Iqbal and Farooqi (2011) 
study the stock price reaction to public 
announcement of quarterly earnings after 
tax profit by listed firms on an emerging 
market, namely the Karachi Stock Exchange 
(KSE). The magnitude and timing of the 
announcements related to earnings provide 
useful information to investors regarding the 
financial soundness of the firms. Conducting 
event studies on emerging markets is 
quite challenging due to their excessive 
price volatility which is a consequence 
of the relatively unstable political and 
macroeconomic conditions.
Johnson and Zhao (2011) study 
contrarian share price reactions to earnings 
surprises. The stock prices tend to rise 
as the effect from unexpected surprises 
caused by positive earnings. Moreover, 
the credibility of analysts and investors 
increases, hence, share prices either also 
increase or are maintained, while negative 
earnings surprises, on the other hand, are 
believed to evoke a severe share price 
penalty because the failure to at least meet 
the market’s expectation raises doubt 
among investors about the firm’s underlying 
strength. Firms tend to fall on impact from 
a negative earnings surprise. Earnings 
surprise persistence is obtained from a 
time-series regression model that controls 
for the presence of contrarian returns. 
The results find that contrarian share 
price responses to earnings surprises are 
a prevalent (but overlooked) feature of 
quarterly earnings announcements of stock 
return distributions. The direction and 
magnitude of the earnings surprise are not 
a reliable indicator of the market reaction to 
the earnings announcements. The research 
concludes about factors that influence the 
incidence of contrarian returns in negative 
earnings surprise deciles are unchanged by 
the sample restrictions. But the above studies 
show only the existence of ‘information 
content’ of the earnings announcement. 
This study attempts to measure the impact 
in change in the risk structure of the firm on 
share valuation. Therefore, we proposed to 
include risk variables in our model. 
Several findings of the past show that 
the ERC is volatile when affected by some 
factors. For example, Miller and Rock 
(1985) examine the unexpected earnings and 
returns affected by the information. Soh et 
al. (2009) defines ERC as the coefficient that 
measures unexpected accounting earnings 
in regressions of abnormal share market 
returns on that and other variables. The ERC 
is influenced by other financial risks factors 
as well. Therefore, some research findings 
point to an increase in significance of the 
relationship between unexpected earnings 
and returns in the middle of time periods. 
Myring (2006) uses the earnings-returns 
relationship to examine how market reaction 
to earnings varies across countries, and the 
stability of this relationship over time as 
well as the factors that influence market 
response to earnings.
The newly raised question is: Can the 
above ERC studies be extended to US banks 
with the incorporation of risks factors? The 
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US subprime crisis that happened at the 
end of 2007 eventually affected the global 
economy in the following year. The global 
crisis started with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. The result of it was a large decline 
in the capital of many banks, and the US 
government had to sponsor enterprises, 
tightening credit around the world. The main 
issue was about an increase in mortgage 
rate and loan incentives and the value of 
the house mortgage that began to dip in 
2006 and 2007. Thus, refinancing became 
more difficult. As a result, most financial 
institutions as well as the stock market 
reported huge losses.
The US banking industry has undergone 
considerable changes over the last two 
decades in response to major deregulation, 
financial innovation and technological 
advancement. The well-known Riegle-
Neal Act of 1994 allowed banking and 
branching on a nationwide scale. Strahan 
(2003) summarises the fundamental 
changes in bank operation as an effect of 
the deregulation period which altered the 
competitive dynamics of the industry and 
directly impacted economic outcomes 
across US states. 
One of the effects of deregulation 
pointed out in prior literature was an 
increased bank risk which can be mitigated 
with better risk management (Houston & 
Stiroh, 2006). In another sense, though, 
deregulation will increase competition, 
causing increased bank risks as banks seek 
out more risky high-yielding investments in 
order to maintain profit margins (Bundt et al., 
1992; Park, 1994; Galloway et al., 1997). It 
may also allow banks to diversify, resulting 
in reduced risks (Craigh & Santos, 1997). 
Having an integrated financial structure 
among the European banks may have 
resulted in reduced operating risk through 
decreased foreign exchange risk exposures, 
decreased differences in legislation and 
accounting and in regulation simplification. 
The recent Greek Sovereign Crisis, however, 
highlights another contagion effect of this 
risk diversification as risk is being shared 
among the European Union countries.
Therefore, this paper concentrates on 
the six types of risk in the banking industry. 
The first four types of financial risk are 
credit risk, interest risk, solvency risk and 
liquidity risk and the other two are market 
risk and price risk. This study first tests 
whether there exists a relationship between 
stock pricing and returns from banks, and 
then extends the study to risks factors. 
Bystrom, Worasinchai and Chongsithipol 
(2005) study the relationship between 
default risk and firm size, book-to-market 
ratio and stock returns during a severe crisis. 
They find a significant increase in market-
based default probabilities around the crisis 
and a fairly slow return to pre-crisis levels. 
The first sector to suffer deterioration in 
creditworthiness was the sector of banking, 
finance and securities institutions. However, 
they conclude that default risk is non-
systematic. Cheng and Ariff (2007) examine 
whether four financial risk factors correlated 
with the abnormal returns of bank shares, 
while Wong (1997) shows that the optimal 
bank interest margin reacts positively to the 
increase in credit risk and interest rate risk. 
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Finally, Hartmann (2010) reviews five new 
research papers, which shed light on various 
aspects of the relationship between market 
and credit risk and illustrate why they matter, 
particularly for risk management, and also 
for financial supervision and regulation. 
He further recommends future research in 
bilateral interaction between market and 
credit risk to other trilateral interaction.
METHODOLOGY
Research Design
This study examines the impact of 
several risk factors on the performance of 
commercial banks by using ratios computed 
from the financial statements of 122 selected 
banks from the period 2004 to 2009. The 
first four types are financial risks such as 
credit risk, interest risk, solvency risk and 
liquidity risk. The other two are market risk 
and price risk. The ratios are defined in Table 
1. The reason is that we wanted to determine 
whether these factors would impact the 
selected banks’ shares in terms of direction 
and magnitude and the revaluation effect 
from earnings changes during that period.
There are two main ways to calculate 
unexpected returns, which are:
i. The return series is regressed against 
the lagged return series. The residual is 
then used as an unexpected return. This 
method is commonly used in economics 
and finance.
ii. The difference in accounting returns 
between current year and previous year, 
which is commonly used in accounting 
literature 
In this study, the second method was 
adopted. 
Analysis of Abnormal Returns
Sharpe Market Model (1963) as a standard 
general equilibrium relationship for asset 
returns was used. The Abnormal Returns 
(AR):
ARit = Rit - ( α + βi Rmt )             (1)
where,
Rit =Ln(Pit/Pit-1) and, 
Rmt = (Ln It/It- ). 
In addition to the terms already defined, 
Ln is natural logarithm and i refers to 
markets composite index. Hence, we took 
the changes in bank share prices as Rit and 
changes in market index as indicating the 
Rmt. We regressed the Rit and Rmt to compute 
the beta (β) and alpha (α) to complete the 
model for each bank. We also computed 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) from 
the summation of Abnormal Return (AR) 
for the period of 12 months. 
Analysis of Unexpected Annual 
Accounting Earnings
Unexpected annual earnings were computed 
using the naive expectation model, which 
assumes that the next period’s expectation is 
simply the current period’s annual earning. 
This is also consistent with the design of the 
study to analyse the contemporaneous effect 
of price at a point in time.
Unexpected annual earnings (UEs) were 
computed using the naive model:
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UEit = (EPSit – EPSi(t-1))/ EPSi(t-1)           (2)
We computed the unexpected earnings 
from annual earnings per share of each 
sample bank as shown above in equation (2). 
However, only five years’ annual earnings 
per share were available for the selected 
banks, thus allowing us to compute only 
four years of UEit. The UEit depends on 
earnings per share of the bank. Therefore, 
the individual bank’s profit and performance 
determine the movement of its share prices, 
and are directly related to earnings per 
share1.
Risk Determinant Factors
In this study, four financial risk factors were 
considered. We included two additional risk 
factors as mentioned above. They were price 
risk and market risk. The financial risks and 
their ratios are stated in Table 1, which gives 
the financial risk factors and their ratios.
This study used four financial ratios 
calculated from the balance sheets sourced 
from Bankscope. The additional two risk 
variables were added according to price 
risk (P) as derived from the yearly standard 
deviation (σ t) of the bank share price 
from 2005 to 2009. The market variable 
was computed from the yearly standard 
deviation (σi) of the share market index.
Relationship Between Abnormal Returns, 
Unexpected Earnings and Risk Factors
The relationship between abnormal returns 
as dependent variable and unexpected 
earnings and the six risk factors, namely, 
1Earnings per share computed by net income / 
number of the shares outstanding
interest rate risk, liquidity risk, credit risk, 
solvency risk, market risk and price risk 
as independent variables was tested in the 
regression:
CARi  
= δ1 + δ2 UEI + δ3 Mri + δ4 Pri + δ5 Sri  
     + δ6  Iri + δ7 Lri + δ8 Cri + εi               (4)
where,
CARi  = Cumulative abnormal return over a 
12-month window
UEi  = Unexpected Annual Earnings,
Mr = Market risk factor, 
Pri = Price risk,
Sri = Solvency risk factor, 
Iri = Interest risk factor,
Lri = Liquidity risk factor, and
Cri = Credit risk factor
Eight regressions were performed 
according to the following specification:
CARi = δ 1 + δ 2 UEi + ε
Model 1
CARi = δ 1 + δ 2 UEi + δ 3 Mri + ε
Model 2
CARi = δ 1 + δ 2 UEi + δ 4  Pri + εi
Model 3
CARi = δ 1 + δ 2 UEi + δ 5 Sri + εi
Model 4
CARi = δ 1 + δ 2 UEi + δ 6  Iri + εi
Model 5
CARi = δ 1 + δ 2 UEi + δ 7 Lri + εi
Model 6
CARi = δ 1 + δ 2 UEi + δ 8 Cri + εi
Model 7
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CARi = δ 1 + δ 2 UEI + δ 3 Mri + δ 4 Pri 
+ δ 5 Sri + δ 6  Iri + δ 7 Lri + δ 8 Cri + εi
Model 8
We examined whether these four 
identified “accounting –financial factors” 
had information content over and above the 
information from unexpected earnings (UE) 
in the US banking industry. Additionally, 
we examined whether the two new risk 
factors would have an impact on the US 
banks earning response. The regressions 
used the panel Ordinary Least Square 
regression following Wooldridge (2001). A 
priori, we expected some of the key factors 
to significantly add more information to the 
price determinants.
OBJECTIVES
This paper examines the relationship 
between risk-adjusted abnormal returns and 
the unexpected annual earnings changes. 
It also ascertains whether six factors i.e. 
market risk, price risk, interest rate risk, 
liquidity risk, credit risk, and solvency risk 
affect the return-to-earnings relationship.
Data
The data set initially contained 132 US 
commercial banks from the Bankscope 
financial database. A final sample of 122 
banks was available for analysis for the 
period 2005 to 2009. Table 2 shows the 
summary of the statistics related to the 122 
sampled banks in terms of their total assets, 
total equity, total loans, total deposit and 
total income in 2009. 
The difference between the largest 
and the smallest bank in terms of total 
assets of the banks is USD11,056 million. 
Wilmington Trust Corporation had the 
highest assets value. MB Financial Inc. was 
the second largest bank in assets, followed 
by Virginia National Bank. The smallest 
bank was Bank Reale, which had the lowest 
asset, equity and loan and deposit value. 
The data above show that US banks 
had more deposits compared to loans in the 
year 2008. This indicated that US banks 
were giving attractive interest rates to the 
public, which resulted in an increase of bank 
savings deposits. The banks had a good cash 
management policy of managing the amount 
of money inflow and outflow. These banks 
TABLE 1 
Financial Risk Factors and Ratios
Label Financial Risk Factors Financial Ratios
Iri Interest risk Loan / Deposit
Cri Credit risk Non-performing loans / Total assets
Lri Liquidity risk Liquid assets / Total deposit
Sri Solvency risk Equity / Deposit and short-term funding
**Additional Risk 
Pri * Price risk Yearly Standard deviation of P (σt)
Mri * Market risk Yearly Standard deviation of Market index (σi)
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were holding cash more than giving out 
loans to avoid insolvency risk in times of 
recession. So the total loan of USD46,668.2 
million compared to a total deposit of 
USD59,271.was at a ratio of 1:1.13. This 
means that 1 % of loans given out were 
covered with 1.13 deposits. Hence, during 
the recession period, US citizens preferred 
traditional savings than investment in other 
financial investment instruments. This was 
encouraged by an attractive deposit interest 
rate by the banks.
FINDINGS
Descriptive Data
Data such as earnings per share, interest risk 
(Loan / Deposit), Credit risk (Net loans / 
Total assets), Liquidity risk (Liquid assets 
/ Total deposit) and Solvency risk (Equity 
/ Deposit and short-term funding) were 
extracted from Bankscope. Capital IQ was 
used to extract monthly data such as the 
banks’ share price data and S&P500 index 
to complete the data set.
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics 
of the dependent and independent variables. 
The average CAR and UE are negative; this 
indicates that the banks were not doing well 
in the preceding few years. The SD values 
for these bank share prices and market index 
were 9.3% and 5 % respectively. This means 
that these banks were more risky than the 
market index.
Returns–to–earnings relationhip between 
UE and CAR
The regression results are summarised 
in Table 4. Model 1 indicates that the 
coefficient for Unexpected Earnings (UE) 
is positively and significantly related with 
CAR at a value of 0.050 and with a t-statistic 
of 5.38. The R-Squared in Model 1 was 
0.066, which is the range that was obtained 
in other studies (Lev 1985). The findings 
show that US commercial banks had a 
strong returns-earnings relationship. 
The six risk factors were subsequently 
added one by one into regression of risk 
adjusted cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) and unexpected annual earnings 
(UE). Table 3 has all the regression results 
for the remaining seven models. Initially, 
the risk factor was regressed one at a time 
and all the risk factors were then combined 
in the last regression. 
TABLE 2 
The Total Assets, Shareholder Equity, Loans and Deposit of Selected Commercial Banks (in USD million) 
in 2008
Bank Asset Equity Loans  Deposit  Income
Mean 586.3 66.3 382.5 485.8 -0.4
Standard Deviation 1,435.1 174.8 1,045.6 1,154.7 12.9
Range 11,056.0 1,303.3 8,699.9 8,967.6 147.5
Minimum 41.1 3.8 15.8 27.1 -104.6
Maximum 11,097.1 1,307.1 8,715.7 8,994.7 42.9
Sum 71,524.3 8,084.0 46,668.2 59,271.1 -49.5
Count 122 122 122 122 122
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Each model exhibited a coefficient 
for UE variables which were significantly 
and positively related to CAR. All the 
risk models were insignificant except 
for market risk, price risk and credit risk 
factor. The market risk model indicated 
that the coefficient for share market risk 
was negatively and significantly related 
at a value of -2.092 and with a t-statistic 
of -3.636. The price risk model indicated 
that the coefficient for share price risk was 
positively related at a value of 0.485 and 
with a t-statistic of 2.564, and the credit risk 
model indicated that the coefficient credit 
risk was negatively related at a value of 
-0.011 and with a t-statistic of -2.812. Other 
risk factors such as interest risk, solvency 
risk and liquidity risk were all insignificant 
with the CAR. This is because the above 
stated risks dealt with the internal financial 
performance of the banks except for market 
risk and price risk, which are the returns 
expected from taking external risks. In terms 
of credit risks, the finding is consistent with 
Cheng and Ariff (2007). The changes in the 
banks’ share price were affected negatively 
by the amount of non-performing loans in 
the loan portfolios of the banks. The higher 
the nonperforming loans, the lower the 
share price reaction to the same amount of 
earnings. 
Where credit risk was concerned, three 
factors drove the expected and unexpected 
losses in the UE: (1) The customer default 
rate given the risks level. (2) The exposure 
in the loans that is technically at risk, and 
(3) The potential loss, given default, after 
allowances were made for security. The 
non-performing loans that measured the 
credit risks encompassed all these factors. 
Therefore, an investor would view the 
magnitude of earnings with the same level 
of credit risk as more valuable, or the same 
level of earnings but lower credit risks as 
more valuable. With this model investors 
would measure the credit risk as -0.011 
times for the equivalent in credit risk, 
whereas the ERC is in the magnitude of 
0.043 of unexpected earnings. The ratio 
of differences of credit risks is about one 
quarter of the ERC.
CONCLUSION
This paper examines the effect of financial 
risks on the earnings response coefficients 
for a selected number of 122 commercial 
banks in the US and focuses on the abnormal 
returns performance in US banks.
TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent and Independent Variables
CAR UE Price 
Risk
Market 
Risk 
Solvency 
Risk
Interest 
Risk
Liquidity 
Risk
Credit 
Risk
Mean -0.072 -0.222 0.093 0.050 13.95 90.5 10.93 2.08
S. Deviation 0.309 2.247 0.084 0.028 8.64 33.2 8.95 2.61
Minimum -0.944 -13.29 0.008 0.014 0.04 28.5 0.55 0.01
Maximum 1.582 17.19 0.944 0.100 89.2 385.9 51.7 9.29
Count 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399
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The findings suggest that accounting 
earnings is a price relevant variable for banks 
and earnings has a contemporaneous impact 
on share prices for banks in the US market. 
All the risk factors were insignificant except 
for market risk, price risk, and credit risk. 
The CAR depended on the earnings of the 
banks’ share price, which was determined 
by the profit the banks were making at the 
end of the day. 
The profit of the banks was affected 
by the performance of the banks internally 
and externally. The internal factors were 
factors specifically related to the firms 
such as assets liabilities management. The 
external factors included the monetary 
policy executed by the government. The 
major income of the banks came from 
the differences in borrowings interest rate 
and depositing interest rate. For example, 
the discount rate, interest or bank lending 
rate which was fixed or imposed by the 
Federal Reserves on all banks required that 
each bank had a certain percentage of cash 
reserved in the Federal Reserves. These 
factors affected money circulation in the 
financial market. Therefore, market risk 
factor was significant in Model 2 and Model 
8, which means that the earnings of the bank 
directly related to economic conditions, 
historical events, government policies and 
other macroeconomic factors.
However, the banks realised losses 
during the recession period due to non-
performing loans from high defaults. 
Therefore, credit risk factor shows up as 
another risk factor that can affect share price 
revaluation due to earnings surprises.
This study unearthed no evidence 
that the other risk factors, namely, interest 
rate risk, liquidity risk and solvency risk, 
had information beyond earnings for US 
commercial banks. This could be due to the 
fact that these banks had managed this risk 
well following the BASEL Accords.
Overall,  this study has shown a 
positive returns-to-earnings relationship 
for banks. The market, price and credit 
risks have information content beyond 
earnings changes in the returns-to-earnings 
relationship. These risk factors are to be 
cautiously interpreted after the unexpected 
earnings variables. The other three risk 
factors were not significant probably due 
to the fact that firstly, the investors were 
not concerned with the other factored risk 
variables, and secondly, the banks were very 
well managed by their managers so that the 
other financial risk variables did not vary 
too much to be significant.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors wish to thank the class in 
Portfol io theory research for  their 
contribution
REFERENCES
Ariff, & Cheng, F. F. (2011). Accounting earnings 
response coefficient: An extension to banking 
shares in Asia Pacific countries. Advances 
in Accounting, Incorporating Advances in 
International Accounting, 27 ,  346–354. 
doi:10.1016/j.adiac.2011.08.002
Berger, A. N., DeYoung R., Genay, H., & Udell, G. F. 
(2000). Globalization of Financial Institutions: 
Comments and Discussion Evidence from 
Cross-Border Banking Performance, Brookings-TA
B
L
E
 4
 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
R
es
ul
ts
 f
or
 R
et
ur
ns
-t
o-
E
ar
ni
ng
s 
R
el
at
io
n 
fo
r 
S
el
ec
te
d 
B
an
ks
 in
 th
e 
U
S
 f
ro
m
 P
er
io
d 
20
05
 to
 2
00
9
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
M
od
el
: C
A
R
i =
 a
1 
+ 
a 2
 U
E
I 
+ 
a 3
 M
r i 
+ 
a 4
 P
r i 
+ 
a 5
 S
r i +
 a
6 
 Ir
i +
 a
7 L
r i 
+ 
a 8
 C
r i +
 ε I
D
ep
en
de
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
e:
 C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
A
bn
or
m
al
 R
et
ur
ns
 (
C
A
R
),
 n
=
25
6
In
de
pe
nd
en
t 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
   
   
 I
C
on
st
an
t 
a 1
U
E
 
a 2
M
ar
ke
t R
is
k 
a 3
P
ri
ce
 R
is
k 
a 4
So
lv
en
cy
 
R
is
k 
a 5
In
te
re
st
 
R
is
k 
a 6
L
iq
ui
di
ty
 
R
is
k 
a 7
C
re
di
t R
is
k 
a 8
A
dj
  
R
-s
q
F
-S
ta
t
V
IF
D
ur
bi
n-
W
at
so
n
M
od
el
1
-0
.0
58
0.
05
0.
06
6
28
.9
4
1.
00
 -
 1
.0
0
1.
94
4
(-
3.
57
1)
(5
.3
80
)
(0
.0
00
)
 
(0
.0
00
)*
**
(0
.0
00
)*
**
2
-0
.0
43
00
48
-2
.0
92
0.
09
4
17
.9
61
1.
13
8 
- 
1.
13
8
1.
91
4
(1
.3
43
)
(5
.1
86
)
(-
3.
63
6)
(0
. 0
00
)
 
(0
.1
80
)
(0
.0
00
)*
**
(0
.0
00
)*
**
3
-0
.1
04
0.
05
1
0.
48
5
0.
07
9
21
.5
29
1.
14
 -
 1
.1
4
1.
99
5
(-
4.
31
6)
(5
.5
29
)
(2
.5
64
)
(0
. 0
00
)
 
(0
.0
00
)*
**
(0
.0
00
)*
**
(0
.0
11
)*
4
-0
.0
59
0.
05
0.
00
1
0.
06
4
14
.4
3
1.
00
9 
- 
1.
00
9
19
12
(-
18
48
)
(5
.3
73
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
. 0
00
)
 
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
00
)*
**
(0
.9
85
)
5
-0
.0
75
0.
05
1
0.
00
0
0.
06
4
14
.5
1
1.
10
2 
- 
1.
10
2
1.
91
5
(-
1.
57
3)
(5
.3
86
)
(0
.3
70
)
(0
. 0
00
)
 
(0
.1
17
)
(0
.0
00
)*
**
(0
.7
12
)
6
-0
.0
66
0.
05
0
0.
00
1
0.
09
3
14
.5
1
1.
02
2 
- 
1.
02
2
1.
87
9
(-
2.
53
3)
(5
.3
68
)
(0
.3
69
)
(0
. 0
00
)
 
(0
.0
12
)*
(0
.0
00
)*
(0
.7
12
)
7
-0
.0
32
0.
04
6
-0
.0
11
0.
12
4
18
.6
8
1.
44
2 
- 
1.
44
2
1.
89
6
(-
1.
72
2)
(4
.8
64
)
(-
2.
81
2)
(0
. 0
00
)
 
(0
.0
86
)
(0
.0
00
)*
(0
.0
05
)*
*
8
0.
03
1
0.
04
3
-2
.9
67
1.
14
4
-0
.0
01
0.
00
0
0.
00
1
-0
.0
16
0.
15
8
11
.5
8
1.
27
9 
- 
2.
39
1
1.
99
5
(0
.5
08
)
(4
.7
66
)
(-
4.
77
)
(5
.4
53
)
(-
0.
69
9)
(-
0.
11
3)
(0
.3
12
)
(3
.5
52
)
(0
. 0
00
)
 
(0
.6
12
)
(0
.0
00
)*
**
(0
.0
00
)*
**
(0
.0
00
)*
**
(0
.4
85
)
(0
.9
10
)
(0
.7
55
)
(0
.0
00
)*
**
*
N
ot
e:
 N
um
be
r 
in
 e
ac
h 
br
ac
ke
t i
s 
t-
st
at
is
ti
c 
an
d 
p-
va
lu
e,
 s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
 a
t (
*)
 0
.0
1 
le
ve
l. 
 
Cheng, F. F., Shamsher, M. and A. Nassir
30 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 21 (S): 19 - 30 (2013)
Wharton Papers on Financial Services, 2000, 
pp. 23-120. 
Bernard, V. L., & Thomas, J. K. (1989). Post-earnings-
announcement drift: Delayed price response or 
risk premium? Journal of Accounting Research 
(Supplement) 27, 1–36.
Bundt, T., Cosimano, T., & Halloran, J. (1992). 
DIDMCA (Depository Institutions Deregulation 
and Monetary Control Act (of 1980)) and market 
risk: Theory and evidence. Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 1179–1193.
Bystrom H., Worasinchai L., & Chongsithipol S. 
(2005). Default risk, systematic risk and Thai 
firms before,  during and after the Asian crisis. 
Research in International Business and Finance 
19, 95–110.
Cheng F. F., & Ariff, M. (2007). Abnormal Returns 
of Bank Stocks and Their Factor-Analyzed 
Determinants. Journal of Accounting – Business 
& Management April 2007. Vol 14, 1-16.
Craig, B. & dos Santos J. C. (1997). The Risk Effects 
of Bank Acquisitions, Economic Review, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q II, 25-35.
Foster G., Olsen, C., & Shevlin, T. (1984). Earnings 
Releases, Anomalies, and the Behaviour of 
Security Returns. The Accounting Review,59, 
574–603.
Francis, B. B., & Hunter, D. M. (2004) The impact of 
the Euro on risk exposure of the world’s major 
banking industries. Journal of International 
Money and Finance 23, 1011-1042. 
Galloway, T., Lee, W., & Roden, D. (1997). Banks’ 
changing incentives and opportunities for risk 
taking. Journal of Banking and Finance, 509-
527.
Hartmann, P. (2010). Editorial, Interaction of market 
and credit risk. Journal of Banking & Finance. 
34, 697-702.
Houston, J., & Stiroh, K. (2006). Three decades of 
financial sector risk. New York: Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. Issue 134. 45-78.
Iqbal, J., & Farooqi, F. (2011). Stock price reaction to 
earnings announcement: The case of an emerging 
market. Munich Personal Repec Archive. Online 
at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30865/ 
MPRA Paper No. 30865.
Johnson, B., & Zhao, R. (2011). Contrarian 
share price reactions to earnings surprises. 
Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance, 
(Forthcoming). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.
com/abstract=990078.
Miller, M. &Rock, K. (1985). Dividend policy under 
asymmetric information. Journal of Finance 
40, 1031-52.
Myring, M, (2006). The relationship between returns 
and unexpected earnings: A global analysis by 
accounting regimes. Journal of International 
Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 15, 92-108.
Latane, H. A., & Jones, C. P. (1979). Standardized 
unexpected earnings 1971–1977. Journal of 
Finance, 34, 717–724.
Park, S. (1994). Explanations for the increased 
riskiness of banks in 1980s. Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, 3-23.
Soh, W. N., Cheng, F. F., & Annuar, M. N. (2009). The 
effect of financial risk on the earnings response 
in Thailand bank’s stock. International Research 
Journal of Finance & Economics, 2009, Issue 
31, p 55-65.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2001). Econometric analysis of 
cross section and panel data. The MIT Press. 
Cambridge, London, England.
Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 21 (S): 31 - 56 (2013)
ISSN: 0128-7702    © Universiti Putra Malaysia Press
SOCIAL SCIENCES & HUMANITIES
Journal homepage: http://www.pertanika.upm.edu.my/
Article history:
Received: 20 December 2012
Accepted: 31 July 2013
ARTICLE INFO
E-mail addresses: 
ariff13@gmail.com (M. Ariff), 
chengfanfah@yahoo.com (Cheng, F. F.)
* Corresponding author
Earnings Response Coefficient of Banking Shares:  
A Multi-Country Study with Control for Risk
M. Ariff1* and Cheng, F. F.2
1Bond University, University Drive, Qld 4229, Australia
2Department of Accounting and Finance, Faculty of Economics and Management,  
Universiti Putra Malaysia, 43400 Serdang, Selangor, Malaysia
ABSTRACT
This paper reports new finding on earnings response coefficients of banking firms on how 
information disclosed regarding (i) total earnings and (ii) fee earnings is associated with 
share price changes around the time of financial report releases. This paper extends to 
banking firms a widely used analysis of earnings response studies on non-banking firms. 
To obtain robust test results, we extended this common model, for the first time, by adding 
control variables and also by applying panel regression. Changes in total earnings do 
influence share prices significantly in the four countries studied i.e. Malaysia, Thailand, 
South Korea and Australia. Australian investors appear to use disclosed information on fee 
income also to revise share prices significantly as being value relevant. Investors regard 
both total and fee incomes as equally important in Australia whereas investor actions in the 
other three markets studied lead to weak evidence on fee income effect. This paper reports 
new findings on value relevance of disclosures extended to banking firms. 
JEL Classification: G14, G21
Keywords: Earnings response coefficient, bank share prices, interest and non-interest incomes, unexpected 
earnings, value relevance
INTRODUCTION
This paper is on banking firms with a 
focus on value relevance of accounting 
earnings disclosures. After four decades of 
research on non-bank firms by accounting 
researchers, the change in total earnings 
as disclosed in financial statements used 
by market participants has been shown in 
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this paper to be a major determinant of 
share price changes in the four markets 
included in this paper. There is an excellent 
review of this literature on non-bank 
firms in Kothari (2001) and Lev (1989) 
for interested readers.1 These two reviews 
conclude that the earnings change variable 
is significantly associated with non-bank 
share price changes around accounting 
earnings report releases, with R-squared 
values typically below 10 %. Fairfield et 
al. (1996) is also a significant study on US 
non-bank firms while Rose (1989) tests non-
financial US firms. Chen and Zhang (2007) 
is a later study, and there are also studies of 
other countries on non-bank firms, but not 
banking firms. 
This paper is motivated, therefore, 
to extend the theory to banking firms on 
what is known in accounting literature. We 
also extend this analysis to the banking 
firms of four countries by more carefully 
modelling the use of an improved method 
to control some known factors by including 
new variables and finally applying panel 
regression, which leads to robust test results, 
1Continuing research on this topic appears 
to have changed focus. The latest studies in 
earnings response coefficients (ERC) are about 
auditor selections, equity fund raising, stock 
splits and other accounting variables as these 
affect the non-bank stock price movements 
(Park and Pincus 2001 and Chen and Zhang 
2007). Another study is Anandrajan et al. 
(2010) on value relevance of banks. Their 
findings show a consensus that the ERC of 
non-bank firm changes are correlated with 
firm-specific variables. With the addition of 
such firm-specific variables, ERC regressions 
produce higher explained variations as shown 
by improved R-squared values of about 20 %. 
by extending the well-known earnings 
response model to banking firms.
Because banking firms are more 
regulated than non-banking firms, and also 
because bank earnings are dependent on 
monetary policy changes; bank prices are 
greatly dependent on business cycles; any 
investor’s revaluation of bank share prices 
to unexpected earnings news releases is 
important enough to be studied as a separate 
topic from that of non-bank firms. Banking 
firms have yet to be studied systematically 
on this issue, and this paper aims to make 
a modest start to contribute to this new 
accounting research topic. 
Further, banking firms are indeed up 
for special attention in current research. A 
measurement of a bank’s earning response 
coefficient, ERC, (thus, earning relevance 
theory) would add significantly new insights 
to banking share price behaviour. The 
earnings of commercial banks consist of 
(i) interest income and (ii) non-interest 
fee income report as disaggregated items 
whereas the revenue and earnings of non-
bank firms are much more complex. We 
also incorporate controls, for the first time, 
for risk and growth in our modelling as 
suggested by a commentator.2 We test the 
established regression model using the new 
and more reliable panel regression for the 
first time applied to this type of study so 
that residual errors in cross sections and in 
time series are eliminated to produce robust 
estimates of earnings coefficient parameters.
2Controlling the effects of some rather obvious 
variables is meant to improve the robustness 
of the test results. We thank an anonymous 
reviewer for this improvement in our modelling.
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The rest of the paper is divided into four 
sections. The next section contains a very 
brief review of literature and a short rationale 
for having selected these four countries for 
this study. The research process, starting 
with the hypothesis development, the 
test models and so forth are included in 
the following section. The findings are 
presented in a penultimate section while the 
paper ends with a short conclusion.
RELEVANCE OF BANK EARNINGS 
RESPONSE COEFFICIENT (ERC)
Studies to-date over five decades have 
focused on and identified stock price 
sensitivity to changes in earnings as a 
key accounting parameter, hence the 
development of the value relevance theory 
of accounting disclosures. The resulting 
finding has largely helped to justify the 
price-relevance of earnings reports as strong 
evidence of the usefulness of accounting 
earnings disclosures churned out by the 
profession across all markets at great costs. 
Applying this to non-bank firms has been 
the mainstay of this line of research in 
prior research. This has yet been widely 
applied to studying share prices of banking 
firms, which, a priori, are more sensitive to 
information. The components of earnings of 
banks are also quite different in that earnings 
arise essentially from interest spread and fee 
income. Therefore earnings are critically 
connected to a country’s monetary regime, 
which is not the case for the earnings of 
non-bank firms. 
Cheng et al. (2008), a first study of 
commercial banks, provides evidence 
of the information content in earnings 
announcements of commercial banks in 
a small economy. There is another study 
relating bank stock price changes to some 
key factors of US commercial banks: see 
DeYoung and Rice (2004). They use US data 
over 1989 and 2001 to study the empirical 
links between bank’s non-interest income 
(so it does not test the total earnings as is 
commonly done in such tests), business 
strategies, market conditions, technological 
change and financial performance. They 
indicate that well-managed banks expand 
more slowly into fee activities and that 
marginal increases, on average, in fee 
income are associated with poorer risk-
return trade-offs. These studies do not 
measure share price reactions directly. 
In a further indirect study of the banking 
industry, Rose (1989) shows US results for 
bank/non-bank financial-services firms as 
well as non-financial firms over the period 
1966-85. He notes that the diversification 
of banks into non-bank product lines 
reduced risk to banking returns and the 
resulting cash flows satisfied appropriate 
portfolio conditions. He also found evidence 
consistent with a proposition that individual 
bank risk may be reduced through selected 
product line diversification, particularly in 
the insurance/data processing firms; hence, 
risk is a known factor for inquiry. There was 
no direct test of ERC.
As for tests on non-bank firms, which 
started this line of inquiry a long time 
back, researchers are very familiar with 
the earliest study by Ball and Brown 
(1968) that provides a major impetus for 
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empirical examination of stock market 
price formation to disclosures of accounting 
information. Hence, the concept of value 
relevance of information releases has 
been further developed in accounting. In 
a much later study Kothari (2001) showed 
strong evidence of how the total change in 
share prices could be traced to the amount 
of a firm’s value change from earnings 
changes i.e. ERC. In a 1989 theory paper, 
Collins and Kothari showed how accounting 
earnings are related to share price changes. 
These published theory papers suggest that 
earnings impact can fully accommodate 
earnings changes at a time. 
The latest studies using the same 
approach for non-bank firms in non-
American stock markets are Lee, Han, Wu 
and Chow (2005) for the Chinese stock 
market and Song, Douthett and Jung (2003) 
for the Korean stock market.3 The former 
explores the determinants of government 
practices of listed Chinese non-bank firms 
and how the practices affect domestic 
investor reaction to earnings reports; note 
that this is not on ERC. They find that 
investors base their valuation decisions, at 
least in part, on these earnings reports. This 
is indicated by a significant relationship 
between disclosed unexpected earnings 
and CAR. The second study examines how 
liberalisation of stock markets affected stock 
price behaviour, which suggests that non-
bank stock prices decreased and the stock 
price differentiation based on individual 
firm characteristics increased after market 
liberalisation. The results also show that the 
explanatory power of accounting numbers 
3See also Footnote # 1.
measured by earnings changes increased 
after market liberalisation.
There is thus a need to explore if 
the information on total income and 
disaggregated income released by banking 
firms is relevant for investors to revise share 
prices around the time of the release of such 
information. This is our modest research 
attempt: to study the value relevance of 
disclosures by banking firms. In addition, 
there is a need to link the ERC to find the 
factors correlated to the price effect.
Country and Sample Selection
The brief summary above shows that there is 
but one study of a minor market using ERC-
type analysis applied to banking firms: US 
studies did not directly measure ERC. Few 
of the Asia Pacific countries are selected 
in this paper (see Table 1). These countries 
were among the earliest to first initiate 
capital market opening, currency reforms 
and banking sector reforms in the 1980s 
and 1990s while also adopting efforts to 
align standards to international accounting 
practices to improve disclosure quality 
and coverage of information released. 
There are at least four countries that have 
carried out modernisation relevant to our 
choice in so far as these four countries have 
reforms promoting market-based signals 
in capital markets while also providing 
relevant internationally-accepted accounting 
information. Tests on more countries 
would be desirable, although due to time 
and resource limitations, our selection is 
a representative sample of Asia Pacific 
banking markets.
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The four countries selected de-regulated 
the financial systems over the mid to 
late 1980s: freed restrictions on charging 
bank fees, returned interest rates and 
exchange rates to be determined by market 
forces; restrictions on foreign ownership 
of all shares were lifted/reduced in Korea, 
Malaysia and Thailand. Australia had 
little restriction on such matters and the 
ones (currency; banking supervision) in 
place have been removed/rearranged since 
1984 and again in 1994. On the quality 
improvements to accounting reports, the 
three countries selected have made much 
progress. 
Chief among the changes is the adoption 
of international accounting standards, for 
example, by Malaysia, which facilitated 
the entry of foreign firms to this market. 
Improved quality of financial statements 
also clearly benefitted the investors to use 
the information to determine their value 
relevance actions in the markets. The joint 
impact of market opening actions improved 
liquidity in capital markets, removed entry 
barriers, resulting in improved competition 
and harmonisation of accounting standards 
to best practices. These reforms collectively 
helped the investor to have confidence in 
information quality and also in the efficiency 
TABLE 1 
Broader Similarities of Accounting, Banking and Market
Countries Banking Reforms Accounting institutions
Australia Currency floated in 1984
Bank supervision separated
Interest rate controls dropped
Broader bank reforms in 1990s
Foreign ownership rule relaxed
Broad and liquid stock market
Profession well established
Rigorous accounting training
CPA and CA competing
Good number of standards
Strict accreditation standards
South Korea Currency floated in 1999
Entry barrier relaxed in 1980s
Supervision by central bank
Foreign ownership rule relaxed
Broad and liquid stock market
Profession well established
Local university training
Harmonisation with international 
accounting standards 
Disclosure rules tightened 2000
Malaysia Currency basket-managed 2005
Capital and currency controls off
Competition in capital market enhanced by 
foreign entry
Entry barriers lifted for players
Foreign ownership limit lifted
Broad and active stock market
2 professional accounting bodies
University-based training
Moderate number of standards
International standards adopted 
Foreign training recognition; link up with 
overseas bodies
Thailand Currency free-floated in 1998
Competition improved with
Entry barriers lifted
Foreign ownership limits lifted
Alien board established: larger
A large liquid stock market
Profession university based
Moderate number of standards
Foreign training accepted
International standards accepted very early, 
attracting foreign firms
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of price formation. Accounting training 
moved from trade institutions such as 
polytechnics to the universities as degree 
programmes, thereby enhancing the value of 
professional training in all these countries.
Unlike these four selected Asia Pacific 
countries, reforms to financial systems 
in most other Asian countries such as 
China and India were put in place only 
in the mid or late 1990s. So we excluded 
these countries in this study. Without a 
competitive and liquid market and the ready 
availability to and acceptance of accounting 
information by investors in the market, price 
reaction study is meaningless, or at best, 
less accurate. So, care is needed in country 
selection.
This study places a different focus on the 
effect of earning announcements on stock 
prices of commercial banks in Australia, 
South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand.4 
Following the 1997/8 Asian financial crisis, 
banks have been restructured in three of 
these countries, with banks given greater 
freedom to decide on how they would charge 
for their services. Thus the magnitude of 
non-interest income is growing although it 
has, as of 2010, not surpassed the interest 
incomes in the four countries. Fee income 
is increasing steadily as a proportion of total 
income (in the US, it is 34 % of banking 
4Interested readers are referred to the following 
sources for a description of the respective 
banking sectors of three countries in Cheng 
et al. (2008), Chansarn (2005) and the central 
bank websites of the four countries. These 
countries together are often described as having 
developed accounting institutions sufficiently 
well and that the share markets are Fama-
efficient. 
income) and it is a lot less than that, at below 
20 %, in these four countries. 
The four countries selected follow 
the too-big-to-fail banking policy, which 
means the top few banks dominate the 
whole economy. Also, this policy results 
in only a few banks being listed on the 
respective stock exchanges. There are only 
10 banks in Malaysia, and all are listed; of 
the 65 bank-like firms, only 11 are listed 
in Australia; the 10 Korean listed banks 
account for two thirds of the total assets; 
Thailand, likewise, is dominated by the 
10 selected banks. Therefore, our original 
sample consists of 4 countries x 10 banks x 
8 years of data for the regression tests. In the 
case of share prices, we obtained monthly 
share prices to measure the CAR via market 
model parameters: so the share price data is 
12 times larger than the panel data.
DATA, HYPOTHESES AND 
METHODOLOGY
Hypotheses
The central hypothesis is that the already 
established positive earnings-to-price 
relationship of non-banking firms is also 
likely observable for commercial banking 
firms in the four markets included in this 
study. Earnings increases (decreases) of 
banks should induce a direct impact on share 
prices at the time of disclosures of earnings 
reports. If it is so, we test to see whether this 
relationship is also evident for both total 
income and non-interest income disclosures 
by the banks in the four countries. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis is:
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H1: Bank’s stock price changes 
are not significantly correlated 
with the magnitude of unexpected 
changes in their reported total 
annual earnings. 
Since this study is conducted in four 
different markets, a priori expectation is 
that this hypothesis is rejected in the four 
different markets. There is no a priori reason 
to suspect that the positive relation is absent 
for banks especially since these four markets 
operate with market-based incentives under 
largely de-regulated financial environments. 
The null hypothesis is expected to be 
rejected if there is no significant relation 
between the stock price changes and the 
unexpected annual earnings changes. 
That is, the coefficients denoted as ds are 
significant in all tests using several models 
that will be discussed later. 
The second hypothesis concerns the 
additional use of disaggregated income 
items: 
H2: Bank’s non-interest income 
has no information content beyond 
unexpected changes as reported in 
reported total annual earnings.
This hypothesis is rejected if the non-
interest income contains information beyond 
unexpected total earnings. This will be the 
case if the coefficients denoted as θs are 
significant (or did have the correct signs) in 
the models to be specified later. 
The control variables are included, for 
the first time, in our extended models. These 
control variables are firm-specific variables 
to be added after the usual earnings variables 
to more fully specify the model. The 
expected signs of the variables are described 
in the relevant discussion on variables. We 
added two key risk variables to extend the 
basic model in the literature. We include 
risk and growth variables in case there is 
an effect from these omitted variables in 
the original model. There are likely to be 
other variables omitted here but which may 
have some effect. For example, size variable 
is often used, but we decided that the size 
of the change in total earnings captures to 
some extent the size effect. We felt that risk 
could be included as a standard deviation 
of share price returns. For growth, we use 
a very commonly used variable (popular 
price-to-book ratio in finance literature) as a 
robustness check; we specify price-earnings 
ratio for this5. Hence, the extension of the 
original model with controls is meant to 
verify the impact of known factors on the 
ERC.
5There are several variables, as suggested 
during the review process, which could be 
explored for modelling. For example, earnings 
level if included will introduce the econometric 
issue of stationarity. To avoid that, we excluded 
this variable. There could be an effect from the 
risk of low/high capital adequacy of banks or 
even non-performing loans: to include these 
factors, we needed information of the type, 
which is not readily available. The same may 
be said of a couple of other omitted variables 
found in the literature. We trimmed the earnings 
events by deleting coinciding non-earnings 
events disclosed in the test windows. Thus, it 
could be worthwhile to extend this study as a 
separate future effort, using more firm-specific, 
even macroeconomic variables, to explore the 
omitted variable problem. 
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To ensure that the results do not suffer 
from multi-collinearity, we measure the 
Variance Inflation Factor (see the statistics 
in the tables): the test results suggest that this 
is not a problem for our multiple regressions 
mainly because the variables are ratios of 
rate of changes. Our a priori expectation is 
that the null will be rejected since the banks 
report some growing amount of earnings 
from both total earnings and non-interest 
incomes. There are also prior studies that 
show a significant impact of some control 
variables. To improve the robustness of 
parameters estimated in the model, we use 
the more current panel regression so that 
there is control for variations across subjects 
and across time periods.
Test models 
ERC has been predominantly defined as 
the coefficient measure of unexpected total 
accounting earning obtained by regressing 
abnormal share market returns (returns are 
usually adjusted by Sharpe (1963) market 
model) on earnings changes of each firm and 
then aggregating the impact across all firms. 
Some studies included other variable(s) 
placed as control variables (Collins and 
Kothari, 1989; Kothari & Zimmerman, 
1995; Willet et al., 2002; Chansarn, 2005). 
The price effect is normally derived by 
regressing unexpected (i.e. abnormal) share 
returns, the CAR, and the unexpected total 
earnings of usually non-financial firms to 
test for a significant relationship. There are 
many published studies on the topic, and 
we refer the reader to those existing review 
articles cited in this paper6.
Therefore, the dependent variable in 
this research is a well-established share 
price returns measure, the CAR, and the 
independent variable is the unexpected 
changes in earnings. The estimation of CAR 
is explained in the next section. 
Model 1: Following the very commonly 
used model, we have:
CARjt  
= c1 + d1 SUEjt + vjt             (1)
where,
CARjt is the measure of risk-adjusted returns 
for bank i over the announcement period t,
SUEjt is a change in earnings over two 
consecutive years is the unexpected earnings 
change (to be defined later); the value 
of standardised unexpected total annual 
earnings, SUE, is the value divided by 
standard deviation of earnings over the test 
period,
d1 is the slope coefficient of the regression 
is the ERC, and
vjt is the random disturbance term assumed 
to be normally distributed
Model 2: To test the second hypothesis 
of whether a disaggregated income is 
relevant for share price, we developed this 
model: 
6One critical commentator states that the low 
explanatory power of such regressions in this 
line of research can be interpreted as accounting 
earnings being uninformative about value 
changes (Lev, 1989). However, the mainstream 
position is that this kind of research establishes 
the usefulness of accounting releases to market 
price formation.
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CARjt  
= c2 + d2 SUEjt + θ1 ΔNIjt + εjt           (2)
where,
CARi is a measure of abnormal returns, over 
and above market price changes attributed 
to the disclosure of earnings report,
SUEi is the standardised unexpected earnings 
from unexpected earnings, and
ΔNIi is a change in non-interest income/
total income
Since this variable is a ratio, there is 
no need to use unit normal transformation 
as done in the case of UE for statistical 
robustness. 
Model 3: The relationship between 
abnormal returns, CAR, is tested with 
the unexpected total earnings and the 
non-interest income/total income as an 
alternative specification of Model 2.
CARjt = c3 + d3 SUEjt +θ2NITIjt + τjt (3)
where,
CAR it is the abnormal returns over a 
12-month window,
SUEi is the standardised unexpected annual 
earnings, and
NITIi : non-interest income/total income 
(a variation of the same variable used in 
Model 2) 
The three regression models are run 
for each country, one at a time. In these 
tests, the parameters of interest are the ERC 
parameters (the ds and θs) in each of the 
equations. Those parameters will be tested to 
see if the variables SUE, ΔNI and NITI are 
relevant for bank stock price changes. The 
theory suggests that the coefficients should 
be positive and significant if the investors 
value the changes in the total earnings and 
the non-interest earnings (disaggregated 
item) as price-relevant information. 
Models with control variables: The 
two most common control variables are risk 
and the growth of earnings of a firm. We 
specify standard deviation (σp) of share price 
return as total risk of share price changes. 
The price earnings ratio (P/E) is specified as 
a proxy for earnings growth. Therefore, the 
final model is as follows:
CARjt  
= c4 + d4 SUEjt + θ3 ΔNIjt + θ4NITIjt   
   + δ1σpjt +  δ2P/E  + εjt            (4)
where, in addition to variables defined 
earlier,
σp is the standard deviation of the bank share 
price returns, and
P/E is the price earnings ratios of the banks 
as growth variable
Model 4 (and its variants as 5, 6 and 
7) is a different specification of the basic 
model with control variables to obtain a 
parsimonious set of results7.
7A further refinement would be to apply pooled 
regression across all four countries with a 
dummy variable for countries. That could 
produce one set of collective results for the four 
countries. We decided to show results for each 
country rather than one group as we believe 
this manner of presenting results provides a 
richer set of results for each country, as all four 
countries are in any known sense not closely-
knit as a group. A study of EU countries, for 
example, could perhaps adopt that method since 
countries from the EU would be economically 
integrated. 
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Two methodological issues that may 
be of concern need to be commented upon. 
One is the confounding effects of events 
coinciding with or appearing as delayed 
effects from other announcements. We 
took care to eliminate all known accounting 
information disclosures falling within the 
test windows. The only confounding effects 
could have been from non-accounting 
disclosures in the same period. For this, we 
appeal to the general assumptions, of which 
some of the pertinent information may have 
affected the prices randomly, so that on 
average, their effects are neutral. 
A second issue is whether accounting 
information effect fully captures price 
effect. This is a debatable issue because 
firstly, there is non-accounting information 
that is always coming in, and secondly, 
the semi-strong form of efficient market 
theory rests on the basis that the effect is 
seen anticipated, and rarely is significant 
in the post-event window. Hence, the 
methodology adopted here to take care of 
the econometric and statistical errors found 
in earlier studies should produce results 
that are unbiased although in terms of non-
accounting information effect, one appeals 
to their random nature so that there is no 
systematic bias in the results reported in 
the paper. 
Variable derivations
Sharpe’s (1963) market model is usually 
applied as a standard general equilibrium 
model relationship for asset return 
generation. To identify the date over which 
the CAR has to be measured, we needed the 
announcement month of earnings report. 
Studies suggest final earnings reports are 
released during the first to third months 
from the end of the financial years, so the 
time of disclosure t=0 is the announcement 
month spanning end of months 1 or 2 or 3 
following the accounting year ends. If one 
takes the prices of the third month using 
the actual release date report , then stock 
price effect in that month as well the price 
changes in the prior months are in fact due 
to the impact of disclosures by a bank. Most 
reports are made in the months 2 and 3 after 
the year end. So, the abnormal returns are 
first obtained by running an OLS regression 
using monthly return data series of each 
stock market index (Rmt) and the share prices 
of each of the selected country’s disclosing 
bank, (Rit).
The market model regression is run as 
Rit = αi + βiRmt + eit with five years of monthly 
returns data to estimate the parameters (αi 
and βi) of the i-th bank around the disclosure 
months t=1 or 3 and backwards to months 
1 month before the previous year end. This 
enables the abnormal returns at the t-th 
month to be estimated for each bank as 
follows: 
ARit = Rit – [αi + βiRmt]            (5)
where,
Rit is [Pit - Pi(t-1)] / Pi(t-1),
Rmt  is [It – I(t-1)] / I(t-1),
I, P are market price index value using a 
composite index (I) and adjusted prices of 
bank stocks (P),
αi  is the intercept of the regression between 
stock returns and market returns, measured 
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as monthly returns, and
βi is the slope of the regression between stock 
returns and market returns representing the 
responsiveness of the stock price to price 
movements in the overall market represented 
by a composite index of the market
The window of analysis for the ARs 
is taken as the months starting with the 
month of announcements (month t=0) and 
prior months up to at most 11 months, in 
conformity with similar usage in accounting 
studies.8 Hence, the market price reactions to 
observations in the post-disclosure months 
are not likely to be significantly different 
from zero as price changes pick up the 
information in disclosures. The abnormal 
returns of each bank’s response over the 
period from month 0 and prior months are 
cumulated as follows,
CARi = Σ t=0..T ARit             (6) 
for each bank i so that for each country 
j (symbol not shown) share price effect 
is measured as the CAR for each of the 
10 banks for each year of the seven years 
under observation. Thus there are 10 x 
7 = 70 observations for each country’s 
test(s) sufficient for reliable parametric test 
statistics. 
Next, we measure the change in earnings 
over each consecutive year over 8 annual 
observations for each bank in each country. 
Observations of earnings can be specified 
as total income, interest income and non-
8There are several dated and well cited studies 
of market efficiency of these markets. Hence, 
we are citing them in this paper.
interest income. Non-interest income is 
included in the regression equation as 
independent variable to study if the effect 
of this disaggregated reporting item also 
affects the share prices in addition to the 
total earnings. The non-interest income 
and a bank’s financial performance are 
interrelated in general, so using this item 
of disclosure will reveal if this disclosure 
affects share prices9. 
The changes in earnings over any two 
periods are computed as:
ΔNIi = [NIit - NIi(t-1)] / NIi(t-1)              (7)
To provide a robustness check, this 
variable on non-interest income is specified 
alternatively as a ratio: non-interest income 
divided by total income. 
NITIi  
= Non-interest income/total income   
               (8)
These variables sets are now grouped 
by country j=1, 2, 3, 4. The individual bank 
data of each country are matched with bank 
price variables. The variables are tested 
using three versions of the theory: Model 
1 is the original version on total earnings 
closely following established procedure 
in accounting (except that we use panel 
regression across 10 banks in each country, 
so our results are clearly robust) while 
9Cheng et al. (2008) finds that (in one emerging 
country) banks with large amounts of fee 
income suffered share price declines despite 
the common aphorisms that it is the banks with 
high-quality management that should generate 
fee income; thus, one would expect share prices 
to go up.
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the other two sets of results are meant to 
examine if the information conveyed by the 
disaggregated items has additional impact 
on share prices. Finally, in a final test of 
the basic models, we also re-estimate the 
coefficients of the main variables after 
controlling the effects of control variables.
Data sources
The data are sourced from two databases 
at University Putra Malaysia: Bankscope 
and Datastream. The data relate to the four 
countries over 8 years from 2000 to 2007 
(before the world financial crisis) so that 
the changes in earnings are computed over 
seven consecutive two years . The data set 
includes only the stock market listed banks: 
the 40 largest banks in the four countries . 
The 10 banks in each of the four countries 
are large banks, and together these accounts 
for four fifths of the assets in each banking 
sector. In the case of Malaysia, the 10 banks 
are the only banks resulting from mergers of 
some 54 deposit-taking institutions as part 
of a 1999-01 central bank reform process. 
Thus, the 10 banks represent the total 
banking system. The names of the banks are 
listed in the Appendix. 
The observations on monthly closing 
prices of banks over the test period and the 
respective market index values are obtained 
from Datastream whereas the financial 
statement items relating to banks are taken 
from the Bankscope database. These were 
annual earnings, interest income, non-
interest income, and total assets as at the 
reporting period used for this study. In 
some cases, where the data series were 
incomplete, access to financial statements 
of the banks in the web sites provided 
additional data for completing and, in some 
cases, corroborating the data items. The data 
set for the tests was then screened using 
Winsorian tests so as to remove transcription 
errors or extreme outliers. Also, elimination 
of coinciding events is meant to eliminate 
confounding effects. 
FINDINGS
Descriptive statistics of banks
The summary descriptive statistics of 
the banks by country are found in Table 
2. The Australian banks are the largest 
in this study in terms of total assets, as 
befits the size of the Australian economy. 
The 10 largest listed banks have total 
assets amounting to USD296 billion. The 
banking sectors of the other three countries 
have the following total assets in billions: 
USD71.3 (Malaysia), USD48.8 (Thailand) 
and USD183.7 (Korea). The smallest single 
bank is a Thai bank with total assets of 
USD172 million while the smallest bank 
in Malaysia has assets of USD409 million 
and the smallest bank in Korea has assets of 
USD653 million. 
Columns 4, 5 and 6 of Table 2 indicate 
the average total income, interest incomes 
and the percentage of interest incomes to 
total incomes for the banks in the respective 
countries. The Australian banks have 
interest incomes ranging from 45.2 % to 
90.3 % with a mean of 76.2 % across the 
selected banks. That means the non-interest 
income is about 24 % of total income. The 
Korean banks have interest incomes ranging 
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between 32.8 % and 91.7 % with an average 
of 69.5 %. Malaysian bank numbers are 
anywhere in the range of 66.8 % to 82.7 
% with a mean of 75.8 %. We also provide 
the median numbers for the variables. As 
is seen, the medians are not close to the 
values of averages, as is common in studies 
using such values. We believe, given the 
absence of multi-collearity and use of panel 
regressions as shown in our tests in later 
tables, this aspect of the variable is unlikely 
to lead to errors in our test statistics.
Thailand’s banks have a mean of 75.8 
% with a range of 66.5 %and 89.5 %. 
Comparing the four countries, two (Malaysia 
and Thailand) have a similar income break-
down of non-interest income while Korean 
and Australian banks have a wider spread in 
their interest incomes. 
Table 3 shows the averages of the 
same variables over a seven-year period. 
Comparing these numbers against the 2007 
numbers in Table 3 shows how non-interest 
income has increased/decreased in these 
countries. The non-interest incomes of 
Australian banks have steadily increased 
from USD10.3 billion in the year 2001 to 
USD17.9 billion. The Australian banks 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Representative Banks in Thailand, Korea, Malaysia and Australia, Most Recent 
Year 2007 (USD million) with n=10 x 4
Total Assets Total 
Income
Interest 
Income %
Non-Int 
Income %
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
A B B/A C C/A
Australia Mean 111,038.3 8,030.8 6,236.0 76.2 1,794.8 23.8
Median 65,149.3 4,703.8 3,030.2 64.4 2,072.9 44.0
Min 9,286.3 653.9 554.9 45.2 70.3 9.7
Max 296,252.1 19,793.9 15,615.7 90.3 4,178.2 62.1
South Korea Mean 79,117.9 3,453.0 2,101.7 69.5 1,351.3 30.5
Median 27,298.3 2970.1 1798.3 19.2 1424.2 16.7
Min 2,772.2 137.7 118.5 32.8 11.5 8.3
Max 223,044.4 8,666.7 4,848.0 91.7 4,091.2 67.2
Malaysia Mean 27,906.9 1,695.2 1,257.4 75.8 350.3 18.3
Median 20,839.6 1,321.9 1,019.2 84.4 252.9 15.6
Min 7,333.1 409.2 311.7 66.8 60.0 13.1
Max 71,296.4 4,063.5 3,015.6 82.7 1,183.5 30.9
Thailand Mean 22,108.4 972.1 716.6 75.8 255.5 24.2
Median 24,492.4 705.9 537.3 74.3 168.6 25.7
Min 171.7 171.8 124.9 66.5 24.3 10.5
Max 48,726.8 2,024.1 1,436.5 89.5 602.3 33.5
Note: Exchange rate: 1 USD = 1.6 Australian Dollar; = 1,454.96 Korean Won; = 3.6 Malaysian Ringgit;  
= 33.5571 Thai Baht 
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have a positive increase in the amount of 
fee incomes but the increase is less than 
the increase in interest incomes. The non-
interest income in terms of percentage 
declined by 2 % over the period. The fee 
incomes of Malaysian banks increased from 
USD1.2 billion in the year 2001 to USD3.4 
billion in the year 2007; from 15 % of the 
total income in the year 2001 to 20.6 % of 
total income in the year 2007. The increase 
is more than 5 %. Therefore, the rate of 
increase in the non-interest fee incomes 
is greater than the rate of increase in the 
interest incomes, a result opposite to that 
seen in the Australian banks. 
Thai banks’ non-interest fee incomes 
increased from USD1.4 billion in the year 
2001 to USD2.5 billion in the year 2007. 
The increase is 34.4 % of the total income 
in the year 2001 and 26.3 % in the year 
2007. Thai banks have a positive increase 
in the amount of fee incomes but the 
increase is less than the interest income. 
Therefore, the percentage dropped by 8 
%. The rate of increase in the fee income 
for Thai commercial banks is less than the 
rate of increase in the interest incomes, as 
in Australia. The non-interest fee incomes 
of Korean banks increased from USD5.4 
billion (2001) to USD9.4 billion (2007). The 
increase is 35 % of the total income to 33 
% in the period. Similar to the Thai banks, 
Korean banks have a positive increase in 
the amount of fee income but the increase is 
less than the increase in interest income. The 
fee income dropped by 2 %. Therefore, the 
rate of increase in the fee income for Korean 
banks is less than the rate of increase in 
interest incomes. This suggests that, unlike 
in Malaysia, there have been declines (thus 
increased risk) in the expectations about this 
item in the other three countries. 
Table 3 also provides information 
on total income, interest income and fee 
income from 2001 to 2007. The fee income 
for Malaysian commercial banks has been 
increasing from USD1.2 billion in the year 
2001 to USD3.4 billion in the year 2007. 
The increase formed 15 % of the total 
income in the year 2001 and 20.6 % of total 
income in the year 2007. 
The increase is more than 5 %. 
Therefore, the rate of increase in the fee 
income for Malaysian commercial banks 
is greater than the rate of increase in the 
interest income.
The fee  income for  Aust ra l ian 
commercial banks increased from USD10.3 
billion in the year 2001 to USD17.9 billion 
in the year 2006. The increase formed 24.7 
% of the total income in the year 2001 and 
22.3 % of total income in the year 2007. The 
Australian banks have a positive increase in 
the amount of fee income but the increase 
is less than the interest income. The fee 
income in terms of percentage dropped by 
2 %. Therefore, the rate of increase in the 
fee income for Australian commercial banks 
is greater than the rate of increase in the 
interest incomes.
The fee income for Thai commercial 
banks increased from USD1.4 billion in 
the year 2001 to USD2.5 billion in the year 
2007. The increase formed 34.4 % of the 
total income in the year 2001 and 26.3 % 
of the total income in the year 2007. The 
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TABLE 3 
Total Income, Interest Income and Fee-income of Banks in Australia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, 
(USD million) with n=270
Yr-end Total Income Interest Income % Fee Income %
(A) (B) B/A (C) C/A
Australia - Panel A
2006 80,307.9 62,360.2 77.7 17,947.7 22.3
2005 70,169.6 51,723.8 73.7 18,445.8 26.3
2004 48,036.4 34,783.2 72.4 13,253.2 27.6
2003 41,418.7 29,669.4 71.6 11,749.2 28.4
2002 38,687.0 27,615.5 71.4 11,071.5 28.6
2001 41,721.8 31,434.9 75.3 10,286.8 24.7
South Korea - Panel B
2007 28,438.6 19,016.6 66.9 9,422.0 33.1
2006 24,062.6 16,279.2 67.7 7,783.3 32.4
2005 20,478.4 15,166.5 74.1 5,311.9 25.9
2004 19,514.7 14,769.6 75.7 4,745.2 24.3
2003 18,329.1 12,629.5 68.9 5,699.6 31.1
2002 15,379.3 10,038.3 65.3 5,340.9 34.7
2001 13,342.2 5,945.1 44.6 7,397.2 55.4
Malaysia - Panel C
2007 16,369.4 12,991.0 79.4 3,378.4 20.6
2006 13,667.4 11,069.8 81.0 2,597.6 19.0
2005 11,933.0 9,652.4 80.9 2,280.7 19.1
2004 11,276.3 9,313.6 82.6 1,962.8 17.4
2003 10,138.3 8,554.7 84.4 1,583.6 15.6
2002 9,034.9 7,653.3 84.7 1,381.6 15.3
2001 8,613.4 7,319.3 85.0 1,294.1 15.0
Thailand - Panel D
2007 9,720.9 7,165.7 73.7 2,555.2 26.3
2006 9,242.7 6,725.6 72.8 2,517.1 27.2
2005 7,830.4 5,720.5 73.1 2,110.0 27.0
2004 6,860.9 4,689.8 68.4 2,171.1 31.6
2003 5,512.7 3,541.0 64.2 1,971.7 35.8
2002 4,803.3 3,075.5 64.0 1,727.8 36.0
2001 4,188.2 2,748.8 65.6 1,439.3 34.4
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Thai banks have a positive increase in the 
amount of fee income but the increase is 
less than the interest income. Therefore, the 
percentage amount dropped 8 %, and the 
rate of increase in the fee income for Thai 
commercial banks is less than the rate of 
increase in the interest income.
The fee income for Korean commercial 
banks increased from USD5.4 billion in 
the year 2002 to USD9.4 billion in the year 
2007. The increase formed 35 % of the 
total income in the year 2002 and 33 % of 
the total income in the year 2007. Similar 
to the Thai banks, Korean banks have 
a positive increase in the amount of fee 
income but the increase is less than that of 
the interest income. The fee income in terms 
of percentage dropped by 2 %. Therefore, 
the rate of increase in the fee income for 
Korean commercial banks is less than the 
rate of increase in the interest income.
Do earnings disclosures affect bank share 
prices?
This sub-section reports the main findings 
on ERC using the commonly used model 
as extended in this study. Our aim is to test 
and discuss if the findings on banking firms 
are similar to those on non-bank firms. The 
results are presented by country.
Australia: The statistics in Table 4 
obtained for Model 1 show results using 
the Australian data over seven years for 
the 10 largest banks. The coefficient of 
standardised unexpected total earnings 
(SUE) is 0.040 with t-statistics of 2.753 with 
a highly significant p-value of 0.008. Thus, 
as in the other countries to be discussed in 
this section, information on unexpected 
change in total earnings had a positive 
and significant impact on share prices 
because investors used the disclosures to 
revalue share prices in the period ahead of 
disclosure date. The R-squared value is 10 
%. This result is consistent with all previous 
research on non-bank earnings response 
coefficients reported. The earnings response 
coefficient is a significant factor in bank 
share price revisions as tested in this study. 
The results from Model 2 include an 
additional variable, the unexpected fee 
income (ΔNI), as another independent 
variable besides total earnings. The results 
show that the coefficient for unexpected 
earnings, SUE, in this model is about the 
same, again 0.040, with a t-statistic of 
2.725, which is also significant as indicated 
by the p-value of 0.009. The coefficient on 
unexpected fee income is 0.021, and it has 
a t-statistic of 0.174, which is not significant 
at all. It appears, as has been shown in 
several studies of non-bank firms using 
extraordinary income, Australia investors 
in this major market appear to value total 
income more than non-interest income, 
which is a minor portion of the earnings.  
The results from using an alternative 
specification of non-interest income as in 
Model 3 produced a significant result. The 
coefficient for SUE is 0.046 with a t-statistic 
of 3.145, thus significant with a p-value 
of 0.003. The coefficient on non-interest 
(fee) income is significant with a value of 
0.133 and t-value at 1.801 and p-value at 
0.077, acceptable 0.10 probability level. 
This suggests that unexpected fee income 
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TABLE 4 
Regression Results of Returns-to-Earnings Relation of Banks, Australia: 2001-2007
This table provides a summary of results of seven regressions using the four basic models developed in this 
paper. The basic model (Equation 1: CARjt = c1 + d1 SUEjt + vjt) is extended by including an additional variable 
for fee income in Model 2. The other 4 models from 4 to 7 include control variables on growth and risk to 
specify key omitted variables.
Australia, n = 70
Independent 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model7
Constant, a1 -0.034 -0.039 -0.060 -0.066 -0.087 -0.265 -0.284
-1.625 -1.077 -2.390 -1.709 -1.927 -2.658 -2.786
(0.110) (0.286) (0.020)** (0.093) (0.059)* (0.010)** (0.007)***
SUE, d 0.040 0.040 0.046 0.047 0.046 0.054 0.053
2.753 2.725 3.145 3.115 3.071 3.614 3.589
(0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
ΔNI, θ1 0.021 0.026 0.005 0.087 0.067
0.174 0.214 0.041 0.733 0.551
(0.862) (0.831) (0.967) (0.467) (0.584)
NII, θ2 0.133 0.133 0.135 0.091 0.093
1.801 1.790 1.814 1.219 1.246
(0.077)* (0.079)* (0.075)* (0.228) (0.218)
Risk σ, δ1 0.025 0.025
0.900 0.909
(0.372) (0.367)
P/E Ratio, δ2 1.157 1.153
1.152 1.140
0.136) (0.137)
Adj-R-squared 0.100 0.085 0.134 0.119 0.116 0.173 0.170
F-stat 7.579*** 3.741*** 5.557*** 3.658*** 2.937** 4.079*** 3.418***
Variance 
Inflation 
Factor = VIF
1.000 1.023 1.056 1.081- 
1.024- 
1.056
1.082- 
1.061- 
1.057- 
1.038
1.1.38-
1.087- 
1.134- 
1.208
1.140-
1.125-
1.135-
1.038- 
1.208
Note: Values in bracket are t-statistics and p-values are significant at (*) 0.1, (**) 0.05 and (***) 0.001 
levels. VIF shows no multi-collinearity problem in the regression.
SUE = standardised unexpected earnings; ΔNI = change in net income; NITI = change in net income 
relative to total assets; Risk = standard deviation of EPS over 8 years; P/E = price to book ratio of bank 
shares as growth proxy
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disclosures by banks have significant 
information value to investors in addition to 
the information disclosure on total earnings 
change. This result is consistent with the 
concept that well-managed banks in this 
market are seen by investors as earning 
significant interest and fee income, both 
being valuable for revaluation of share 
prices. The use of a refined variable as in 
Model 3 made a difference to test results. 
So, specification of the variable is important. 
Model 4 (and its variation of) regression 
analyses includes control variables in 
addition to interest income, non-interest 
income by including risk and growth of 
earnings (also price-to-earnings variable) 
as controls. The results are surprising. The 
risk and growth variables have no influence 
on the earnings response after the earnings 
variables have extracted the value. However, 
the growth variable (P/E) appears to be 
relevant only if the ΔNI variable is included. 
Korea: Table 5 provides a summary of 
test results of regressions using the models 
with the data set relating to 10 South Korean 
banks. 
The results from Model 1 yielded a 
coefficient of 0.129 on total earnings with 
t-statistic of 2.258, which is significant 
at 0.031 probability level. The R-squared 
value is 11.7 %, low but similar in size to 
findings in most studies. Compared with 
the Australian market, this R-squared value 
is quite similar in size. The results indicate 
that the information disclosed as unexpected 
total earnings had a similar effect on the 
returns of the stocks as in Australia. This 
indicates that Korean investor behaviour 
relating to bank stock pricing is somewhat 
similar to that of Australia and also similar 
to non-bank firms. 
The findings from using Model 2 would 
suggest that the coefficient for SUE is 0.127 
with a t-statistic of 2.00, which is significant 
at 0.030 probability level. The coefficient for 
the change in non-interest income is -0.504 
with t-statistic of -1.529, and, contrary 
to theory, with a negative sign. It is not 
significant at any acceptable confidence 
level as the probability is 0.137. 
Results from Model 3 suggest that 
the coefficient on SUE is 0.131 with a 
t-statistic of 2.264, which is also significant 
at 0.031 probability level. The coefficient 
for non-interest income over total income 
is 0.042 with a t-statistic of 0.527. That 
coefficient is positive but is not significant 
at levels usually acceptable given that the 
measured probability is 0.602. This shows 
the non-interest income effect is positive as 
predicted but the investors do not appear to 
value this information as significant. Taken 
together, Korean investors value disclosures 
on total income and not non-interest income, 
although the sign is correct. 
Model 4 (and its variants) produced 
results for control variables added in 
addition to interest income, non-interest 
income, risks and earnings growth. The 
results show that after the effect of change 
in total income (SUE) and non-interest (fee) 
income, risk and growth variables have no 
influence on the share price revisions. The 
control variables did not matter.
Malaysia: The statistics in Table 6 
from regression Model 1 show share price 
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TABLE 5 
Regression Results of Returns-to-Earnings Relation of Banks, Korea: 2001-2007
This table provides a summary of results of seven regressions using the four basic models developed in this 
paper. The basic model (Equation 1: CARjt = c1 + d1 SUEjt + vjt) is extended by including an additional variable 
for fee income in Model 2. The other 4 models from 4 to 7 include control variables on growth and risk to 
specify key omitted variables.
South Korea, n = 70
Independent 
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model7
Constant, a1 -0.008 0.119 -0.017 0.114 0.125 0.145 0.157
-0.159 1.245 -0.321 1.179 1.161 1.440 1.406
(0.875) (0.223) (0.751) (0.248) (0.256) (0.161) (0.172)
SUE, d 0.129 0.127 0.131 0.130 0.131 0.136 0.136
2.258 2.275 2.264 2.303 2.268 2.398 2.361
(0.031)** (0.030)** (0.031)** (0.029)** (0.032)** (0.024)** (0.026)**
ΔNI, θ1 -0.504 -0.532 -0.521 -0.478 -0.465
-1.529 -1.591 -1.515 -1.415 -1.340
(0.137) (0.123) (0.141) (0.169) (0.192)
NII, θ2 0.042 0.057 0.055 0.047 0.045
0.527 0.722 0.687 0.590 0.555
(0.602) (0.476) (0.498) (0.560) (0.584)
Risk σ, δ1 0.000 0.000
-0.251 -0.270
(0.804) (0.789
P/E Ratio, δ2 -0.004 -0.004
-1.052 -1.039
(0.302) (0.308)
Adj-R-squared 0.117 0.155 0.095 0.140 0.111 0.144 0.113
F-stat 5.099*** 3.833*** 2.627** 2.687** 1.963* 2.300** 1.791*
Variance 
Inflation Factor 
= VIF
1.000 1.000 1.006 1.006-
1.014- 
1.019
1.006-
1.033-
1.026- 
1.024
1.015-
1.038-
1.035- 
1.046
1.016-
1.058-
1.042-
1.024- 
1.046
Note: Values in bracket are t-statistics and p-values are significant at (*) 0.1, (**) 0.05 and (***) 0.001 
levels. VIF shows no multi-collinearity problem in the regression.
SUE = standardised unexpected earnings; ΔNI = change in net income; NITI = change in net income relative 
to total assets; Risk = standard deviation of EPS over 8 years; P/E = price to book ratio of bank shares as 
growth proxy
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changes and the change in total earnings 
data, SUE, of all the banks over seven 
years. The coefficient on SUE is 0.086 
with t-statistics of 2.444 with a p-value of 
0.019, which is significant. The R-squared 
value is 7 % meaning that about 7 % of 
variation in share price returns is explained 
by earnings changes. The result is consistent 
with all previous research on earnings 
response coefficient literature relating to 
non-financial corporations. Thus, our tests 
on banking firms help to verify that this is 
true for commercial banks in this emerging 
economy. Thus, in the case of Malaysian 
banking firms, the earning impact is binding.
The results from Model 2 are from 
adding unexpected fee income as another 
independent variable. The results show 
that the coefficient for SUE is 0.066 with 
a t-statistic of 1.95 and a p-value of 0.059. 
Thus, the earnings impact continues to be 
significant in this economy. The coefficient 
for unexpected fee income (ΔNI) is -1.884 
with a t-statistic of -2.412 but a p-value of 
0.021, which is significant but not positive 
as expected. This suggests that unexpected 
fee income information has significant 
negative information for investors, and so it 
does significantly affect share valuation by 
investors at the time of information release. 
It is possible that this result is driven by 
extreme values (despite Winsorian checks) 
since some banks in this banking sector 
have a large fee income while most banks 
have a very low fee income. The results 
from alternative specification of fee income 
produced a positive coefficient, but it is not 
statistically significant. Thus, one should 
conclude that fee income disclosure has no 
discernible effect in Malaysia’s banking 
sector. 
The results shown against model 4 
(and its variations) are with control factors. 
This test is meant to fully specify earnings 
with non-interest income, risks and growth 
factors. As with all three prior countries, the 
risk and growth variables have no influence 
on share price changes after earnings impact. 
Thailand: A summary of results for 
this country is to be found in Table 7. 
The statistics show that the coefficient for 
unexpected change in total earnings in 
the measured relationship in Model 1 is 
0.136 with a t-statistic of 2.746, which is 
significant since the computed p-value is 
0.009. The coefficient for change in non-
interest income in Model 2 is -0.034 with a 
t-statistic of -0.168, the sign being contrary 
to theory. 
The coefficient for change in non-
interest income is negative (as in Malaysia 
and in the US) and is not significant since 
the computed p-value is 0.868, below the 
acceptable 0.10 level. This suggests that 
investors do not value the change in non-
interest income information. But the re-
specification of fee income appears to make 
a difference to the result. The results using 
Model 3 indicate the SUE coefficient is still 
significant with a coefficient of 0.117 with 
t-statistic of 2.127 and a computed p-value 
of 0.039. The coefficient for non-interest 
income over total income is 0.056 with a 
t-statistic of 0.831, a result that matches 
expectation. The adjusted R-squared value 
is 11.4 %, which is almost similar to 12 % 
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TABLE 6 
Regression Results of Returns-to-Earnings Relation of Banks, Malaysia: 2001-2007
This table provides a summary of results of seven regressions using the four basic models developed in this 
paper. The basic model (Equation 1: CARjt = c1 + d1 SUEjt + vjt) is extended by including an additional variable 
for fee income in Model 2. The other 4 models from 4 to 7 include control variables on growth and risk to 
specify key omitted variables.
Malaysia, n = 70
Independent 
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model7
Constant, a1 -0.016 0.282 -0.017 0.291 0.270 0.293 0.272
-0.565 2.225 -0.452 2.267 1.990 2.230 1.976
(0.575) (0.032)** (0.654) (0.029)** (0.054) (0.032)** (0.056
SUE, d 0.086 0.066 0.086 0.063 0.061 0.064 0.063
2.444 1.950 2.402 1.807 1.722 1.774 1.735
(0.019)*** (0.059)* (0.021)** (0.079)* (0.094)* (0.085)* (0.091)*
ΔNI, θ1 -1.884 -2.031 -2.077 -2.020 -2.056
-2.412 -2.488 -2.504 -2.426 -2.441
(0.021)** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.020)** (0.020)**
NII, θ2 0.001 0.106 0.121 0.109 0.137
0.006 0.674 0.751 0.677 0.809
(0.995) (0.504) (0.457) (0.503) (0.424)
Risk σ, δ1 0.072 0.094
0.508 0.598
(0.615) (0.554
P/E Ratio, δ2 0.000 -0.001
-0.128 -0.350
(0.899) (0.729)
Adj-R-squared 0.070 0.098 0.133 0.113 0.115 0.097 0.092
F-stat 5.973*** 6.266*** 2.910** 4.269*** 3.202*** 3.120*** 2.523**
Variance 
Inflation Factor 
= VIF
1.000 1.059 1.008 1.085-
1.141- 
1.086
1.098-
1.155-
1.127- 
1.046
1.128-
1.155-
1.125- 
1.102
1.129-
1.161-
1.215-
1.233- 
1.299
Note: Values in bracket are t-statistics and p-values are significant at (*) 0.1, (**) 0.05 and (***) 0.001 
levels. VIF shows no multi-collinearity problem in the regression.
SUE = standardised unexpected earnings; ΔNI = change in net income; NITI = change in net income 
relative to total assets; Risk = standard deviation of EPS over 8 years; P/E = price to book ratio of bank 
shares as growth proxy
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TABLE 7 
Regression Results of Returns-to-Earnings Relation of Banks, Thailand: 2001-2007
This table provides a summary of results of seven regressions using the four basic models developed in this 
paper. The basic model (Equation 1: CARjt = c1 + d1 SUEjt + vjt) is extended by including an additional variable 
for fee income in Model 2. The other 4 models from 4 to 7 include control variables on growth and risk to 
specify key omitted variables.
Thailand, n = 60
Independent 
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model7
Constant, a1 -0.036 -0.026 -0.039 -0.026 0.014 -0.060 -0.025
-1.256 -0.401 -1.330 -0.402 0.195 -0.910 -0.338
(0.215) (0.690) (0.190) (0.690) (0.846) (0.368) (0.737)
SUE, d 0.136 0.138 0.117 0.119 0.111 0.086 0.083
2.746 2.682 2.127 2.105 1.973 1.482 1.438
(0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.039)** (0.041)** (0.055)* (0.046)* (0.058)*
ΔNI, θ1 -0.034 -0.042 -0.020 -0.040 -0.023
-0.168 -0.206 -0.099 -0.205 -0.118
(0.868) (0.838) (0.921) (0.838) (0.907)
NITI, θ2 0.056 0.057 0.073 0.052 0.065
0.831 0.831 1.065 0.776 0.966
(0.410) (0.410) 0.293) (0.442) 0.340)
Risk σ, δ1 -0.017 -0.014
-1.466 -1.167
(0.150) (0.250)
P/E Ratio, δ2 0.002 0.001
1.896 1.658
(0.165) (0.105)
Adj-R-squared 0.120 0.101 0.114 0.095 0.118 0.145 0.152
F-stat 7.538*** 3.705*** 4.090*** 2.684** 2.602** 3.027*** 2.714**
Variance 
Inflation 
Factor=VIF
1.000 1.056 1.219 1.265-
1.059- 
1.221
1.278-
1.065-
1.253- 
1.033
1.396-
1.059-
1.224- 
1.146
1.398-
1.065-
1.260-
1.069- 
1.185
Note: Values in bracket are t-statistics and p-values are significant at (*) 0.1, (**) 0.05 and (***) 0.001 
levels. VIF shows no multi-collinearity problem in the regression.
SUE = standardised unexpected earnings; ΔNI = change in net income; NITI = change in net income 
relative to total assets; Risk = standard deviation of EPS over 8 years; P/E = price to book ratio of bank 
shares as growth proxy
Earnings Response Coefficient of Banking Shares: A Multi-Country Study with Control for Risk 
53Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 21 (S): 31 - 56 (2013)
obtained for Model 1. The market perceives 
the interest income and fee income of Thai 
banks to be important. 
Finally, results using Model 4 (and 
its variations) included control factors in 
addition to the two earnings factors. The 
results would have us believe that the risk 
and earnings growth variables have no 
influence on investor behaviour in revising 
share prices. The relevant information for 
share price changes is from change to total 
earnings only. 
CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS
This paper reports significant share 
price impacts in four banking sectors from 
accounting reports disclosing earnings 
changes in four moderate-sized economies 
with efficient capital markets and well-
developed accounting institutions. We 
believe this is a first multi-country study of 
value relevance of accounting disclosures 
focused on banking firms. In terms of size 
measured by total assets, Australian banks 
are the largest banks while Thai banks 
are the smallest, and the banks included 
accounted for four fifths of their national 
banking sectors . 
Testing the bank’s earnings-to-share 
price relation is the objective of this paper 
as is commonly done in value relevance 
studies. We tested if (i) changes in total 
earnings (ii) changes in non-interest (fee) 
incomes and (iii) control variables are 
significantly correlated with share price 
changes over eight years in four significant 
economies in the Asia Pacific, namely 
Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea and 
Australia. We selected only those countries 
with sufficient stock market reforms, 
banking reforms and developed accounting 
institutional development for accounting 
disclosure, so that inefficiency and lack 
of quality of information are unlikely to 
affect the findings reported in this paper. 
The samples of listed banks selected in 
each country (in the case of Malaysia all 
banks were selected) are representative 
of the banking sector. Australian and 
Korean economies are modestly large 
economies with institutional and market-
based incentives promoting pro-private 
sector actions, with strong supervisory 
history, as in Australia.
The regression results using data from 
four countries suggest that the unexpected 
changes in total earnings as disclosed in 
the final reports appear to significantly 
affect the banking share prices in each 
of the four countries. The results for the 
10 listed banks in each of the four Asia 
Pacific markets are somewhat similar in 
that share prices across the four countries 
react positively to unexpected total earnings 
changes while in three countries there is 
also some impact of fee-income on share 
prices of the banks. This result is the first to 
be provided for fee income in any country, 
and so, is important. Also, this is contrary 
to the impact of extraordinary income in 
the studies of non-bank firms: extraordinary 
income effect is absent as reported in most 
studies. Obviously, investors in banks do 
value fee income although in two of the four 
countries, that is not the case. 
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Our attempt to refine the usually applied 
common model by applying the panel 
regression and control variables could 
well be a significant factor in the refined 
results reported in this paper. For example, 
the explained variation is slightly larger in 
this study than in previous studies on non-
bank firms: this could well be due to the 
higher sensitivity of commercial banks to 
information. Further refinements were done 
by including control variables (risk and 
earnings growth) which did not produce any 
findings of significant correlation arising 
from risk and earnings growth, in addition 
to total income and fee income.
These findings are from four significant 
Asia Pacific economies since we could 
not include other less liberalised, less 
institutionally-developed economies. The 
excluded countries, in our opinion, have 
yet made sufficient reforms to assure us 
that share price is efficiently formed and 
the accounting information framework is 
well-developed. An extension of this study 
to major non-Asian economies with open 
share markets and accounting institutional 
development may help to reveal if similar 
results are evident, for example in the 
EU. Also, testing these propositions with 
control variables for a more integrated 
set of economies such as the EU could be 
done as pooled regression with dummy 
variables. In that event, our refined modeling 
and test procedures may serve to yield 
reliable findings to generalise the results 
relating to the very critical banking firms to 
generalise our findings to a large population 
of countries. Confounding events effect in 
our measure of share price returns may have 
some impact on our results, but we hope it 
is trivial. Extending the value-relevance 
findings to a new set of firms, the banking 
firms, is a modest contribution of the paper.
The methodology developed for 
earnings research in this paper has the 
unique advantage of removing errors in 
the response coefficients reported in earlier 
papers. Adoption of this methodology would 
improve future research on earnings. In 
addition, applying this model to a larger 
sample of banking firms from more countries 
would lead to more generalisable findings on 
the earnings behaviour of banking firms. 
This task is left as an extension to this 
research effort.
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ABSTRACT
The objective of the paper is to ascertain the influence of shares derivatives trading on the 
Malaysian stock market. Johansen-Juselius’ co-integration test reveals signs of increasing 
integration between these cash and futures markets over time. The Granger causality test 
indicates that the stock index futures Granger causes the cash index with no feedback in the 
reverse direction during periods of financial crisis and recovery. Significantly observable 
during the period was high participation of foreign investors in the futures market. The 
increase in the number of foreign investors in the futures market dramatically increases the 
herding activities in futures market trading. The findings suggest that the transmission of 
information from the futures market to the cash market could, to a certain extent, during 
a period of “bad economy”, be due to herding by foreign investors. 
Keywords: Derivatives trading, cash market, volatility spill-over and developing derivatives market
INTRODUCTION
The introduction of the derivatives market 
cantract is one of the significant innovations 
in the emerging stock markets of the 1980s 
and the 1990s. The economic functions of 
the contract for example are to diversify 
financial risk through hedging strategies 
and to facilitate the process of price 
discovery. Hedging through futures trading 
is a process used to reduce uncertainty 
induced by adverse price changes in the 
cash marketindices. The introduction of 
stock index futures contract offers portfolio 
managers an opportunity to manage portfolio 
market risk without changing the portfolio 
composition. The stock index futures is 
preferred as a hedging vehicle because of 
its speed, liquidity and lower transaction 
cost on brokerage commissions and bid 
and asked spread (Drimbetas et al., 2007; 
Ghosh, 1993).
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Economic agents involved in the cash 
market trading are subjected to a wide range 
of risks associated with movements in the 
spot prices. A key factor in the development 
of the futures markets is the demand for 
hedging facilities. In line with the Malaysian 
Government’s aim of establishing Kuala 
Lumpur as the Asia Pacific region’s premier 
financial centre, on 15 December 1995, the 
Kuala Lumpur Option and Financial Futures 
Exchange (KLOFFE) was established. 
Derivative instruments such as option1 
and stock index futures are offered by 
the KLOFFE, in which the basis is the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE)2 
Composite Index. Having these hedging 
facilities in the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange, allows portfolio managers 
and investors to better manage their risk 
exposure and exploit the full potential of 
the tools for effective risk and portfolio 
management.
In mid 1997, the currency crisis hit 
Asian countries including Malaysia. The 
roots of the crisis can be traced to the 
speculative activity on Thai Baht in mid-
May 1997. The Malaysian stock market 
began its sharp downward trend not long 
after the Thai Baht crisis. In July of the 
same year, the KLCI (Kuala Lumpur 
Composite Index) broke through the lowest 
psychological level. The futures market 
during that period exhibited the strongest 
correlation with the cash market. The 
1The option was launched by the KLOFFE in 
the office of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
in December 2000.
2The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange is now 
referred to as Bursa Malaysia.
correlation was so significant that many 
analysts suspected there was a lead and lag 
relationship between these two markets, 
and that the futures index was the leading 
factor. As seen from the observations of the 
index movement in the cash market during 
the crisis period, the continued decline each 
day of the futures index would be followed 
by a definitive decline in the cash market 
composite index in the following few day. 
Could this phenomenon depict that the 
trading in the futures market has a causal 
effect on the cash market in Malaysia?
Based on their findings, Lemmon and 
Ni (2008) and Hodgson and Nicholls (1991) 
have shown that higher volatility in the 
futures markets is caused by more highly 
levered and speculative participants. This 
may be a significant contributing factor in 
increasing the volatility of the cash market 
in Malaysia. An increase in spot market 
volatility may result in an increase in cost 
of capital and real interest rates, leading to 
a decline in the value of investments and 
investors’ share market loss of confidence. 
In the study by Kasman and Kasman 
(2008), and Stoll and Whaley (1990), it was 
suggested that the stock index futures, index 
arbitrage and program trading are to blame 
for the excessive stock market price swings. 
A study on the impact of the introduction 
of financial futures index on the cash market 
in Germany, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, the 
UK and the US was carried out by Antoniou 
et. al (1998). In the study, an analysis was 
conducted using data over a three-year period 
prior to the introduction of futures trading. 
Overall results for all countries in this study 
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showed that the introduction of futures had 
not had an unfavorable effect on the cash 
market. As a matter of fact, it appeared 
that there had been an improvement in the 
way the news was transmitted into prices 
following the introduction of futures trading. 
Thus, the researchers believed that market 
turbulence as a result of the introduction 
of derivative trading appeared unfounded. 
Consequently, calls for further regulation 
of futures markets based on this view were 
deemed injudicious. 
At the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
the usefulness of the futures market during 
the crisis as a hedging function was 
questioned. Was there a possibility that 
the investors used the futures market to 
influence the cash market? If so, trading 
in the futures market can create a negative 
feedback to the cash market and increase 
the latter’s volatility. Such speculative 
activities, therefore, merit further regulation 
of the futures market.
The objectives of this paper are to 
examine the relationship between the cash 
market and the futures market of the KLSE. 
Specifically, the objective is to determine 
whether derivatives in the futures market 
exert a destabilising influence on the cash 
market during a financial crisis. The paper is 
divided into four sections. The first section 
is this Introduction. The methodological 
framework employed and sources of data 
are discussed in the second section. The 
estimated results and discussion are reported 
in third, and last section presents some 
concluding remarks.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
The daily closing values of the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange Composite Index 
(CI) and the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
Composite Index Futures contract (CIF), 
spanning from January 1996 to June 2000 
are employed as the main variables in 
this study. The Daily Dairy, published by 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange is the 
major source for these data. The analysis is 
conducted over three sub-sample periods, 
namely: before the financial crisis period 
(Jan 1996 – Jun 1997); during the crisis 
period (Jul 1997 – Aug 1998) and during 
the recovery period (Sep 1998 – Jun 2000), 
which saw the oversight of selective capital 
control measures. . 
Methodology
In order to investigate the relationship 
between the CI and CIF, this study employed 
the vector autoregressive (VAR) model. The 
VAR model can be presented as:
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where CI denotes the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange Composite Index; and CIF is the 
Composite Index Futures contract.
The co-integration test is employed to 
investigate the long-run relationship between 
both variables, CI and CIF. Prior to testing 
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for co-integration however, the individual 
variables’ time-series properties should be 
investigated. If the variables are found to 
be stationary, the appropriate procedures to 
follow would be the conventional regression 
procedures. But, if the variables are found to 
be non-stationary, with means and variances 
that are time-dependent, then to establish the 
long-run relationships, the co-integration 
test is necessary. Testing the stationary 
level of the variables is done using the unit 
root tests method introduced by Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (1979) and Phillips-Perron 
(1988).
If the two variables are non-stationary 
and integrated of the same order, then 
to estimate the relationship of these two 
variables, the co-integration method 
suggested by Johansen (1988) and Johansen 
and Juselius (1990) can be employed. The 
co-integration method (see Engle and 
Granger, 1987) is described as a long-run 
relationship between the variables, and it 
implies that deviations from equilibrium are 
stationary, with finite variance, even though 
the series itself is non-stationary and has 
infinite variance. The Johansen and Juselius 
(1990) procedure provides the appropriate 
test statistics to test the hypothesis for the 
number of co-integrating vectors and tests 
of restriction upon the coefficients of the 
vectors. 
The Johansen procedure involves 
the identification of rank of the m by m 
matrix Π in the specification given by
Xt =   



1
1
k-ti-t XX
k
i
ti 
              (2)
where X t is a column vector of the m 
variables, Γ and Π correspond to coefficient 
matrices, ∆ is a difference operator, k 
denotes the lag length, and δ is a constant. 
In the case of no co-integration, Π is treated 
as a singular matrix (its rank, r = 0). Hence, 
in a co-integrated case, the rank of Π could 
be anywhere between zero. For the rank of 
Π, the procedure provides two likelihood 
ration (LR) tests, namely, the trace statistics 
and maximum Eigen value (λ-max).
If two variables move together in the 
long-run equilibrium, the short-run Granger 
causality tests should be constructed within 
a vector error-correction model (VECM) 
to avoid misspecification (see Granger 
1988)3. Otherwise, the standard vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model4 may be 
applied in the analysis. The vector error-
correction model (VECM) derived from 
the long-run co-integrating vectors can be 
used to detect the direction of the Granger-
causal effect running from one variable to 
another. The VECM model employed for the 
testing of Granger-causality across various 
variables can be represented by:
Xt =    
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3If the variables in a system are co-integrated, 
then the short-run analysis of the system should 
incorporate the error-correction term (ECT) to 
model the adjustment for the deviation from its 
long-run equilibrium. 
4When an ECT is added to the vector 
autoregressive model (VAR), the modified 
model is referred to as the vector error-
correction model (VECM). VECM is thus a 
special case of VAR.
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where Xt  is a (2 x 1) vector of the variables 
in the system, α corresponds to a vector of 
constant terms, ∆ is a difference operator, β 
is the estimable parameter, β(L) and Φ(L) 
are finite polynomials in the lag operator, 
zt-1 is the error-correction term, L is a lag 
operator and εt is the disturbances.
The short-run Granger causality test 
is executed by calculating the F-statistic 
based on the null hypothesis that the set 
of coefficients on the lagged values of 
independent variables (in first difference 
except for the I(0) variable, which will be in 
its level)  are not statistically different from 
zero. In the event that the null hypothesis 
is not rejected, then it can be concluded 
that there is no causal effect between the 
independent variable and the dependent 
variable. In addition to the detection of 
the short-run causal effects, the VECM 
also enables us to examine the effective 
adjustment towards equilibrium in the long 
run through the significance or otherwise of 
the t-test of the lagged error-correction terms 
(ECT) of the equation.
ESTIMATION RESULTS
Integration and Co-integration Tests
Presented in table 1 are the results of the 
ADF and PP unit root tests for the CI and 
CIF in levels and the first differences. As 
indicated in the results the null hypothesis 
of a unit root could not be rejected for 
both variables in levels in the three sub-
sample periods. The null hypothesis of a 
unit root, however, was rejected for the 
first differences in the three sub-sample 
periods. This indicates that all the variables 
are stationary in their first differences, or 
I(1).  As a result, all these variables should 
appear in first difference in stationary form 
in the causality tests within the VAR/VECM 
framework.
Reported in table 2 are the results of 
bivariate co-integration tests using the 
method introduced by Johansen (1988), 
Johansen and Juselius (1990).  The test results 
indicate that there is one co-integrating 
vector in the system for the different sample 
periods. This means that both variables have 
a tendency to move together in the long-run. 
This test also establishes the existence of the 
long-run co-integration relationship between 
CI and CIF since both variables reveal very 
high correlation5 (see Fig.1a). Even though 
within the short sample period, the long-run 
relationship is already established for both 
CI and CIF.
Granger Causality Tests
As indicated by the co-integration test 
results in Table 2, both CI and CIF are 
co-integrated. Thus, this warrants further 
analysis in order to determine the short-
run and long-run dynamic relationships 
5The correlation between CI and CIF before 
the crisis, during the crisis and during the crisis 
under selective capital control measures are 
0.9940, 0.9977, 0.9980 respectively.
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TABLE 1 
Results of Unit Root Tests
     Test Statistics
   Augmented Dickey-Fuller test Phillips-Perron test 
 Variables  Constant  Constant  Constant  Constant
   without trend with trend without trend with trend 
         Level
Before crisis
CI   -1.7889 (7) -1.2748 (7) -2.6916 (1) -2.1504 (1)
CIF   -1.8279 (7) -1.3967 (7) -2.5961 (1) -2.1207 (1)
During crisis
CI   -0.3256 (1) -1.6791 (1) -0.1991 (1) -1.5097 (1)
CIF   -0.4319 (0) -1.8099 (0) -0.4270 (1) -1.8188 (1)
Recovery 
CI   -2.3875 (5) -1.9974 (1) -2.0486 (1) -2.8315 (1)
CIF   -1.6318 (4) -0.5013 (4) -2.5606 (1) -2.7853 (1)
                First Difference
Before crisis
CI   -2.9408 (19)* -3.1978 (19) -16.267 (1)* -16.365 (1)*
CIF   -2.9685 (19)* -3.2173 (19) -17.361 (1)* -17.449 (1)*
During crisis
CI    -4.3891 (14)* -4.4345 (14)* -14.579 (1)* -14.572 (1)*
CIF    -3.8472 (16)*  -3.8758 (16)* -17.012 (1)* -16.996 (1)*
Recovery
CI   -7.3590 (6)* -7.4962 (6)* -23.732 (1)* -23.973 (1)*
CIF    -5.8139 (10)* -5.9799 (10)* -27.010 (1)* -27.208 (1)*
Note: The critical values for rejection of ADF tests and PP tests are -2.86 and -3.41 at a significant level of 
5 %, where a constant without and a constant with a time trend are included in the equation. The asterisk 
* indicates rejection of the null at 5 % significance level. Numbers in parentheses indicate the lag length 
to ensure residual whiteness. 
between both variables within the vector 
error-correction model (VECM). The results 
of the causality test under the framework of 
VECM are presented in Table 3.
The short-run causality tests for the 
period before the crisis indicate that the CIF 
was not causing the CI and vice-versa. This 
could be due to the nature of the financial 
futures trading at that time which was still 
at the infant stage. As a ‘young’ financial 
futures market, the market is still mired in a 
grinding step-by-step battle to win approval 
from the investors to participate in the 
derivatives market. Perhaps investors still 
could not see the benefit of futures trading 
at that time and the lack of knowledge of 
its usefulness as a hedging instrument. 
As a result, the transaction volume was 
persistently low over the period before crisis 
(See Fig.1b).
However, the short-run causal effect 
running from CIF to CI is detected during 
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TABLE 2 
Johansen’s Test for Co-Integrating Vectors
H0  Maximum Critical Value Trace   Critical Value
   Eigen value 95%    95%
Full sample period (k = 10)
p = 0  32.17**  14.1  33.6**  15.4 
p ≤ 1  2.32  3.8  2.32  3.8 
Before crisis (k = 8)
p = 0  20.57**  14.1  23.9**  15.4 
p ≤ 1  3.33  3.8  3.33  3.8 
During crisis (k = 2)
p = 0  35.76**  14.1  35.84**  15.4 
p ≤ 1   0.08  3.8  0.08  3.8 
Recovery (k = 10)
p = 0  29.77**  14.1  34.23**  15.4 
p ≤ 1  2.46  3.8  2.46  3.8 
Note: p indicates the number of co-integrating vectors. The (*) indicates rejection at the 95% critical 
values. The optimal lag-structure (k) is determined through the likelihood ratio test. Critical values are 
tabulated in Osterwald-Lenum (1992).
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Fig.1(a): Daily KLSE Composite Index and Composite Index Futures
Fig.1(b): Daily Futures Volume in KLSE
Junaina Muhammad, A. N. Bany-Ariffin and M. H. Yahya
64 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 21 (S): 57 - 70 (2013)
the crisis period. It is alleged that the 
unidirectional causality effect has led to a 
major decline in cash market performance. 
The observation highlights that the volume 
traded for the futures contract increased 
significantly during the crisis period and 
showed a significant correlation between 
these two markets over  the same period. This 
leads us to conclude that trading in index 
futures may have played a significant role 
during the KLSE stock market turbulence 
of 1997.  Furthermore, we also suspect that 
the increase in transaction volume during 
that period was caused by massive selling 
transactions.  
Due to the Asian financial turmoil, 
selective capital control measures were 
introduced in September 1998 to give 
Malaysia breathing space for its reforms to 
work. This included pegging the ringgit at 
RM3.80 to the US dollar, the convertibility 
of the Ringgit abroad, a moratorium on 
the outflow of capital and profits for 12 
months and restrictions on exporting 
Malaysian currency. As shown in Fig.1(a), 
the CI reveals an upward trend after the 
implementation of capital control, indicating 
a positive response from the investment 
sectors towards the control measures. 
During this period, the Granger causality 
results reveal that the CIF has a similar 
unidirectional influence on the CI just as it 
did during the crisis.  
In the case of the recovery period, it is 
suspected that the confidence in the market 
returned and the investors at KLSE were 
buying instead of selling the futures contract 
and this stimulated the cash market. It is 
also suspected that the investors may have 
regained their confidence, and this time, were 
buying futures contracts for normal hedging 
purposes. The lower volume of trading in the 
futures market during this recovery period 
was perhaps due to investors approaching 
the market more cautiously. The buying of 
futures derivatives for hedging purposes as 
a result created stability in the cash market. 
This is consistent with the efficient market 
hypothesis suggested by Fama (1970). 
According to Fama, this trend indicates 
that as the KLSE market matures, it slowly 
becomes more rational.
Fig.1(c): Market Demography of Futures Market Between Foreign and Domestic Institutions
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The overall result thus reveals that the 
CIF was a more significant influence on the 
CI during the financial crisis period. Table 
3 displays the error-correction coefficient 
(ECT) and measures the degree to which 
the one-period response of each of the 
endogenous variables to a deviation from 
the equilibrium is corrected. These terms 
are statistically significant during a crisis 
period when the independent variable is 
CI, implying that futures adjust to short-run 
deviations from a long-run equilibrium. This 
verifies the long-run relationship between CI 
and CIF. This estimate seems to suggest high 
speed, with around 32 % occurring during 
the crisis under the selective capital control 
period, 27 % during the crisis period and 13 
% during the period before the crisis.
As shown by the estimated results, the 
futures market Granger cause led to the cash 
market. What could be the underlying factors 
that explain such a relationship? A variety of 
factors have been put forward to explain the 
lead-lag and the causal relationship. Perhaps 
the best explanation for the Malaysian case 
would be the herding factor.  In the context 
of a capital market, herding is trading by a 
group of investors in the same direction over 
a certain period of time. In Malaysia it has 
been documented that futures market trading 
was mostly done by foreign institutional 
investors, who are more sophisticated and 
more informed than ordinary local traders. 
Hence, they tend to react to any information 
more efficiently. Due to the fact, local 
traders would normally watch the action 
taken by these foreign investors and then 
react to that (Nofsiger & Richard, 1999). 
The results in Table 3 show that during the 
crisis period, the Granger cause between 
TABLE 3 
Granger Causality Test with Vector Error-Correction Model Results
Dependent Variables   Independent Variables
   ∆CI   ∆CIF   ECT[ε1,t-1]  
   F-statistics Coefficient  
     (Significant levels)  (t-statistics)
Before Crisis (k = 8)
 ∆CI  1.2529  1.2193   -0.0984
   (0.2674)  (0.2865)   (-0.9312)
 ∆CIF  1.3776  1.0632   -0.1256
   (0.2050)  (0.3884)   (-1.0812)
During Crisis (k = 2)
 ∆CI  5.4474***  8.9608***   -0.0166
   (0.0047)  (0.0002)   (-0.1410)
 ∆CIF  1.4546  1.5871   -0.2742
   (0.2352)  (0.2063)   (-1.8838)*
Recovery (k = 10)
 ∆CI  11.894***  1.8667***   -0.0546
   (0.0001)  (0.0480)   (-0.4650)
 ∆CIF  0.7119  16.629***   -0.3170
   (0.7133)  (0.0001)   (-2.1145)**
Note: The F-statistic tests the joint significance of the lagged values of the independent variables, and 
t-statistics test the significance of the error correction term (ECT). The asterisks indicate the following 
levels of significance: *10 %, **5 % and ***1 %.
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the CI futures and the CI index was most 
significant. In general, this may be due to 
the foreign traders who had made their move 
first in the futures market because of market 
conditions. In response to the exchange rate 
uncertainty at the time, foreigners were 
struggling to sell their portfolio in order 
to minimise their anticipated losses. This 
action was later replicated by local investors 
in the cash market, causing a sharp decline 
within a short period of time.
Table 4 shows that foreign participants 
accounted for 55 % of total futures market 
participants in 1996 compared to local 
participants, who numbered only 20 %. Even 
more surprising was that Local Institutions 
represented only 1 % of total futures 
market participation. In 1997 and 1998, 
foreign participants steadily maintained 
their participation level at 46 % and 49 %, 
respectively. Local participants, especially 
the Retails, also maintained their level at 31 
% and 33 % in 1996 and 1997, respectively. 
In September 1998, most of the foreigners 
offset their futures market positions and 
sold their cash market portfolio due to 
government capital control measures, and 
this resulted in a sharp decline in foreign 
participation in the futures market as well as 
in the cash market leaving only 14 % and 16 
% in 1999 and 2000, respectively. 
Table 5 shows that foreign participation 
in the futures market during the crisis 
increased from 38 % to 58 %. This market 
demography has proven the assumption that 
foreigners hedged their cash market position 
by going short in the futures market, hoping 
to gain a profit to cover their losses in the 
cash market. They were taking advantage of 
bearish market sentiment by locking in their 
profit in the futures market. By late 1998, 
foreign investors offset their futures market 
position, leaving foreign participation during 
recovery at 15 % only. Domestic retail and 
local member participation during the crisis 
declined by 6 % and 7 %, respectively, in 
adverse reaction to this foreign investment 
trend. Domestic retail and local investors 
did not take advantage of the downward 
trend sentiment due to lack of futures 
trading knowledge, an improper regulatory 
structure, wide publicity on losses suffered 
by companies engaged in futures transaction 
and lack of in-depth market for hedging6.
The interesting issue here is why the 
initial transactions made by the foreigners 
were done in the futures market first. It 
has been suggested that the existence of 
transaction costs, capital requirements and 
the freedom of short-selling transactions 
may have made it optimal for some to trade 
in the futures market rather than in the cash 
market.  As explained by Grossman and 
Fleming (1990), the futures market may 
provide more immediacy than the spot 
market. This implies that informed foreign 
6Several authors, including Kim and Wei 
(1999), Park and Song (1999) and Radelet and 
Sachs (1998), put the blame for the Asian crisis 
on foreign investors. Bae et al. (2009) and 
Ghysels and Seon (2000) examined the role 
of derivatives securities in the Korean capital 
market. They found evidence supporting market 
destabilisation by foreign investors during the 
crisis. Foreign investors also became negative 
feedback traders of futures, and the permanent 
impact of their futures contracts sales increased 
substantially during the crisis. 
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traders may find that they can act faster and 
at a lower cost in the futures market than 
they can in the cash market, resulting in 
a lead-lag relationship between these two 
markets.  With raising uncertainty, foreign 
traders were struggling to leave the market. 
These attributes of the futures market were 
the key incentives for them to exit initially 
via the futures market. 
Another factor that could explain 
why the initial actions were first taken in 
the futures market is the liquidity factor. 
Grunbichler et al. (1994) proposed that 
the differences in liquidity between the 
two markets could also create a lead-lag 
relationship.  As pointed out in their work, 
if the average time between trades for index 
constituent firms is longer than that of the 
index futures contract, information would 
be incorporated, on average, more rapidly 
in futures prices than in cash prices.  Thus 
futures prices will adjust more quickly in 
reaction to economic conditions than would 
cash prices. This period of adjustment could 
also be attributed to the investor behaviour. 
As explained by Kim and Wei (1999), 
traders in the developing futures market 
are made up of mostly foreign institutional 
traders, who are generally more informed 
than local traders. With these advantages 
it is expected that they would react to 
information more efficiently than other less-
TABLE 4 
Market Demography of Futures Market
Category Year 1996 Year 1997 Year 1998 Year 1999 Year 2000
Foreign Institutions 52 % 45 % 47 % 14 % 16 %
Domestic Institutions 1 % 2 % 1 % 4 % 4 %
Overseas Retail 3 % 1 % 2 % 2 % 2 %
Domestic Retail 19 % 31 % 33 % 51 % 49 %
Local Members 20 % 17 % 15 % 26 % 28 %
Proprietary 5 % 4 % 2 % 3 % 1 %
Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
TABLE 5 
Market Demography of Futures Market
Category   Before Crisis During Crisis Recovery
Foreign Institutions  38 %  58 %  15 %
Domestic Institutions   3 %    0 %    3.5 %
Overseas Retail    1 %    0 %    2 %
Domestic Retail  34 %  28 %  50 %
Local Members  19 %    2 %  28 %
Proprietary    5 %    1 %    1.5 %
Total   100 %  100 %  100 %
Before Crisis :  As at June 1997
During Crisis :  As at June 1998
After Crisis    :  Average Rate for 2000 and 2001
(Source: Malaysian Derivatives Exchange - MDEX)
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informed traders.
CONCLUSION
The major objective of this paper is to 
ascertain the effect of derivatives trading on 
the Malaysian stock market. The Johansen-
Juselius co-integration test indicates that 
there are signs of increasing integration 
between the Malaysian futures market and 
the cash market over time. The Granger 
causality test indicates that the stock index 
futures cause no reverse direction to the cash 
index during periods of financial crisis and 
recovery. The causal relationship is more 
vigorous in the high volume-trading period 
with significant volatility, particularly during 
a financial crisis period. It is suggested from 
the estimated results that the futures market 
played a key role during the Malaysian stock 
market turbulence in 1997-98. The fraction 
of index futures volume started to increase 
dramatically in July 1997. The massive 
selling sentiment in the futures market 
during the crisis was eventually transmitted 
to the cash market, causing a decline in cash 
prices, a pattern which was not observed 
prior to the crisis.
Given the significance of futures 
trading, we examine whether futures trading 
by foreign investors exerted a destabilising 
influence during the crisis. We find that 
foreign investors increased their presence 
in the futures market and dramatically 
increased their herding of futures trading. 
During the crisis period, to protect their 
profitability, foreign traders fled the cash 
market and entered the futures market. 
Observing this, the local investors in the 
cash market reacted irrationally and made 
similar moves without giving any form of 
consideration to the strong fundamentals at 
that time (Kremer & Nautz, 2011). On the 
other hand, the foreigners took advantage of 
the flexibility features of the futures market 
such as lower transaction cost, small capital 
requirement, ease in engaging in short 
selling activities, and no barriers to entering 
and exiting the market.   Thus, the estimated 
results suggest that, to a certain extent, the 
transmission of information from the futures 
market to the cash market during the period 
of “bad economy” could have been due to 
manipulation by foreign participants.
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ABSTRACT
Despite concerns on joint-provision of audit and non-audit services, not many studies 
have been conducted on examining the factors influencing companies to purchase non-
audit services from their auditor. The attachment theory postulates that non-audit services 
purchasing decisions are influenced by the director-auditor link. Using 759 sample 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia in 2007, the OLS regression results show a significant 
positive relationship between director-auditor link and non-audit services fee. The finding 
adds to the limited literature on the factors influencing companies to purchase non-audit 
services from their auditor and suggests the need for active involvement of shareholders 
in the auditor selection process.
Keywords: Attachment theory, auditor choice, auditor-auditee relationship, director-auditor link, interlocking 
directorships, non-audit services fee
INTRODUCTION
Joint provision of audit with non-audit 
services has received a considerable amount 
of attention due to the possible negative 
effects on auditor independence. It is argued 
that providing non-audit services to audit 
clients creates conflicts of self interest 
(Svanstrom & Sundgren, 2012) in the 
sense that an auditor might give in to client 
pressure to avoid jeopardising or losing 
lucrative non-audit services or be reluctant 
to adversely report on items involving 
non-audit services (Firth, 2002). However, 
despite these concerns, not many studies 
have been conducted on examining the 
factors influencing companies to purchase 
non-audit services from their auditors. 
The limited research may probably be due 
to the lack of data since many countries 
do not have any requirements regarding 
the disclosure of non-audit services. For 
example, listed companies in Malaysia 
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and the United States only required the 
disclosure of non-audit services in 2001. 
Thus, the primary purpose of this study is 
to examine the factors affecting the joint 
provision of audit and non-audit services 
focussing on the director-auditor link. The 
attachment theory postulates that purchasing 
decisions related to non-audit services are 
influenced by the director-auditor link.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Besides auditing services, accounting 
firms also provide some other services. 
Among them are accounting related 
consultancy, forensic accounting, taxation, 
management accounting, secretarial 
services, management information systems 
and internal controls. As has been contended 
by Chien and Chen (2005), audit firms 
need to provide non-audit services to gain 
various benefits, which, among others, are 
competitive advantages, personnel attraction 
and retention, meeting client’s needs and 
risk diversification. Non-audit services 
have become an issue in auditing due to 
the joint provision of audit with non-audit 
services. Even though joint provision could 
be beneficial in terms of cost saving through 
knowledge spillover (Barkess & Simnett, 
1994; Svanstrom & Sundgren, 2012), the 
possible effects on auditor independence 
have become a concern (see for example 
DeFond, Raghunandan & Subramanyam, 
2002; Hay, Knechel & Li, 2006; Quick & 
Warming-Rasmussen, 2009). In Malaysia, 
the government’s concerns on this matter 
have led to the imposition of a mandatory 
requirement for the disclosure and the 
prohibition of joint provision of audit with 
some types of non-audit services. The By-
laws (On Professional Ethics, Conduct and 
Practices) of the Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants (2010) have prohibited auditors 
from providing valuation services, litigation 
support services, dispute resolutions and 
some corporate finance services to their 
audit clients. For listed clients, the By-
laws also prohibit auditors from providing 
accounting and bookkeeping services, 
internal audit services, staff lending and 
design and financial information technology 
services.
Prior studies have identified three 
(3) factors that may affect the non-audit 
services fee. While many believe that 
companies with higher agency conflicts 
will demand higher audit quality (see for 
example DeFond, 1992; Firth & Smith, 
1992; Francis & Wilson, 1988), the level 
of agency conflict is postulated to be 
negatively related to non-audit fee. Firth 
(1997) hypothesised that higher agency 
conflict companies will purchase lesser 
non-audit services in order to protect an 
auditor’s independence (especially when it 
is perceived independence). In a study, Firth 
(1997), who used data from 500 of the largest 
British listed companies for the year 1993, 
found significant positive relationships 
between directors’ shareholdings and 
the largest owner’s shareholdings with 
non-audit services fee; Firth also found a 
significant negative relationship between 
leverage and non-audit services fee. In an 
earlier United States study by Parkash and 
Venable (1993), data from 860 observations 
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during the period from 1978 to 1980 were 
used, with similar evidence collected. 
Audit services fee is believed to have 
a negative relationship with non-audit fee. 
This belief is due to the possible ‘loss leader’ 
practised by auditors, where the auditor 
charges a lower price for audit services 
in order to attract the non-audit service 
work (Hay et al., 2006). Besides that, 
the use of an incumbent auditor may also 
increase the level of efficiency of the auditor 
due to knowledge-spillovers and hence, 
may save cost (Barkess & Simnett, 1994; 
Simunic, 1984). However, prior research has 
generally found a positive relationship (see 
for example Barkess & Simnett, 1994; Hay 
et al., 2006; Houghton & Jubb, 1999). Peel 
and Clatworthy (2001) had argued that the 
positive relationship may be due to the audit 
services fee being inflated at the expense 
of the non-audit services fee, where the 
portion of non-audit services fee is included 
as audit services fee. Meanwhile, Firth 
(2002) posits that the positive relationship 
as due to the demand for non-audit services 
because of certain company specific events 
and the occurrence of these events may 
lead to higher audit efforts (thus increases 
the amount of audit services fee). Firth 
(1997) had suggested that the cost-saving 
of knowledge-spillover (if it exists), may be 
kept by the auditor if competition for audit 
and non-audit services is limited. 
It has also been hypothesised that the 
type of audit opinion has an effect on the 
amount of non-audit services fee charged 
by the auditor. While audit production costs 
and audit risks are likely to be higher for 
auditors who issue qualified audit opinions 
(Francis, 1984; Palmrose, 1986; Simunic, 
1980), Houghton and Jubb (1999) argue 
that an audit qualification could increase the 
amount of non-audit services fee charged 
due to the audit services fee recoup strategy 
by the auditor. They add that the additional 
costs borne by the auditors by their decision 
to issue an audit qualification are not 
necessarily recouped through the audit 
services fee alone but also through the non-
audit services fee (where an incumbent 
auditor also provides non-audit services to 
the client). The auditors may make use of 
non-audit services as a means of relieving 
billing constraints for audit services since 
the non-audit services fee is less price-
sensitive and less constrained to increase 
(Houghton & Jubb, 1999). Prior studies by 
DeFond et al. (2002) and Houghton and 
Jubb (1999) have both found support for 
these arguments. 
HYPOTHESES
Past studies have shown that interlocking 
directors have the tendency to select the 
same auditor across the companies in which 
they serve. This may be due to the fact that 
these directors may have developed an 
attachment with a particular auditor with 
whom they have previously worked. The 
evidence of these occurrences (termed as 
director-auditor link) have been shown by 
Davison, Stening and Wai. (1984) and Jubb 
and Houghton (1998) in Australia and Malek 
and Che Ahmad (2011) in Malaysia. 
The strength of interpersonal and inter-
organisational attachment is expected to 
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grow when relationship-specific skills are 
necessary to adequately perform the tasks 
required (Meyer, Rigsby & Boone, 2007). 
Such assets may consist of well-grounded 
communication patterns and the development 
of trust among those individuals involved 
in boundary-spanning roles; knowledge 
of the peculiarities of a firm’s accounting 
system; and understanding of the client’s 
product market to forecast the likely value of 
inventory (Levinthal & Fichman, 1982). For 
example, when specialised knowledge or 
skill-sets are needed, which may be specific 
to a particular organisation, then, significant 
investment is required at the personal and 
the organisational level in the relationship 
(Meyer et al., 2007). One immediate benefit 
of continuing a relationship is a substantial 
saving in time and effort for both the client 
and auditor in familiarising the auditor 
with the client’s accounting procedures 
(Levinthal & Fichman, 1982). 
Most of the non-audit services provide 
beneficial and important inputs to directors 
(which will then be used by the directors 
in the decision-making process), hence, 
besides emphasising upon the quality of 
the services itself, directors also require 
that the providers of these services are 
those whom they can personally trust. The 
familiarisation of the quality of work of 
auditors (through experience working in 
the interlink companies) and mutual trust 
between interlink directors and interlink 
auditor will result in the interlink directors 
being more favourable towards an interlink 
auditor in the appointment for the providers 
of the non-audit services.
From the auditor’s perspective, interlink 
auditors may also use their influence power 
(which exists due to mutual dependence and 
mutual trust) upon the interlink directors 
to purchase additional services from them. 
In a profession in which clients are loyal 
to their existing relationships, networking 
offers one of the best ways of finding leads 
for new business opportunities (Harding, 
1996). This suggests that the attachment 
created by the director-auditor link may lead 
to the existence of opportunities for new 
businesses (which, in this case, is providing 
non-audit services) for the auditor. 
Therefore, it is argued that director-
auditor links are related to non-audit fees, 
hence, leading to the following hypothesis:
H1: The director-auditor link is significantly 
and positively related to the non-audit 
services fee.
In order to capture the possible different 
influence by different types of director, the 
following hypotheses are tested:
H1a: The director-auditor link generated 
by executive interlocking directors is 
significantly and positively related to 
the non-audit services fee.
H1b: The director-auditor link generated by 
non-executive interlocking directors is 
significantly and positively related to 
the non-audit services fee.
H1b1: The director-auditor link generated 
by independent  non-execut ive 
interlocking directors is significantly 
and positively related to the non-audit 
services fee.
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METHODOLOGY
The initial population of this study was all 
companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia 
Main Board and Second Board in the year 
2007, totalling 863 companies. A total of 
104 companies (23 newly-listed companies, 
39 financial companies, 8 financial year-
end-change companies and 34 incomplete 
information companies) were excluded from 
the sample, which brings the final sample to 
a total of 759 companies.
For the testing of hypotheses H1 ‒ H1b1, 
the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) non-audit 
services fee model is used and is replicated 
and modified from Firth (1997) and Parkash 
and Venable (1993). The model takes the 
following form:
LNAS
= β0 + β1DIRLINK + β2LAFEE  
+ β3OPINION + β4ET_CC  
+ β5ET_FC + β6BFOUR  
+ β7LASSET + β8LSUBS  
+ β9INVREC + β10LEV + β11ROE  
+ β12DIROWN + β13INITIAL  
+ β14BOARD + β15INSTHLDG  
+ β16ISSUE + β17GROWTH  
+ β18RESTATE + β19LgOWN  
+ β20LAGE + β21DLOSS  
+ β22LAGOPINION + β23QUICK 
+ µ
LNAS is measured by natural logarithm 
of total non-audit services fee paid by the 
company to its auditor. Consistent with 
Courtney and Jubb (2002) and Jubb and 
Houghton (1998), the director-auditor link 
is measured by the number of interlocking 
companies (companies in which the 
directors of the observed company also 
served as directors) audited by the focal 
company’s auditor. H1 is measured by the 
number of interlocking companies generated 
by all directors of the focal company 
audited by the observation company’s 
auditor. H1a is measured by the number 
of interlocking companies generated by 
executive directors of the focal company 
audited by the observation company’s 
auditor, H1b1 is measured by the number of 
interlocking companies generated by non-
executive directors of the focal company 
audited by the observation company’s 
auditor and H1b2 is measured by the number 
of interlocking companies generated by 
executive directors of the focal company 
audited by the observation company’s 
auditor. Other variables are measured as 
follows: 
LAFEE = Natural logarithm of audit 
services fee
OPINION = 1, unqualified audit 
opinion 0, otherwise
ET_CC = Proportion of Chinese 
directors
ET_FC = Proportion of foreign 
directors
BFOUR = 1, brand name auditor 0, 
otherwise 
LASSET = Natural logarithm of total 
assets 
LSUBS = Natural logarithm of 
number of subsidiaries 
INVREC = Proportion of inventory 
and receivables to total assets 
LEV = Ratio of long-term debt to total 
equity
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ROE = Proportion of net profit to total 
shareholders’ equity 
DIROWN = Percentage of directors’ 
shareholdings 
INITIAL = 1, newly appointed auditor 
0, otherwise
BOARD = 1, main board companies 
0, otherwise
INSTHLDG = Percentage of shares 
owned by institutional holdings 
ISSUE = 1, acquired additional 
funding 0, otherwise
GROWTH = Sales growth over last 
fiscal year
RESTATE = 1, restatement of prior 
year audit account 0, otherwise
LgOWN = Percentage of shares 
owned by the largest shareholder
LAGE = Natural logarithm of number 
of years listed 
DLOSS = 1, loss in prior and current 
year 0, otherwise 
LAGOPINION = 1, unqualified audit 
opinion in prior year 0, otherwise
QUICK = Ratio of current asset (less 
inventory) to current liabilities 
RESULTS
Descriptive and Univariate Analysis 
Results
Table 1 and Table 2 below present the 
descriptive statistics and univariate test 
results for samples of companies based 
on companies which purchase non-audit 
services from its auditor (purchaser 
companies) and companies which do not 
purchase non-audit services from its auditor 
(non-purchaser companies).
Table 1 shows that purchaser companies 
have twice the number of director-auditor 
links than non-purchaser companies and 
the results of the t-test of mean differences 
between the two groups are significant 
(at a 1 % significance level) for all the 
hypotheses variables. On average, the 
purchaser companies’ auditors audit 1.77 
of interlocking companies, while non-
purchaser companies’ auditors only audit 
0.88 of interlocking companies. Based on 
types of interlocking director, the purchaser 
companies’ auditors audit 0.45 of executive 
directors’ interlocking companies, 1.56 
of non-executive directors’ interlocking 
companies and 1.08 of independent directors’ 
interlocking companies, while non-purchaser 
companies’ auditors only audit 0.20 of 
executive directors’ interlocking companies, 
0.78 of non-executive directors’ interlocking 
companies and 0.61 of independent directors’ 
interlocking companies. 
Meanwhile, Table 2 shows significant 
frequency differences of the interlink 
auditor between purchaser and non-
purchaser companies (at a 1 % significance 
level). While a majority of non-purchaser 
companies are audited by non-interlink 
auditors, a majority of purchaser companies 
are audited by interlink-auditors (60 %) 
and interlink auditors from non-executive 
interlocking directors (56 %). In addition, 
49 % of purchaser companies are audited 
by interlink auditors from independent 
interlocking directors and 25 % are audited 
by interlink auditors from executive 
interlocking directors.
Table 3 presents a matrix of the 
Pearson-Correlation for all the variables. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test Results of Continuous Variables for Purchasers and Non-
Purchasers of Non-Audit Services
Variable
Purchaser of NAS  
(Sample= 428 )
Non-Purchaser of NAS  
(Sample= 331 )
t-test 
(2 tailed)
Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
DIRLINK 1.77 2.26 0.88 1.45 -6.556*
EDLINK 0.45 0.94 0.20 0.56 -4.625*
NDLINK 1.56 2.09 0.78 1.34 -6.229*
INDLINK 1.08 1.57 0.61 1.12 -4.851*
LAFEE 5.17 0.44 5.08 0.37 -3.267*
ET_CC 0.54 0.31 0.6 0.27 2.688*
ET_FC 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.12 0.143
LASSET 8.7 0.65 8.45 0.5 -5.884*
LSUBS 1.14 0.47 1.1 0.38 -1.267
INVREC 0.28 0.19 0.32 0.19 2.781*
LEV 0.29 0.94 0.23 0.34 -1.096
ROE 0.13 0.77 -0.01 1.15 -1.83
DIROWN 33.9 25.81 37.61 23.13 2.059*
LDELAY 1.97 0.13 2.01 0.12 3.644*
INSTHLDG 56.27 25.75 46.86 25.5 -5.021*
GROWTH 0.21 0.66 0.24 1.03 0.431
LGOWN 30.16 16.72 27.11 16.37 -2.517#
LAGE 1.04 0.38 0.95 0.35 -3.167*
QUICK 2.35 3.44 3 22.15 0.532
*Significant at 1 % level 
#Significant at 5 % level
The variables representing director-auditor 
links (DIRLINK, EDLINK, NDLINK and 
INDLINK) are all found to be significant 
and positively correlated with LNAS. LNAS 
is also found significant and positively 
correlated with variables such as LAFEE, 
ET_BC, BFOUR, LASSET, LSUBS, LEV, 
ROE, BOARD, INSTHLDG, RESTATE, 
LGOWN,  LAGE and  QUICK bu t 
significantly and negatively correlated with 
ET_CC, INVREC, DIROWN, LDELAY 
and DLOSS. Meanwhile, as expected, the 
correlations among the hypotheses variables 
are significant and considerably high. Thus, 
this supports the inclusion of the hypotheses 
variables separately, one after the other 
into the multivariate regressions. Among 
the independent variables, the correlations 
are found to be less than 0.5, except for 
correlations between LASSET with LSUBS, 
LASSET with BOARD and LGOWN with 
INSTHLDG.
Multivariate Analysis Result
Table 4 presents the results of OLS 
regressions. All models are significant at 
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a 1 % significance level. However, the 
adjusted R-squared of around 0.14 is lower 
than previous studies by Firth (1997) of 0.32 
and Parkash and Venable (1993) of 0.26. 
This implies that around 14 % of variation 
in non-audit services fee is explained by 
the model. 
The results show the significant and 
positive coefficient of DIRLINK at a 1 
% significance level which implies that 
the greater the director-auditor link, the 
higher the audit services fee. Meanwhile, 
the coefficient for variables EDLINK and 
NDLINK are positive and significant at a 5 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test Results of Dummy Variables for Purchasers and Non-Purchasers 
of Non-Audit Services Companies
Variable
NAS Purchaser
(Sample = 428)
Non- Purchaser
(Sample = 331)
Pearson chi-
square test
OPINION 
Unqualified 
Other 
294 (88.82%)
37 (11.18%)
374 (87.38%)
54 (12.62%)
0.3661
BFOUR
Big 4
Non-Big 4 
258 (77.95%)
73 (22.05%)
237 (55.37%)
191 (44.63%)
41.922*
INITIAL
Change
Non-Change 
14 (4.23%)
317 (95.77)
28 (6.54%)
400 (93.46%)
1.909
BOARD
Main
Second
269 (81.27%)
62 (18.73%)
280 (65.42%)
148 (34.58%)
23.426*
ISSUE
Issue
Non-Issuance
52 (15.71%)
279 (84.29%)
65 (15.19%)
363 (84.81%)
0.0392
FISDEC
December
Others
178 (53.78%)
153 (46.22%)
250 (58.41%)
178 (41.59%)
1.630
RESTATE
Restate
None
161 (48.64%)
170 (51.36%)
149 (34.81%)
279 (65.19%)
14.770*
FOREIGN
With
Without
185 (55.89%)
146 (44.11%)
251 (58.64%)
177 (41.36%)
0.5789
DLOSS
Loss
None
36 (10.88%)
295 (89.12%)
77 (17.99%)
351 (82.01%)
7.456*
LAGOPINION
Unqualified 
Others
306 (92.45%)
25 (7.55%)
395 (92.29%)
33 (7.71%)
0.0066
Director
-Auditor Link
DIRLINK
Others
198 (59.82%)
133 (40.18%)
181 (42.29%)
247 (57.71%)
22.941*
EDLINK
Others
84 (25.38%)
247 (74.62%)
62 (14.49%)
366 (85.51%)
14.252*
NDLINK
Others
186 (56.19%)
145 (43.81%)
166 (38.79%)
262 (61.21%)
22.745*
INDLINK
Others
162 (48.94%)
169 (51.06%)
141 (32.94%)
287 (67.06%)
19.919*
*Asymptotic Significance at 1 % level (two-tailed) 
# Asymptotic Significance at 5 % level (two-tailed)
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% significance level but the coefficient for 
variable INDLINK is insignificant. These 
results imply that the director-auditor link 
created by executive and non-executive 
directors have an influence on the non-audit 
services fee while the director-auditor link 
created by independent directors do not 
have an influence on non-audit services fee. 
Overall, the results support the hypotheses 
that the greater the director-auditor link, the 
higher the non-audit services fee. Therefore, 
the results confirm the prediction of the 
preferences of Malaysian companies for 
interlink auditors in non-audit services 
fee decisions as a result of attachments 
developed through director-auditor links. 
The attachments created by director-auditor 
links develop trust regarding the quality of 
services provided by interlink auditors and 
at the same time, gives an opportunity for 
interlink auditors to influence the interlink 
director to purchase additional services 
from them. For the control variables, 
BFOUR, LASSET and RESTATE are 
found to be positively significant across all 
the regressions at a 1 %significance level, 
which is consistent with earlier studies by 
Firth (1997), Houghton and Jubb (1999) and 
Parkash and Venable (1993).
TABLE 4 
Results of OLS Regression of Non-Audit Services Fee
Variable
Predicted
Sign
OLS Regression
Panel A
Coefficient
(t-value)
Panel B
Coefficient
(t-value)
Panel C
Coefficient
(t-value)
Panel D
Coefficient
(t-value)
Constant -4.121##          
(-2.31)
-4.078##
(-2.28)
-4.035##          
(-2.25)
-3.999##
(-2.23)
DIRLINK + 0.717*
(2.47)
- - -
EDLINK + - 0.912**
(1.91)
- -
NDLINK + - - 0.589**
(1.91)
-
INDLINK + - - - 0.466
(1.37)
LAFEE +/-
-0.420         
(-0.99)
-0.460
(-1.08)
-0.431         
(-1.01)
-0.478
(-1.12)
OPINION - -0.085
(-0.28)
-0.038
(-0.12)
-0.086
(-0.28)
-0.056
(-0.18)
ET_CC +/-
-0.434
(-1.34)
-0.443
(-1.36)
-0.429
(-1.32)
-0.458
(-1.41)
ET_FC +/-
-0.191
(-1.63)
-1.211**
(-1.65)
-0.1214**
(-1.66)
-1.260**
(-1.72)
BFOUR + 0.765*
(4.05)
0.872*
(4.84)
0.814*
(4.36)
0.853*
(4.61)
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Variable
Predicted
Sign
OLS Regression
Panel A
Coefficient
(t-value)
Panel B
Coefficient
(t-value)
Panel C
Coefficient
(t-value)
Panel D
Coefficient
(t-value)
LSUBS + -0.165  
(-0.52)
-0.130
(-0.41)
-0.149  
(-0.47)
-0.119
(-0.37)
INVREC + 0.115
(0.25)
0.121
(0.26)
0.099
(0.21)
0.096
(0.21)
LEV - 0.100
(0.81)
0.086
(0.70)
0.102
(0.82)
0.098
(0.79)
ROE - 0.063
(0.80)
0.065
(0.81)
0.061
(0.77)
0.061
(0.76)
DIROWN + -0.005        
(-1.53)
-0.005
(-1.55)
-0.005        
(-1.53)
-0.005
(-1.51)
INITIAL - -0.161
(-0.46)
-0.163
(-0.47)
-0.177
(-0.51)
-0.170
(-0.49)
BOARD - 0.162
(0.77)
0.162
(0.77)
0.162
(0.77)
0.168
(0.79)
INSTHLDG + 0.005      
(1.21)
0.006
(1.31)
0.005  
(1.22)
0.005
(1.24)
ISSUE + 0.171
(0.76)
0.156
(0.69)
0.175    
 (0.78)
0.179
(0.79)
GROWTH + -0.073
(-0.81)
-0.079
(-0.88)
-0.068
(-0.76)
-0.066
(-0.74)
RESTATE + 0.401*   
(2.46)
0.405*
(2.48)
0.425* 
(2.62)
0.431*
(2.65)
LGOWN - -0.004        
(-0.57)
-0.004
(-0.57)
-0.004        
(-0.61)
-0.004
(-0.58)
LAGE - 0.158   
(0.66)
0.119
(0.50)
0.164 
(0.69)
0.168
(0.70)
DLOSS + -0.193        
(-0.80)
-0.193
(-0.80)
-0.202        
(-0.83)
-0.196
(-0.81)
LAGOPINION - 0.022
(0.06)
-0.018
(-0.05)
0.005
(0.01)
-0.038
(-0.10)
QUICK +/-
-0.003
(-0.69)
-0.004
(-0.73)
-0.003
(-0.70)
-0.003
(-0.71)
Adj-R² 0.1414# 0.1386# 0.1386# 0.1365#
*Significant at 1 % level (one-tailed) 
**Significant at 5 % level (one-tailed) 
# Significant at 1 % (two-tailed)
TABLE 4 (continue)
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CONCLUSION 
Using the data of 759 listed companies 
on Bursa Malaysia in 2007, this study has 
shown the effect of the director-auditor link 
on non-audit services fee. Consistent with 
the initial prediction, the results of the OLS 
regression show that the director-auditor 
link has significant positive effects on non-
audit services fee paid to the auditor. In 
addition, the OLS regression results also 
show that the director-auditor link created 
by executive and non-executive directors 
have influence on non-audit services fee 
while the director-auditor link created 
by independent directors do not have an 
influence on non-audit services fee. Overall, 
the results confirm the prediction of the 
preference of companies for their interlink 
auditor in non-audit services decisions as a 
result of the attachments developed by the 
director-auditor link. The findings support 
the influence of attachments created by 
the director-auditor link on auditing in 
Malaysia. While the joint provision of 
audit and non-audit services are usually 
linked to the impairment of the auditor’s 
independence, the findings suggest the need 
for active involvement of shareholders in the 
auditor selection process.
Despite the concerns of impairment 
on auditor's independence from providing 
additional services to audit clients, not 
many studies have been conducted in 
understanding the factors influencing 
companies' decision to purchase additional 
services from their auditors. In particular, 
this study adds to the growing literature on 
the influence of interlocking directorships 
(especially the director-auditor link) and 
the factors influencing joint provision of 
audit and non-audit services. For future 
studies, it is suggested to consider corporate 
governance as one possible factor in 
influencing non-audit fees and to separate 
the data of non-audit fees into different 
categories.
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ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to examine the roles of independent members on the board and CEO 
duality on firm performance in Malaysia. Data on 40 Malaysian plantation companies 
over 2007 and 2010 are used. The result shows that independent directors may not fully 
understand the operations of their firms since they might not be fully involved in business 
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should balance their number of outsiders and adopt a CEO duality structure in order to be 
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INTRODUCTION
Investors and other stakeholders in 
corporations have begun to discover the 
importance of good corporate governance 
practices in protecting their interests 
(Ehikioya, 2009). Before making any 
investment in a company, investors look into 
the governance practices of the company 
and the structure of the board of directors 
as good corporate governance can enhance 
a firm’s performance and increase its access 
to outside capital (Abdullah, 2004). Poorly 
governed firms find it difficult to attract 
capital investment from investors for their 
business expansion. Such firms are likely 
to suffer higher bankruptcy risks, lower 
valuations, less profit and less investment 
return to shareholders (Kyereboah-Coleman 
& Biekpe, 2006). Board members of such 
firms have been criticised for the decrease 
in shareholders’ wealth and the failure of 
the firms. These firms might be associated 
with fraud cases such as WorldCom and 
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Enron (Uadiale, 2010), where the board of 
directors failed to be vigilant in exercising 
oversight ability by assigning control 
power to managers who pursue their self-
interest and fail in their accountability to 
shareholders. 
Although many research studies have 
been carried out in the area of corporate 
governance, there are confusing results with 
regards to the effect of CEO duality and 
board composition on firm performance. 
Many developing or emerging market 
countries are not obtaining full and effective 
corporate governance support from the 
private sector (Samada, 2010) as the 
enforcement capacities are not yet fully 
developed due to the legal and regulatory 
systems. Malaysia is no exception. Unlike 
developed countries, Malaysia’s legal and 
regulatory system is not as well established 
nor as well regulated(Gregory & Simms, 
1999). Therefore, the prior study findings 
might not be applicable in the Malaysian 
context.
An Overview of Corporate Governance in 
Malaysia
Corporate governance is always in operation 
but it lacks clear definition (Abidin & 
Ahmad, 2007). Corporate governance is 
also always used to explain the structures 
and processes used to direct and manage 
business activities (Mustapja & Ahamd, 
2011). According to the agency theory, 
outside or independent directors are in a 
better position to monitor management 
as they are assumed to be independent 
members not employed by the firm such 
as are its managers. The separation of 
Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) provides higher transparency and 
accountability to firm information and 
decisions (Kroll et al., 2008). In contrast, 
the stewardship theory proposes that the 
board of directors should be dominated by 
executives or insider members in order for 
effective decisions to be made. The CEO 
and chairman positions should be combined 
in order to strengthen the leadership of the 
company (Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2009).
In the 1990s, Malaysia began to reform 
its corporate governance in order to develop 
better governance in monitoring firms with 
the purpose of enhancing transparency 
and accountability for the management of 
companies. The Asian financial crisis of 
1997/98 brought to Malaysian government’s 
attention the fact of weak corporate 
governance, which was the primary factor 
behind the crisis (Zulkafli et al., 2006). 
In 2000, the government launched the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
(MCCG), which was fully implemented in 
2001 (Mustpha & Ahamd, 2011). The code 
was gradually enforced on public-listed 
firms in Bursa Malaysia. 
However, MCCG was again revised 
by the Malaysia Securities Commission 
with more stringent international standards 
effective as of 1 October 2007 (Johari 
et al., 2008). The code proposes that the 
board of directors of a company should 
include independent directors numbering 
at least one third of the total board and that 
there must be clear separation of duties 
between the chairman and the CEO. Firms 
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in which the roles of chairman and CEO are 
combined have to publicly announce the fact 
and explain the need for it in their annual 
report (Securities Commission, 2007). 
In 2000, the Code of Malaysian 
Corporate Governance (MCCG) was first 
issued. However, many scholars claim 
that the existing governance mechanisms 
lackeffective control over managerial 
behaviour (Khoo, 2003). Most listed 
companies have disclosed their corporate 
governance information according to their 
own format (Rachagan, 2010). Besides, 
many studies also focus on large firms in 
developed countries with very few studies 
having been conducted in developing 
countries such as Malaysia (Muhamad et 
al., 2005), especially studies related to the 
plantation industry.
Board Composition and Firm 
Performance
Fama and Jensen (1983) state that the board 
of directors plays a vital role in corporate 
governance. There are two types of board 
of directors, namely, insiders and outsiders. 
Some prior studies suggest the board of 
directors should consist of independent 
members i.e. non-executive and outside 
directors (Johari et al., 2008). It may help 
to reduce the agency problem by controlling 
and monitoring the opportunistic behaviour 
of management (Meckling, 1976 cited in 
Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).
Dehaene et  al .  (2001)  use  122 
Belgian listed companies to test the link 
between governance mechanism (board 
independence and CEO duality) and firm 
performance (ROE and ROA). The result 
presented significant positive relationship 
between board independence and ROE, 
implying the higher the percentage of 
outside director, the better the performance. 
The study of Kyereboah-Coleman and 
Biekpe (2006) find an insignificantly 
negative link between outside directors, 
Tobin’s Q and ROA. Ehikioya (2009) 
finds no association between board 
composition and performance. Weir et al., 
(2002) documents no significant association 
between independent board composition and 
accounting based measure of performance. 
Using Tobin’s Q, the findings from Yermarch 
(1996) and Ehikioya (2009) indicate a 
significant relationship between board 
composition and performance. 
Based on Bhagat and Black’s (2002) 
findings, there was no relationship between 
non-executive director and Tobin’s Q. 
Kajola (2008) shows that there is no relation 
between ROE and board composition, 
implying an insignificant impact of the 
boards of outside directors on the firms’ 
financial performances. Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) point out that too many 
outsiders on the board will not help to 
increase firm performance due to political 
reasons. Moreover, Ibrahim and Samad 
(2011) find no significant link in proportion 
of independent directors to performance 
as measured by ROE and Tobin’s Q. The 
weak link between outside directors and 
performance indicated that outside directors 
cannot enhance potential value to the firms 
(Rashid et al., 2010; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006). To conclude, the prior studies’ 
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findings on the impact of independent non-
executives are mixed. 
CEO Duality and Firm Performance
The CEO is a full-time employee who holds 
the responsibility for the daily running of the 
firm as well as for setting and implementing 
corporate strategies. The chairperson leads 
the board of directors to ensure that the 
board performs effectively and he holds the 
responsibility for monitoring and evaluating 
the performance of the executive directors, 
including the CEO. A dual position does 
not separate the positions of chairman 
and CEO (Petra, 2005). The CEO takes 
responsibilities as chairman such as setting 
meeting agenda, running meetings of 
the board and overseeing the processes 
of compensation. Obviously, a potential 
conflict of interest arises when there is CEO 
duality (Petra, 2005). Higgs (2002) suggests 
both roles should not be combined due to 
the fact that a dual position affects the firm 
performance adversely (Chen et al., 2005).
Among others, Pi and Timme (1993) 
and Rechner and Dalton (1991) suggest 
that firms with a dual leadership structure 
have a higher ROE. Consistently, Dehaene 
et al. (2001) find a significant positive link 
between CEO duality and ROA. However, 
according to Ehikioya’s (2009) study, the 
CEO duality has a significant adverse impact 
on performance, measured as ROA and 
Tobin’s Q. Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe 
(2006) find a negative correlation between 
thedual position and Tobin’s Q and ROA but 
both are insignificant. Ibrahim and Samad 
(2011) suggest that if different persons held 
the separate positions of CEO and Chairman 
as suggested by the MCCG (revised 20007), 
then the firm’s performance would improve.
Moreover, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) 
state that there is no relationship between 
CEO duality and performance as measured 
by Tobin’s Q while it is significantly 
inversely related to ROA. Kajola’s (2008) 
study finds that there is a significant 
relationship between ROE and CEO duality 
but there is no relation between ROE and 
board composition. This is supported 
by Baliga et al. (1996) who also find no 
significant relationship between duality and 
firm performance. To conclude, the results 
of prior studies are inconsistent and mixed.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data
The plantation industry was selected as 
the research context because it makes 
a substantial contribution to economic 
growth under the Malaysian Economic 
Transformation Programme (ETP ) (Tan, 
2011). Malaysia’s palm oil export is one 
of the largest contributors to the Malaysian 
economy today, amounting to RM1.889 
(8 %) of the country’s GNI per capital 
(PEMANDU, 2010). The rubber industry, 
on the other hand, only contributed RM18.5 
billion to the country’s GNI in 2009;it is 
the second main commodity crop after oil 
palm (PEMANDU, 2010). Therefore, the 
plantation industry is selected as the focus 
of this study with regards to its potential 
growth in Malaysia in the future. This study 
aims to examine the relationship among 
independent board composition, CEO 
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duality and firm performance. The findings 
of this study are expected to provide an in-
depth knowledge of corporate governance in 
the plantation industry by filling in the gap 
in the literature on corporate governance and 
it is also expected to benefit organisational 
stakeholders such as managers, investors, 
the government and customers in terms of 
theoretical and managerial significance. 
The data was collected using secondary 
data including each company’s annual 
report and its official website as well 
as DataStream. Such data was obtained 
manually by calculating the number of 
directors on the board (Board Size) in order 
to determine the number of independent 
non-executive/outside director on the board 
(Ibrahim & Samad, 2011) and also the dual 
position of chairman and CEO in the years 
from 2007 to 2010, making up a total of 41 
listed plantation companies. Firms that were 
newly listed after 31 December 2007 or that 
were delisted from the Main Board were 
excluded. This study also excluded firms 
which failed to comply with any obligations 
under Practice Notes No 4 (PN4) and No 
17 (PN 17). PN4 was also amended to PN 
17 effective as of January, 2005 (Ibrahim 
& Samad, 2011). At the same time, the 
firm’s accounting period must have fully 
completed 12 months’ of operation for the 
business year and should be in line with the 
same end of year over a four-year period 
(Ibrahim & Samad, 2011). This study also 
included firms that changed the name of the 
company during the study period. In total, 
there were 40 firms meeting the criteria with 
only one PN17 firm having to be dropped.
Methodology
This study utilised the multiple regression 
technique to determine the relationship 
among board composition, CEO duality 
and firm performance as follows.
0 1 21 2it it itY X Xβ β β= + +
3 4 353 4 5it it itX X Xβ β β+ + +
6 7 86 7 8it it it itX X X eβ β β+ + + +
Where 
Yit = Return on Asset (ROA) or 
  Return on Equity (ROE) or 
  Tobin’s Q
β0 = Constant
βj = Coefficient of the explanatory 
  variable, with j =1,2….8
X1it = CEO Duality (CD)
X2it = Board Composition (BC)
X3it = Board Size (BSize)
X4it = Firm Size (FSize)
X5it = Firm Age (FAge)
X6it = Firm Growth (Growth)
X7it = Total Debt to Total Assets  
  (Debt 1)
X8it = Total Debt to Total Equity  
  (Debt 2)
eit = Error term
It is important to state that this study 
adopts two accounting performance 
measures (ROA and ROA) and a market 
performance measure (Tobin’s Q) to measure 
the performance of the firm. A summary of 
the terms of variables is presented in Table 1.
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Descriptive Analysis 
The statistics in Table 2 indicate that the 
majority of listed plantation firms (90 %) 
are engaged in the oil palm business in 
Malaysia due to the increasing demand for 
edible oils and animal proteins under oil 
crop cultivation, particularly oil palm, in 
the last few decades. Today, palm oil is the 
most widely traded edible oil. Its production 
has increased almost twice since the 1990s. 
As shown in Table 3, the majority 
of listed firms (80 %) have 6 to 9 board 
TABLE 1 
Summary of Terms of Variables
Variables Acronym Terms of Measurement
Dependent
Return on Assets ROA Profit before interest and tax payment
Total assets
Kyereboad-Coleman and Biekpe (2006); Haniffa and Hudaib (2006)
Return on Equity ROE Total Profit after Interest and Tax Payment
Total Equity
Kyereboad-Coleman and Biekpe (2006); Kajola (2008)
Tobin’s Q ratio Q-Ratio Market Value of Equity Capital + Book Value of Debt
Book Value of Total Assets
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006); Ehikioya (2009), 
Note: Book values of total assets should not differ markedly from 
replacement cost due to reasonably frequent updating of book values to 
reflect market values (Black et al., 2006)
Independent
CEO duality CD Dummy variable: (1) CEO combined as the chairman
                             (0) Otherwise
Abdullah (2004); Johari et al. (2008); Kajola (2008); Ehikioya (2009) 
Board 
Composition (%)
BC Number of outside directors
Total number of directors (Board Size)
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006); Kajola (2008)
Control
Board Size BSIZE Natural Logarithms of Total Board Members
Jackling and Johl (2009); Arosa et al. (2010)
Firm Size FSIZE Natural Logarithms of Total Assets
Arosa et al. (2010)
Firm Age FAGE Natural Logarithms of the number of years firm was incorporated
Wang (2006);Barontini and Caprio (2006); Arosa et al. (2010)
Growth (%) GROWTH Current Year’s Revenue-Last Year’s Revenue
Last Year’s Revenue
Wang (2006); Barontini and Caprio (2006); Arosa et al. (2010)
Debt 1 DEBT 1 Total Liability
Total Assets
Masheyekhi and Bazaz (2008); Rashid et al. (2010)
Debt 2 DEBT 2 Total Liability
Total Equity
Wang and Oliver (2009); Rashid et al. (2010)
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members. The Code of Malaysia corporate 
governance does not limit the number 
of directors on a board but Abduallah 
(2004) argues that broad size should be 8 
to 9 persons for the board to be effective. 
Table 4 presents 90 % of the listed firms 
that have 2 to 5independent directors. 
The MCCG requires at least two or one 
third of the company’s board members to 
be independent directors. Hence, listed 
plantation firms mostly comply with the 
MCCG.
Table 4 presents the descriptive analysis 
of the 40 companies in the sample. For the 
dependent variables, the mean of ROA, 
ROE and Q-ratio is about 9.8 %, 9.4 % and 
0.857. The Q value is near to 1, implying 
that on average, the firms are perceived to 
be valuable for shareholders (Khatab et al., 
2011). The majority of the firms comply 
with the provisions of the MCCG and the 
listing of Bursa Malaysia as the mean of 
board composition is about 5 %, which 
requires that more than two or one third of 
the members should be independent non-
executive directors on the board. Almost 
20.6 % of the sampled firms have one 
person holding the dual position of CEO 
and Chairman while 79.4 % of the firms 
have different individuals holding the 
posts of CEO and Chairman. Hence, it can 
be argued that the MCCG (revised 2007) 
recommendation for the separation of the 
CEO and Chairman posts has been complied 
with by the majority of the listed firms in the 
plantation sector. However, this percentage 
is lower compared with the study of Abidin 
et al. (2009) which finds that 29.3 % of the 
selected sample practices CEO duality. 
The mean of the board size is about 8 
directors, ranging from minimum 4 directors 
to maximum 13 directors. This result fulfils 
the board size requirement that there should 
be 8 or 9 persons on the board in order for 
TABLE 2 
Core Business of Sampled Firms
Business Activity Percentage (%) Number of Company
Oil Palm 90.0 36
Oil Palm and Rubber 5.0 2
Oil Palm and Cocoa 2.5 1
Oil Palm, Coconut and Banana 2.5 1
Total 100.0 40
TABLE 3 
Number of Directors on the Board and Number of Independent Directors
No. of Persons No. of Directors on Board No. of Independent Directors
Percentage (%) Number of Company Percentage (%) Number of Company
2-5 persons
6-9 persons
10-13 persons
7.5
80.0
12.5
3
32
5
90
10
0
36
4
0
Total 100.0 40 100.0 40
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it to be effective (Abdullah, 2004). The 
mean of firm size is around RM88,900,000 
ranging from minimum RM280,825 to 
maximum RM11,859,088,000. The average 
operating years of the firms is 28.82 years. 
Firm growth ranges from100 % to 898 % 
with a mean of 31.8 %, implying that some 
of the firms are growing faster while others 
tend to be at default. The average of total 
debt to total assets (debt 1) is 21.9 %, which 
indicates that merely 20 % of the assets are 
financed by debt whereas the mean of total 
debt to total equity (debt 2) is 79.3 %. Firm 
growth ranges from100 % to 898 % with a 
mean of 31.8 %, implying that some of the 
firms are growing at a faster speed while 
others tend to be at default.
The results shown in Table 6 indicates 
that the Tolerance and VIF values are well 
below the cut-off points for determining 
the presence of multi-collinearity, thus 
suggesting no multi-collinearity problems 
with cross correlation. 
TABLE 5 
Collinearity Statistics
Variables Tolerance VIF
(Constant)
BC 0.823 1.215
CD 0.790 1.266
BSIZE(log) 0.592 1.690
FSIZE (log) 0.789 1.268
FAGE 0.678 1.476
GROWTH 0.832 1.202
DEBT 1 0.675 1.120
DEBT 2 0.781 1.365
Regression Analysis 
Table 6 presents the result of regression 
analysis by performing the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression in this study. The 
R-squares for ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q 
are 10 %, 15.97 and 20.4 % respectively. 
Of these three models, none of the board 
composition and CEO duality show a 
significant relationship with ROA and ROA 
respectively. The overall significance level 
of Tobin’s Q model is higher and the board 
composition and dual CEO are significant. 
TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Independent, Dependent and Control Variables
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Median Mode Standard Deviation
ROA -0.165 1.262 0.098 0.068 -0.165 0.133
ROE -0.168 0.471 0.094 0.078 -0.168 0.986
Q-Ratio 0.194 3.557 0.856 0.714 0.194 0.694
BC 0.167 0.857 0.497 0.444 0.333 0.168
CD 0.000 1.000 0.206 0.000 0.000 0.406
BSIZE (log) 0.600 1.110 0.863 0.845 0.780 0.105
FSIZE (log) 5.448 10.074 8.007 8.470 5.448 1.280
FAGE (log) 0.301 1.973 8.467 1.362 1.342 0.331
GROWTH -1.0 8.980 0.318 0.077 0.000 1.808
DEBT 1 0.001 1.00 0.219 0.147 0.001 0.206
DEBT 2 0.001 3.235 0.793 0.497 0.001 0.794
Board Composition, CEO Duality and Firm Performance: Malaysian Plantation Sector 
93Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 21 (S): 85 - 98 (2013)
Independent board composition is 
statistically negatively correlated with 
Tobin’s Q with a t-value of -0.670. This 
suggests that independent directors do not 
necessarily have a positive association with 
firm performance if they do not play their 
role properly. If the board is dominated by 
a large number of independent directors, 
poor investment decisions may result such 
as investing in undervalued projects. CEO 
duality is positively significant with Tobin’s 
Q, consistent with Yermarck (1996) but not 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Ehikioya 
(2009). A firm can perform well under dual 
leadership as CEO duality would lead to 
better knowledge and understanding of the 
firm’s operation and environment, allowing 
the firm to make a better investment decision. 
He or she is not only responsible for the 
running of the firm’s operation but also the 
running of the board.
CONCLUSION
This study aims to examine the relationship 
between governance mechanisms (i.e. 
independent board and CEO duality) and 
firm performance in the plantation sector in 
the period from 2007 to 2010 by using both 
accounting and market-based performance 
measures. The majority of the listed firms 
have 6 to 9 directors. Abdullah (2004) 
states that board size should be 8 or 9 
persons in order for the board to achieve 
effectiveness. In addition, an independent 
board has a negative relationship with firm 
performance. Raheja (2005) argues that 
outside directors are not involved in day-
to-day management while inside directors 
have a greater knowledge of the firm. 
According to Abdullah (2004), independent 
directors might not be truly independent 
while they may have connections in unlisted 
subsidiaries. The results also recommend 
that listed firms should balance their number 
TABLE 6 
Factors Affecting Firm Performance in the Plantation Industry, 2007-2010
Variables ROA ROE Tobin’s Q ratio
Coefficient t-value Sig. Coefficient t-value Sig. Coefficient t-value Sig.
BC -0.040 -0.059 0.555 -0.027 -0.561 0.575 -0.670 -2.014 0.046
CD -0.028 -1.079 0.282 -0.024 -1.262 0.209 0.395 3.063 0.003
BSIZE (log) 0.154 1.488 0.139 0.132 1.782 0.077 -0.653 -1.287 0.200
FSIZE (log) -0.004 -0.541 0.589 -0.002 -0.416 0.678 -0.021 -0.520 0.604
FAGE (log) 0.031 0.991 0.324 0.027 1.211 0.228 -0.067 -.0431 0.667
GROWTH 0.026 2.755 0.007 0.029 4.307 0.000 0.040 -0.843 0.401
DEBT 1 -0.107 -1.273 0.205 -0.118 -1.976 0.050 2.092 5.099 0.000
DEBT 2 0.000 -0.043 0.966 0.030 1.925 0.056 -0.503 -4.722 0.000
R2 = 0.100
Adjusted R2 = 0.052
F value = 2.088
F significance = 0.040
R2 = 0.159
Adjusted R2 = 0.115
F value = 3.575
F significance = 0.001
R2 = 0.204
Adjusted R2 = 0.162
F value = 4.848
F significance = 0.000
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of independent directors on the board 
of directors. On the other hand, CEO 
duality has a positive relationship with 
firm performance as suggested by the 
stewardship theory. It can be interpreted 
that a firm can perform well under a dual 
leadership structure even though the MCCG 
recommends that the dual position should be 
avoided The CEO and chairman positions 
should be combined rather than separated as 
such a merging can strengthen the leadership 
of a company (Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 
2009). Baliga et al. (1996) suggests that a 
non-dual leadership structure would limit 
innovation, and Davis et al. (1997) believe 
that a dual leadership structure can help 
listed companies to achieve leadership 
that is unambiguous and strong in order to 
achieve internal efficiency through unity of 
command; to remove potential for conflict 
between the chairman and CEO; and also 
to avoid confusion as a result ofhaving two 
different public spokespersons. 
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to explore the firm characteristics of family-managed firms in 
Malaysian public-listed firms. Selected firms were matched for size and industry before 
comparisons were made between the family-managed firms and non-family-managed 
firms. The data were collected using secondary sources. Various firm characteristics were 
investigated. The findings indicate that firms managed by families have a significantly larger 
board size, higher number of non-independent directors and executive directors and their 
directors have significantly longer experience working in the firm. However, the results 
suggest that the directors of these family-managed firms significantly lack professional 
qualification and tend to have fewer meetings compared to those directors in non-family-
managed firms. The findings also indicate that the compensations paid to the executive 
directors of family-managed firms are significantly higher than those paid to executive 
directors of non-family managed firms. The results also suggest that these firms have not 
utilised their assets efficiently to generate sales compared to their non-family-business 
counterparts.
Keywords: Family managed firms, firm characteristics, Malaysia
INTRODUCTION
Family firms are unique (Saito, 2008). It is 
also claimed that there are differences in the 
way family firms are run compared to the 
way non-family firms are run. McConaughy 
et al. (1998) claim that family businesses are 
more efficient in managing their businesses. 
This ownership structure is claimed to 
be common among public-listed firms 
in developed and developing countries, 
and contribute to wealth creation and 
job generation in the development of the 
economy (Jorissen et al., 2007). Faccio 
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and Lang (2002) find that 44 % of firms in 
Western Europe are controlled by families. 
Anderson et al. (2003) reveal that founding 
families are present in one third of 500 firms 
in the US, and more than 50 % of businesses 
in East Asia are family-owned (Tsai et al., 
2006). Saito claims that it is important 
to generate stylized facts on family firms 
from different countries because of the 
various characteristics of the countries, 
such as their legal system and corporate 
governance system, which may affect the 
family firms. Family businesses are claimed 
to be different from non-family businesses 
because they are owned or controlled by 
family members, and, thus, have a great 
potential for the family to be involved in 
or influence business matters (Jorissen 
et al., 2007). Despite the significance of 
these businesses, prior studies claim that 
very little research has been done in less 
developed countries where their corporate 
governance mechanisms are still evolving 
(Carcello et al., 2002; Yatim et al., 2006).
This  paper  at tempts  to  explore 
the corporate governance structure of 
family-managed firms among public-
listed firms in Malaysia. Besides being 
a developing country with an emerging 
market in Asia, Malaysia was chosen for 
this study because of its unique concentrated 
business environment. It is claimed that 
owner-managed firms are common among 
Malaysian firms (Mat Nor & Sulong, 2007), 
especially in the form of family businesses 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Hanazaki & 
Liu, 2006). This claim is further supported 
by Ow-Yong and Guan (2000), who posit 
that listed firms in Malaysia evolved from 
traditional family-owned firms, and some of 
these firms continue to be managed as such. 
Unlike firms with dispersed shareholdings, 
these firms are believed to have reduced 
agency problems and agency costs due 
to a better match of control and cash 
flow rights of the shareholders (Abdul 
Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006). In 
order to examine the differences in the 
characteristics and corporate governance 
structure between public listed firms which 
are managed by families and those managed 
by nonfamilies, a comparison is made 
between the groups. Among others, board 
size, board activity, the education level 
of the directors and remuneration of the 
directors are investigated. 
The rest of this paper is structured as 
follows. Literature Review gives a review 
of the relevant literature and Methodology 
describes the sample and methodology used 
for the study. Result and Discussion presents 
and discusses the empirical results and, 
finally, Conclusion provides the conclusions 
of the study. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Family businesses are regarded as the 
most common ownership structure around 
the world (La Porta et al., 1999). It is 
claimed that the structure of family firms 
is different compared to non-family firms. 
This structure would normally affect their 
governance structure, such as the selection 
of their board members, the CEO and their 
decision processes (Bartholomeusz & 
Tanewski, 2006). Family businesses would 
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normally choose their family members to 
sit on their boards and to be their chairman. 
Horii (1991) observes that family businesses 
tend to place their family members in the top 
management position of the organisations. 
In addition, knowledge and expertise 
are more likely to be passed on within 
families as opposed to shared with outsiders 
(Andres, 2008). Even though professionals 
are more qualified, family enterprises 
will only hire professionals after their 
businesses reach a critical size because they 
believe the professional interest may not 
be aligned with the interest of the family 
(Bhattacharya and Ravikumar, 2001). 
Family businesses are also claimed to have 
committed, undiversified stake in the firm 
and induce strong incentive to monitor as 
the firm survival and its value maximisation 
are important to them (Fleming et al., 2005).
Tsai et al. (2006) claimed that informal 
family influence is more powerful than 
formal authority in Taiwanese family firms 
because CEOs and top management are also 
family members. Tsai et al. find that CEO 
turnover is significantly lower in family 
firms and its relation to firm’s performance 
is negative. They further claim that there 
are two opposite effects of family firms: 
the family firms have sufficiently high 
ownership concentration to help solve the 
firms’ problem, and to discipline the CEO, 
but on the other hand, they may also create 
conditions for new agency problems, when 
the interests of the controlling shareholders 
and the managers are still not perfectly 
aligned. This is agreed by Andres (2008), 
who claims that family businesses with 
concentrated shareholdings have strong 
economic incentives to monitor managers 
and decrease agency costs; this is also due 
to the fact that the agency conflict does not 
arise as family members are also part of the 
executive board. However, this combination 
of management and control might also lead 
to sub-optimal investment decisions when 
the interests of the family are not in line 
with those of other shareholders (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). For example, it is claimed 
that the family’s role in selecting managers 
and members of the board may increase 
entrenchment and lower the firm value 
since the external parties can hardly capture 
control over the firm. It is also claimed that 
family control provides family members 
with a unique opportunity to use their 
concentrated block-holding to expropriate 
the wealth of outside shareholders through 
excessive compensation, related-party 
transactions, special dividends and risk 
avoidance (Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 
2006).
It is claimed that these corporate 
governance attributes (such as its board 
size, and board leadership or role duality) 
are related to the corporate performance 
of the firm, (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). 
Haniffa and Hudaib posit that the size 
of the board does matter as it affects the 
extent of monitoring, controlling and 
decision-making in a firm. Small boards 
are said to help in alleviating the effort 
problem and in becoming more effective. 
But, when they grow too big, boards 
become more symbolic rather than part of 
the management process. Jeremias (2007) 
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claims that firms might minimise agency 
costs if the board of directors effectively 
supervises managers. Accordingly, there 
are arguments that the boards’ manager-
monitoring activities will be more effective 
when they are dominated by independent, 
outside directors. Furthermore, the value of 
outside directors is related to their ability 
to judge firm performance objectively; 
inside directors may lack this quality, which 
will limit their effectiveness as corporate 
monitors. Boards of directors which are 
more independent from management tend to 
perform management-monitoring activities 
more effectively, which will in turn minimise 
the likelihood of managers engaging in 
opportunistic behaviour, and discipline 
them to run the firm more efficiently. But 
in family businesses, the family members 
are normally appointed as the directors 
and sit on the board, thus, they are not 
independent. Lansberg (1999) argues that, 
in the case of family businesses, even when 
they are well stocked with independent 
outsiders, they tend to focus too narrowly 
on business issues. Too often, independent 
directors are not chosen for any particular 
knowledge or sensitivity to the family side 
of the business. On the contrary, they are 
selected for precisely the opposite reasons; 
for example, because they are from the 
larger corporate world, they presumably 
have much experience into which the family 
firm can tap. 
A study by Amran and Che Ahmad 
(2009) finds evidence that independent 
directors’ background and competencies are 
essential factors that contribute positively to 
family firms. The study claims that family 
firms are facing challenges in searching for 
qualified directors to sit on their boards and 
encounter the problem of incompetence 
agents. Amran and Che Ahmad conclude 
that educational background and skills may 
influence the performance of family firms. 
They further claim that a family’s special 
technical knowledge concerning a firm’s 
operations may put it in a better position 
to monitor the firm more effectively. They 
also claim that families have the incentive 
of counteracting free-rider problems 
that prevent atomised shareholders from 
bearing the costs of monitoring, ultimately 
reducing agency costs. This is supported by 
another study, which claims that directors 
appointed among family members have 
excellent knowledge of the firm due to their 
long-standing relationship with the senior 
management of the firm. In addition, some 
family firms institute succession plans, 
which include training for successors (Smith 
& Amoako-Adu, 1999).
Jeremias (2007) claims that CEO 
duality might impede the effectiveness of 
a firm’s control mechanisms. He argues 
that the CEO and the chairman of the board 
should not be the same person in order to 
ensure that the board is more independent 
from management. If the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board of directors, he might 
have a significant influence on the board, 
which could diminish the board’s ability to 
oversee managerial decisions and activities 
and, thereby, negatively affect performance. 
The board, with the high influence of the 
management, will not be able to discipline 
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the management appropriately as the 
management who controls the board will 
over-rule such initiatives and a non-
executive chairman promotes a higher 
level of corporate openness. Jeremias 
(2007) claims that the existence of CEO 
duality could diminish the board’s ability 
to supervise management decisions and 
activities and, thus, give negative feedback 
on the firm’s performance. However, in 
family businesses, the firm would normally 
appoint the family member to be the CEO 
and chairman of the board.
Prior studies claim that structures of 
ownership will affect the firm’s performance 
(Saito, 2008; Tsai et al., 2006). Among 
others, family ownership is claimed to affect 
this relationship. Tsai et al. (2006) claim that 
family firms have a positive impact on firm 
values because they typically have longer 
planning horizons that result in valuable 
investment strategies. They conclude that 
family firms have effective organisational 
structures because they perform better 
compared to non-family firms. The evidence 
from McConaughy et al. (1998) proves that 
family relationship improves monitoring 
and provides incentives that are associated 
with better firm performance. This is 
supported by Anderson et al. (2003), who 
find evidence that family ownership is 
associated with lower agency cost of debt. 
After controlling for industry and firm 
specific characteristics, their study indicates 
that the costs of debts financing for family 
firms are lower than those in non-family 
firms. This is supported by McConaughy 
et al. (1998), who claim that the unique 
relationship between the family descendant 
in management and the firms holds the 
potential for improved monitoring and 
top managerial incentives. They find firm 
efficiency and value related to the person 
who owns and manages the firm. Family-
managed firms are managed by both tenure 
and their descendants, and for this reason, 
their firms are run more efficiently than 
they would be run by managers outside the 
family.
Thus, this study examines these 
corporate governance attributes of family 
businesses in Malaysian firms. Specifically, 
this study investigates the differences 
between the corporate governance attributes 
(such as board size, board activity, board 
independence and the existence of CEO 
duality) of family-managed firms and non-
family-managed firms.
METHODOLOGY
The study uses secondary data from annual 
reports of public-listed firms. These annual 
reports are available and downloadable from 
the website of the exchange1. Firstly, 50 
firms which were defined as family-managed 
firms were selected; then, after matching 
the industry category and size, another 50 
firms were selected and categorised as non-
family-managed firms. This study defines 
a firm as a family-managed firm if 2 or 
more directors on the board of directors 
are related, and at least one of the family 
members holds an executive director’s 
position in the firm and their shareholdings 
1http://www.announcements.bursamalaysia.
com
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are equal to or more than 20% (as used by 
Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006). 
Independent t-tests were carried out to 
investigate the differences in the governance 
structure and characteristics between the 
two groups, namely family-managed firms 
and non-family-managed firms. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics for sample firms 
used in this study are presented in Table 
1. The table shows the statistics of family-
managed firms and non-family-managed 
firms. 
The sample firms include firms from the 
industrial sector (40 firms), consumer sector 
(28 firms), trading/services sector(12 firms), 
properties sector (12 firms) and technology 
and plantation sector (4 firms each). The 
firms were categorised as family-managed 
firms and non-family-managed firms after 
matching for size and industry category.
Independent Sample T-test Analysis
Table 2 displays the independent t-test 
results relating to the characteristics and 
governance structure of sample firms from 
both categories, family-managed firms and 
non-family-managed firms. 
The first row of the table indicates that 
family-managed firms have a significantly 
larger board size compared to the non-
family-managed firms. The average mean 
size is 8.4 compared to 6.86. This larger 
board may be attributed to a higher number 
of non-independent and executive directors 
in their firms as shown in the following 
rows. The results appear to suggest that 
family-managed firms have a significantly 
higher number of non-independent directors 
(mean = 5.18) and executive directors (mean 
= 4.24), compared to non-family-managed 
firms. A plausible explanation for these 
significant results may be that family-
managed firms prefer to appoint family 
members who have shares and interests 
in the firms rather than outsiders to the 
board of directors as well as to manage 
the firm. This is consistent with earlier 
observations by Horii (1991), who posits 
that family businesses tend to place family 
members in the top management position 
of the organisations. It is further claimed 
that even though professionals are more 
qualified, family enterprises will only hire 
professionals after their businesses reach 
a critical size because they believe the 
professional interest may not be aligned 
with the interest of the family (Bhattacharya 
& Ravikumar, 2001). Thus, in the case of 
family businesses, the appointment of the 
independent directors may be done only 
because of the requirement by law. From 
the results in Table 2, it is observed that the 
number of independent directors in both 
categories of companies are about the same 
and not statistically different; this may be 
due to the fact that both categories are listed 
companies which are supposed to adhere 
to the law, which requires them to have a 
certain percentage of independent directors 
to monitor the management. 
The results also show that the chairman 
of the board is significantly related to the 
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CEO in family-managed firms compared to 
those in non-family-managed firms. Further 
investigation of this data reveals that 18 out 
of 50 of the chairman of the family-managed 
firms are related to the CEO, and another 
8 chairmen also act as CEOs for the firms. 
However, none of the chairmen is related 
to the CEO in non-family-managed firms. 
CEOs in family-managed firms appear to 
have significantly more years of experience 
(mean = 15.26 years) compared to their 
counterparts in non-family-managed firms 
(mean = 7.12 years). This may be due 
to the fact that in family businesses the 
descendant has been trained and developed 
to manage the firm and has been exposed 
to the working environment and culture of 
the firms from the start of the business, as 
it is claimed that some family firms develop 
succession plans and training for their 
successors (Smith & Amoako-Adu, 1999). 
However, there is a significantly lower 
number of CEOs in family-managed firms 
who have professional qualification and 
higher education compared to those CEOs 
in non-family-managed firms. This may 
be due to the fact that in family managed 
firms, CEOs are appointed based on their 
family values and relationship, as well as 
their past experience in handling the family 
businesses rather than on educational or 
professional qualification. In these firms, 
older members of the family will continue 
to head the firm until they can pass the 
management to a suitable descendant. Their 
aim is to determine survival and safeguard 
the future of the firm as well as that of the 
following generations (Bhattacharya & 
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Ravikumar, 2001). On the other hand, CEOs 
of non-family-managed firms are usually 
appointed based on merit, knowledge and 
qualification.
As indicated in the last three rows of 
Table 2, the total directors’ compensation 
in family-managed firms also appears to be 
significantly higher than that of non-family-
managed firms. The detailed statistics 
show that this high compensation payment 
is due to the high payment to executive 
directors in compensation, which also 
shows a significant result. The descriptive 
statistics show that the average mean for 
total directors’ compensation and executive 
directors’ compensation is about 2.97 
million and 2.64 million respectively in 
family-managed firms, which is almost 
double the amount paid to their counterparts 
in non-family-managed firms of 1.47 million 
and 1.24 million respectively. However, the 
payment to the non-executive directors is 
approximately the same for both categories 
of firm, with the average mean of 2.5 
million for family-managed firms and 2.3 
million for non-family-managed firms, 
and the results indicate an insignificant 
difference. This result appears to suggest the 
possibility that family-managed firms adopt 
a different compensation plan compared to 
non-family-managed firms, as the payments 
would flow to the board members who are 
family members. Further investigation in 
this domain is needed before any conclusion 
can be made.
Family-managed firms appear to 
have significantly fewer board meetings 
compared to non-family-managed firms. 
A detailed investigation of the data reveals 
that the majority of the family-managed 
firms have either 4 or 5 meetings in a year, 
whereas the majority of the non-family-
managed firms have either 5 or 6 meetings 
every year. The law requires listed firms to 
have at least 4 meetings every year, or one 
meeting each quarter. The 4 or 5 meetings 
conducted by family-managed firms may be 
conducted to make sure that this requirement 
is fulfilled. Another plausible explanation 
is that as family members, they may have 
informal meetings during which some of the 
firms’ problems or issues may be solved or 
discussed, therefore, they may need fewer 
meetings than would non-family-managed 
firms, the board members of which rarely 
have the opportunity to meet without reason. 
In terms of performance, at 10 % level 
of significance, the total sales of family-
managed firms are statistically different 
compared to the total sales of non-family-
managed firms. Earnings before interest 
and tax and earnings per share of family-
managed firms are also statistically higher 
than those of non-family-managed firms. 
However, the results also indicate that 
family-managed firms have a significantly 
lower asset utilisation ratio compared to that 
of non-family-managed firms. 
CONCLUSION
The objective of the study is to explore the 
differences between family-managed firms 
and non-family-managed firms in Malaysia. 
The findings indicate that governance 
characteristics of family-managed firms and 
non-family-managed firms are significantly 
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TABLE 2 
Independent Sample T-tests of the 100 Sample Firms
Variable Categories N Mean T value (sig)
Board size Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
8.40
6.86
4.158
(0.000)
No of independent directors Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
3.22
3.26
-0.224
(0.823)
No of  non-independent 
directors
Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
5.18
3.60
5.431
(0.000)
No of  executive directors Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
4.24
2.26
8.320
(0.000)
No of  non-executive 
directors 
Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
4.16
4.60
-1.260
(0.211)
No of related directors Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
3.94
.00
30.524
(0.000)
Independent 
directors (%)
Family-managed firms 
Nonfamily-managed firms
50
50
.3879
.4855
-4.836
(0.000)
Chairmen are related to CEO Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
.36
.00
5.250
(0.000)
CEO Duality Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
.16
.10
0.887
(0.378)
Years of CEO’s experience Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
15.26
7.12
5.050
(0.000)
CEO has  professional 
qualification
Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
.16
.82
-3.233
(0.002)
CEO has  higher education Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
.4400
.6600
-2.244
(0.027)
Board activity (meetings) Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
4.94
5.50
-1.898
(0.061)
Total sales Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
389, 179, 837.68
263, 348, 846.40
1.730
(0.087)
Earnings before interest and 
tax
Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
27, 649, 958.74
13, 603, 991.80
2.155
(0.034)
Asset utilisation ratio Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
1.6764
2.5031
-1.656
(0.091)
Earnings per share Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
12.9700
7.9068
1.610
(0.091)
Executive Directors’ 
compensation
Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
2,642,152.84
1,236,856.78
3.317
(0.000)
Non-Executive Directors’ 
compensation
Family-managed-firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
250, 095.02
230, 321.08
0.278
(0.781)
Total Directors’ 
compensation
Family-managed firms 
Non-family-managed firms
50
50
2, 975, 760.50
1, 475, 562.52
3.475
(0.001)
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different. Firms managed by families have 
a significantly larger board size, higher 
number of non-independent directors and 
executive directors and their directors have 
a significantly longer experience working in 
the firm compared to non-family-managed 
firms. However, the results suggest that 
the directors of family-managed firms 
significantly lack professional qualification 
and tend to have fewer meetings compared to 
directors of non-family-managed firms. The 
findings also indicate that the compensations 
paid to the executive directors of family-
managed firms are significantly higher 
than those paid to executive directors of 
non-family-managed firms. Even though 
the family-managed firms appear to have 
significantly higher earnings per share and 
total sales compared to the non-family-
managed firms, they have not utilised their 
assets efficiently compared to non- family-
managed firms.
This study provides information to 
potential investors about the differences 
between family-managed firms and non-
family-managed firms. In addition, it also 
provides a basis for more detailed study 
on family-managed firms in Malaysia, 
where this unique concentrated business 
environment is claimed to be common.
However, the conclusions drawn from 
this study should be interpreted in a limited 
way, which would potentially represent 
opportunities for further investigation 
in future research. This study is a cross-
sectional study that uses data from one year 
only. Future research could extend the study 
to include data collected over more years for 
a longitudinal study.
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ABSTRACT
One of the main concerns about interlocking directorates is their effect on corporate 
performance; however, there is little research undertaken on this issue. Therefore, the 
objective of this study is to examine the effect of interlocking directorates on corporate 
performance by considering the nature and the direction of interlocking. The analyses are 
based on the data of 741 listed companies on Bursa Malaysia in 2007. The Ordinary Least 
Square regression results show that the number of interlocking companies, inter-industry 
interlocking directorates and interlocking created by independent directors are all significant 
and positively related to corporate performance, which is consistent with the resource 
dependence theory and the corporate governance theory. However, it is also discovered 
that both multiple directorships by executive directors and non-executive non-independent 
directors do not have any effect on corporate performance, which is consistent with the 
class integration theory. Despite the negative perception on interlocking directorates by 
the public, the findings suggest that interlocking directorates actually benefit shareholders 
by enhancing the earnings performance of the corporation.
Keywords: Corporate performance, directors, interlocking directorates
INTRODUCTION
The issue of directorships has long been 
discussed in corporate governance research 
and by policy makers due to the importance 
of the role of directors in the corporate 
structure. Among the debated issues is the 
matter of interlocking directorates, where 
directors of one company hold additional 
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directorships in other companies. The 
holding of multiple directorships has been 
criticised as it is said to limit the directors’ 
time and commitment in discharging their 
responsibilities (Ibrahim Raman & Saidin, 
2009).
In Malaysia, a study by Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) found negative perceptions 
related to multiple directorships by the 
capital market; the study argued that this was 
due to the perception of ‘crony capitalism’, 
‘class consolidation’ and ‘elite capitalist 
integration’ in the Malaysian business 
environment. However, Hashim and Abdul 
Rahman (2011) found that the presence of 
interlocking directors enhances the quality 
of financial reporting due to the diligent 
monitoring and protection guaranteed by 
the reputation of these directors.
The government’s concern about this 
issue can be seen through the restriction 
on multiple directorships imposed Bursa 
Malaysia. Under Paragraph 15.06 of the 
Listing Requirements, a director of a listed 
company is restricted from holding not more 
than 25 directorships (10 in listed companies 
and 15 in unlisted companies). 
One of the main concerns about 
interlocking directorates is its effect on 
corporate performance. However, findings 
from earlier studies by Ferris, Jaghannathan 
and Pritchard (2003), Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006), Liu and Yang (2008), Phan Lee and 
Lau (2003) and Shao (2010) have all shown 
mixed results of the effect of interlocking 
directorates on corporate performance. 
The mixed results may possibly be due to 
their failure to recognise the nature and the 
direction of the interlocking directorates. 
Therefore, the objective of this study is 
to examine the effects of interlocking 
directorates on corporate performance by 
considering the nature of directors and the 
direction of the interlocking directorates. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
The basic form of interlocking directorates 
occurs when a director of one corporation 
also sits on the board of directors of another 
corporation (Mizruchi, 1996). It also occurs 
when two directors from different companies 
(e.g. A and B) sit on the board of a third 
company (namely C), where company 
A and B are directly interlocked with 
company C (or the other way around) and 
indirectly interlocked with each other (Phan 
et al., 2003). Two main theories have been 
proposed by researchers for the existence 
of interlocking directorates. The class 
integration theory proposes that interlocking 
directorates occur as mutual protection of 
interest of a social class by its members 
(Koenig & Gogel, 1981). Under this theory, 
the directors are appointed from candidates 
within the personal network of incumbent 
directors who have similar backgrounds, 
characteristics and political beliefs to protect 
the welfare of the individual within the class 
(Phan et al., 2003). The resource dependence 
theory as proposed by Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) argues that interlocks occur for the 
inter-organisational coordination exchange 
of resources (capital, information and 
market access) to overcome environmental 
uncertainty.
Interlocking Directorates and Corporate Performance
113Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 21 (S): 111 - 126 (2013)
Past studies on interlocking directorates 
focus more on the nature and reasons 
behind interlocking directorates. Generally, 
interlocking directorates are found to be 
a common phenomenon and an increase 
in the trend of interlocking directorates is 
found around the world (see for example 
Dooley, 1969; Ferris et al., 2003; Haniffa 
& Hudaib, 2006). 
Several factors contributing to the 
occurrences of interlocking directorates 
among corporations have been identified by 
earlier studies. Dooley (1969) hypothesised 
that the proven ability and the influence of 
directors of large corporations towards others 
(such as industry, potential investors and 
government) and the importance of business 
connections with large corporations by small/
medium corporations, make the directors of 
large corporations attractive candidates 
for other boards. Dooley also posits that 
due to the importance of corporation-
financial institution relationships such as 
funding (for the corporation) and reliable 
customers (for the financial institutions), 
interlocking directorates have been related 
to financial institutions. Dooley postulates 
that financially-difficult-corporations need 
to have a close connection with financial 
institutions (so they can have more ready 
access to funds) and at the same time, the 
need of monitoring by financial institutions 
has led to the occurrence of interlocking 
directorates by financial institutions. In 
addition, the existence of trust operations 
by financial institutions has also been 
a leading factor for the occurrence of 
interlocking directorates by financial 
institutions (Dooley, 1969). Besides that, 
the appointment of individual directors to 
other boards is the market’s reward to the 
individuals due to the superior performance 
enjoyed by the corporation in which the 
director serves (Ferris et al., 2003). It has 
also been postulated that the predominance 
of non-executive directors on the board of 
directors will lead to more interlocks since 
these directors will favour the nomination of 
individuals in their elite class (Phan et al., 
2003). At the same time, executive directors 
are less likely to hold directorships in other 
corporations due to their commitment and as 
well as to time constraints (Dooley, 1969). 
HYPOTHESES
Several arguments based on corporate 
governance and organisational theories have 
been used by earlier studies in hypothesising 
the effects of interlocking directorates 
on corporate performance. The class 
integration theory proposes that interlocking 
directorates occur as a form of mutual 
protection of interest within a social class 
by its members and therefore, it has been 
argued that interlocking directorates do not 
have any effect on corporate performance 
(Koenig & Gogel, 1981; Phan et al., 
2003). The corporate governance theory, 
however, offers that holding multiple 
directorships may have a negative effect 
on corporate performance due to limitation 
of time and increase in commitment by the 
interlocking directors (Ibrahim et al., 2009). 
Time and commitment limitation may 
affect interlocking directors’ monitoring 
ability. On the other hand, holding multiple 
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directorships may increase directors’ 
ability as monitors due to experience and 
knowledge gained by serving on multiple 
companies’ boards and increase their 
motivation to discharge their monitoring 
roles due to the concerns of damage to 
reputation (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The 
resource dependence theory as proposed 
by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), argues 
that interlocking directorates occur for 
inter-organisational coordination exchange 
of resources (capital, information and 
market access) to overcome environmental 
uncertainty, and, thus, may imply that 
interlocking directorates may have a positive 
effect on corporate performance.
Prior empirical evidence has shown 
mixed findings on the effects of multiple 
directorships on corporate performance. 
While Liu and Yang (2008) found significant 
negative relationships between multiple 
directorships and earnings, Shao (2010) 
provided evidence of significant positive 
relationships. The mixed findings by the 
above studies may probably be due to the 
failure to recognise the types of director 
involved in interlocking directorates. 
Limitation of t ime and increase in 
commitment due to holding multiple 
directorships as argued by Ibrahim et 
al. (2009) may be true for executive 
directors, due to their daily involvement 
in business operations, while the argument 
that experience and knowledge are gained 
as proposed by Fama and Jensen (1983) 
may be suitable for non-executive directors, 
due to their indirect involvement in daily 
business operations. In the Malaysian 
business environment, it can be seen 
that interlocking directorates are more 
pronounced among non-executive directors 
than executive directors. Therefore, the 
following hypotheses are developed:
H1: Average multiple directorships have 
a significant positive relationship 
with corporate performance.
H1a: Average executive directors’ 
mult ip le  d i rec torships  have 
a negative effect on corporate 
performance.
H1b: Average non-executive non-
independent directors’ multiple 
directorships have a positive effect 
on corporate performance.
H1c: Average independent directors’ 
multiple directorships have a 
posi t ive effect  on corporate 
performance.
The above studies view interlocking 
directorates at the individual (directors) 
level without considering the organisational 
(company) level. Interlocking directorates 
may exist between companies in the 
same industry (known as intra-industry 
interlocking directorates) or in different 
industry (also known as inter-industry 
interlocking directorates) (Phan et al., 
2003). Phan et al. (2003) argued that 
intra-industry interlocking directorates are 
important for the coordination exchange of 
resources and inter-industry interlocking 
directorates are important for a wide view of 
business environment. Based on Singapore 
listed companies, Phan et al. (2003) found 
that inter-industry interlocking directorates 
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have a significant positive relationship 
with return on equity (ROE) but failed to 
find any significant effect contributed by 
intra-industry interlocking directorates. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are 
developed:
H2: Total number of interlocking 
companies has a positive effect on  
corporate performance.
H2a:  Inter- industry inter locking 
directorates have a positive effect 
on corporate performance.
H2b:  Intra-industry interlocking 
directorates have a positive effect 
on corporate performance.
METHOD
The archival method is used to collect data 
from listed companies in Bursa Malaysia 
both on Main and Second Board (now 
known as Main Market) in 2007. Listed 
companies are chosen due to their publicly 
available annual reports, and 2007 data 
is used due to the stability of the country 
both economically and politically during 
that period of time. As at 31 December 
2007, 863 companies are listed on Bursa 
Malaysia, but only 741 companies are used 
in the final sample. Due to the difference in 
the regulatory requirements, all financial 
and unit trust companies are excluded. In 
addition to that, newly listed companies 
are also excluded because of unavailability 
of prior year annual reports and financial 
year-end change companies are also 
excluded due to inconsistency of their data. 
Furthermore, 42 companies are excluded 
due to incomplete data and another 12 
companies are also excluded due to the 
negative value of their equity.
For the multivariate analysis, the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression 
will be used. The model takes the following 
form:
PERFORMANCE  
= b1INTERLOCKING + b2ISSUE 
+ b3BOARD+ b4FOREIGN  
+ b5DIROWN + b6BODIND  
+ b7BODSIZE + b8GROWTH  
+ b9LSUBS + b10LAGE  
+ b10LEVERAGE + C
The dependent variable represents 
corporate performance. Two common 
proxies for corporate performance are 
market return and accounting return, but 
only accounting return will be used in this 
study. The accounting return is suitable 
for long-term phenomenon, whilst market 
return measurement is more suitable for 
the testing of the effects of specific events 
(Phan et al., 2003). Two accounting return 
measurements are used, namely, return on 
equity (ROE) and return on asset (ROA). 
High values of ROE and ROA indicate 
effective use of company resources in 
enhancing the shareholders’ wealth. ROE 
is calculated as the ratio of the net income 
to the book value of equity and ROA is 
calculated as the ratio of the net income to 
the book value of assets.
Consistent with Phan et al. (2003), 
only interlocking directorates within 
the population and direct interlocking 
directorates will be counted. The inclusion 
of interlocking directorates outside the 
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population and indirect interlocking 
directorates will complicate the calculation. 
Two main measurements are used in defining 
interlocking directorates, namely, average 
additional directorships and the number 
of interlocking companies. Consistent 
with Feris et al. (2003), TOTALOCK 
is measured by the average number of 
additional directorships held by all directors, 
EXECLOCK is measured by the average 
number of additional directorships held by 
executive directors, NONLOCK is measured 
by the average number of additional 
directorships held by non-executive non-
independent directors and INDLOCK 
is measured by the average number of 
additional directorships held by independent 
directors. Meanwhile, consistent with Phan 
et al. (2003), INTERLOCK is measured by 
the number of other companies served in 
by the directors of the observed company, 
INTRA is measured by the number of other 
companies served in by the directors of the 
observed company within the same industry 
and INTER is measured by the number of 
other companies served in by the directors 
of the observed company in the different 
industry. 
Several factors have been said to affect 
corporate performance (see for example 
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Liu & Yang, 2008; 
Shao, 2010) and therefore, these variables 
are included in the model to control for 
the interrelation of these variables. ISSUE 
is measured by dummy, 1 if observed 
company issues additional shares or acquires 
additional loan in the current year and 0 if 
otherwise; BOARD is measured by dummy, 
1 if observed company is listed on Main 
Board and 0 if otherwise; and FOREIGN is 
measured by dummy, 1 if observed company 
has foreign subsidiaries and 0 if otherwise. 
DIROWN is measured by the proportion 
of shares, directly and indirectly owned 
by directors; GROWTH is measured by 
the changes in sales over prior year sales; 
LSUBS is measured by natural logarithm of 
the number of the company’s subsidiaries; 
and LAGE is measured by natural logarithm 
of the number of years a company is listed 
on Bursa Malaysia. All of these variables 
are expected to have significant positive 
relationships with corporate performance. 
Meanwhile, LEVERAGE is measured 
by the proportion of total liabilities over 
total assets and is expected to have a 
negative effect on corporate performance. 
BODSIZE is measured by the number of 
board of directors’ members and BODIND 
is measured by the proportion of non-
executive directors on the board of directors. 
RESULTS
Descriptive
Table 1 and Table 2 present the descriptive 
statistic of the continuous variables and the 
dummy variables respectively. 
Table 1 shows that on average, the 
return on asset (ROA) is 3.7 % and return 
on equity (ROE) is 4.5 %. On average, a 
company shares its director with 5 other 
listed companies, with the highest number 
of companies being 23. It also shows 
that a company is interlocked more with 
companies in a different industry (a mean 
of 4 companies are found for inter-industry 
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interlocking directorates, while a mean of 
1 company for intra-industry interlocking 
directorates). Based on directors, on 
average, a director holds almost 1 additional 
directorship in other companies, whereby 
independent directors hold 1 additional 
directorship and executive directors only 
hold 0.44 additional directorships. This 
implies that interlocking directorates is more 
pronounced among independent directors 
than any other types of director and is 
more likely to incur between companies in 
different industries.
Related to board of directors, the average 
size is 8 members with the minimum being 3 
and the maximum being 17 members. About 
64 % of the directors are non-executive 
directors. On average, the directors also own 
about 37 % of the shares of the companies. 
The average number of years a company 
has been listed on Bursa Malaysia is 13 and 
the average number of subsidiaries is 21 
companies. The average value of leverage 
is 40 % and sales increase is by 23 %. Table 
2 shows that 16 % of the sample companies 
(115 companies) have issued additional 
shares and acquire additional long-term 
liabilities, 73 % (539 companies) are listed 
on Main Board and 58 % (427 companies) 
have foreign subsidiary.
Univariate
Table 3 shows the univariate result by 
comparing the ROE and ROA between 
companies with interlocking directorates 
and companies without interlocking 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev
TOTALOCK 0 4.25 0.757 0.712
EXECLOCK 0 7 0.446 0.887
NONLOCK 0 8 0.587 1.053
INDLOCK 0 7 1.045 1.066
INTERLOCK 0 23 4.668 4.235
INTRA 0 7 1.078 1.448
INTER 0 22 3.579 3.534
DIROWN 0 0.992 0.365 0.243
BODIND 0.286 1 0.637 0.174
BODSIZE 3 17 7.522 2.006
GROWTH -1 17.837 0.232 0.877
LSUBS 0 2.535 1.123 0.419
LAGE 0 1.663 0.988 0.366
LEVERAGE 0.001 0.985 0.398 0.210
ROA -1.406 1.426 0.037 0.121
ROE -7.751 2.271 0.045 0.381
AGE 1 46 13.472 11.030
SUBS 0 342 20.734 31.214
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Dummy Variables
Variables Variables Number Percentage
ISSUE Issue 115 15.52
No 626 84.48
BOARD Main 539 72.74
Second 202 27.26
FOREIGN Yes 427 57.62
No 314 42.38
TABLE 3 
Univariate Result
  Panel A   Panel B  
 INTERLOCK
(n=647)
Non-INTERLOCK 
(n=94)
t-test EXECLOCK
(n=268)
Non-EXECLOCK 
(n=473)
t-test
ROE
Mean
Std dev
 
0.050
0.391
 
0.006
0.304
-1.07 0.062
 0.279 
0.035
 0.428 
 -0.95
ROA
Mean 
Std dev
 
0.039
0.123
0.023
0.100 
-1.26
 
0.044
0.130
 
0.034
0.115
-1.10 
Continue:
  Panel C   Panel D  
 NONLOCK 
(n=287)
Non-NONLOCK 
(n=454)
t-test INDLOCK 
(n=580)
Non-INDLOCK 
(n=161)
t-test
ROE
Mean
Std dev
 
0.039
0.517
 
0.048
0.261
0.32
 0.061
0.221
-0.014
0.700 
-2.22**
ROA
Mean
Std dev
 
0.042
0.154
0.034
0.093 
-0.84
0.040
0.097
0.026
0.182
-1.32
Continue:
  Panel E   Panel F  
 INTER 
(n=606)
Non-INTER
(n=135)
t-test INTRA 
(n=385)
Non-INTRA 
(n=356)
t-test
ROE
Mean
Std dev
0.053
0.402 
0.006
0.263
-1.32
 
0.065
0.247
0.024
0.486 
 -1.46
ROA
Mean
Std dev
0.042
0.126
0.018
0.092
-2.10**
0.042
0.124
0.032
0.117
-1.10
** significant at 5 % level (2-tailed)
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directorates. In general, interlocking 
companies have a higher mean of ROE and 
ROA than non-interlocking companies, 
which suggests that interlocking companies 
have better earnings performance than 
non-interlocking companies. However, 
significant mean difference is only found 
between ROE by comparing companies 
with interlocking independent directors and 
companies without interlocking independent 
directors, which suggests that companies 
with interlocking independent directors have 
better earnings performance than companies 
without interlocking independent directors. 
A significant mean difference is also found 
between ROA by comparing companies with 
inter-industry interlocking and companies 
without inter-industry interlocking, which 
suggests that companies with inter-industry 
interlocking companies have better earnings 
performance than companies without inter-
industry interlocking companies.
Correlation
Table 4 shows the correlation matrix among 
the variables. The table shows that ROE 
and ROA are significantly correlated with 
most of the explanatory variables. ROE is 
significant and positively correlated with 
INTERLOCK, INTER, TOTALOCK, 
I N D L O C K ,  B O A R D ,  F O R E I G N , 
GROWTH, LSUBS, LAGE and significant 
and negatively related to LEVERAGE. 
ROA is significant and positively related 
to  INTERLOCK, INTER,  INTRA, 
TOTALOCK, EXECLOCK, INDLOCK, 
BOARD, FOREIGN, GROWTH, LSUBS 
and LAGE and significant and negatively 
related to LEVERAGE. As expected, the 
correlations between hypotheses variables 
are significant and highly positively related. 
This supports the inclusion of the hypotheses 
variables separately, one after the other, into 
the multivariate regression. In addition, 
the correlations among other explanatory 
(control) variables are less than 0.5. While 
0.8 is usually used as a threshold for possible 
multi-collinearity, it can be assumed that no 
serious collinearity exists.
OLS Regression
Table 5 shows the Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) regression results of the ROE model 
and Table 6 shows the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression results of ROA 
model. Both tables show that all regression 
models are significant at 1 % significance 
level. The adjusted R-squared of ROE 
model is between 0.050 and 0.056, which 
is consistent with Phan et al. (2003). This 
suggests that the variation of return on equity 
that is explained by the models is about 5 
to 6 %. Meanwhile, an adjusted R-squared 
of between 0.105 to 0.110 of ROA model is 
slightly higher than a prior study by Amran 
and Che Ahmad (2010) who had recorded 
an R-squared of 0.07. This suggests that the 
variation in return on asset that is explained 
by the models is about 11 %. 
Both tables show that all the hypotheses 
variables are positively related to ROE 
and ROA. Table 5 shows that the variables 
INTERLOCK, INTER and INDLOCK are 
significant at a 5 % level and the variables 
INTRA and TOTALOCK are only marginally 
significant (at a 10 % level). However, the 
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TABLE 5 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression Result of Return on Equity (ROE)
Variables
Panel A
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel B
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel C
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel D
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel E
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel F
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel G
Coefficient
(p-value)
Constant 0.059
(0.61)
0.055
(0.57)
0.051
(0.53)
0.047
(0.49)
0.095
(0.96)
0.089
(0.90)
0.065
(0.68)
ISSUE 0.067
(1.72)**
0.069
(1.77)**
0.069
(1.78)**
0.068
(1.74)**
0.066
(1.69)**
0.066
(1.70)**
0.068
(1.76)**
BOARD 0.038
(1.14)
0.043
(1.28)
0.043
(1.30)
0.035
(1.06)
0.037
(1.11)
0.038
(1.13)
0.042
(1.26)
FOREIGN 0.059
(1.92)**
0.060
(1.95)**
0.060
(1.95)**
0.057
(1.84)**
0.058
(1.87)**
0.059
(1.90)**
0.058
(1.89)**
DIROWN -0.000
(-0.24)
-0.000
(-0.39)
-0.000
(-0.37)
-0.000
(-0.21)
-0.000
(-0.14)
-0.000
(-0.16)
-0.000
(-0.32)
BODIND -0.166
(-1.90)**
-0.143
(-1.64)***
-0.139
(-1.58)***
-0.148
(-1.72)**
-0.180
(-2.04)**
-0.171
(-1.94)**
-0.159
(-1.83)**
BODSIZE 0.003
(0.44)
0.003
(0.36)
0.002
(0.33)
0.002
(0.26)
-0.001
(-0.18)
-0.000
(-0.06)
0.000
(0.05)
GROWTH 0.042
(2.72)*
0.041
(2.65)*
0.041
(2.65)*
0.043
(2.75)*
0.043
(2.76)*
0.043
(2.73)*
0.042
(2.70)*
LSUBS 0.045
(1.15)
0.052
(1.31)
0.055
(1.38)
0.056
(1.43)
0.045
(1.14)
0.046
(1.17)
0.052
(1.34)
LAGE 0.046
(1.09)
0.054
(1.28)
0.057
(1.36)
0.046
(1.10)
0.045
(1.08)
0.046
(1.08)
0.056
(1.34)
LEVERAGE -0.326
(-4.70)*
-0.328
(4.71)*
-0.329
(-4.72)*
-0.336
(-4.83)*
-0.332
(-4.78)*
-0.334
(-4.81)*
-0.324
(-4.66)*
TOTALOCK 0.034
(1.62)***
EXECLOCK 0.006
(0.37)
NONLOCK 0.000
(0.00)
INDLOCK 0.028
(2.11)**
INTERLOCK 0.007
(1.97)**
INTER 0.007
(1.69)**
INTRA 0.015
(1.53)***
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.054 0.050 0.050 0.056 0.055 0.054 0.053
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*, **, *** significant level at 1, 5, 10 % respectively (one-tailed)
Nurhaniza Saidin, Mazrah Malek and Saidatunur Fauzi Saidin
122 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 21 (S): 111 - 126 (2013)
TABLE 6 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression Result of Return on Asset (ROA)
Variables
Panel A
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel B
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel C
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel D
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel E
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel F
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel G
Coefficient
(p-value)
Constant 0.027
(0.92)
0.027
(0.92)
0.026
(0.87)
0.023
(0.78)
0.037
(1.22)
0.036
(1.20)
0.027
(0.92)
ISSUE
0.022
(1.85)**
0.023
(1.91)**
0.023
(1.92)**
0.023
(1.90)**
0.022
(1.85)**
0.022
(1.85)**
0.023
(1.91)**
BOARD
0.031
(3.02)*
0.032
(3.18)*
0.033
(3.23)*
0.031
(3.00)*
0.031
(3.04)*
0.031
(3.04)*
0.032
(3.19)*
FOREIGN
0.022
(2.37)*
0.023
(2.42)*
0.023
(2.42)*
0.022
(2.31)**
0.022
(2.34)**
0.022
(2.36)*
0.022
(2.37)*
DIROWN
-0.000
(-0.73)
-0.000
(-0.95)
-0.000
(-0.89)
-0.000
(-0.76)
-0.000
(-0.68)
-0.000
(-0.67)
-0.000
(-0.87)
BODIND
-0.029
(-1.06)
-0.021
(-0.80)
-0.021
(-0.77)
-0.020
(-0.78)
-0.030
(-1.11)
-0.028
(-1.05)
-0.022
(-0.84)
BODSIZE
0.002
(1.17)
0.002
(1.11)
0.002
(1.01)
0.002
(0.97)
0.001
(0.51)
0.001
(0.59)
0.002
(0.82)
GROWTH
0.017
(3.57)*
0.017
(3.47)*
0.017
(3.48)*
0.017
(3.57)*
0.017
(3.58)*
0.017
(3.57)*
0.017
(3.52)*
LSUBS
0.014
(1.14)
0.015
(1.26)
0.017
(1.36)
0.018
(1.48)
0.015
(1.21)
0.015
(1.21)
0.017
(1.41)
LAGE
0.004
(0.29)
0.006
(0.46)
0.008
(0.59)
0.005
(0.39)
0.005
(0.36)
0.004
(0.33)
0.008
(0.61)
LEVERAGE
-0.144
(-6.74)*
-0.144
(-6.74)*
-0.144
(-6.73)*
-0.146
(-6.87)*
-0.146
(-6.83)*
-0.146
(-6.86)*
-0.144
(6.72)*
TOTALOCK
0.013
(2.03)**
EXECLOCK
0.005
(0.95)
NONLOCK
0.002
(0.52)
INDLOCK
0.008
(1.87)**
INTERLOCK
0.002
(1.88)**
INTER
0.002
(1.80)**
INTRA
0.003
(1.08)
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.110 0.106 0.105 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.106
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*, **, *** significant level at 1, 5, 10 % respectively (one-tailed)
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variables EXECLOCK and NONLOCK 
are insignificant. Meanwhile, Table 6 
shows that the variables INTERLOCK, 
INTER, TOTALOCK and INDLOCK are 
significant at a 5 % level but the variables 
INTRA, EXECLOCK and NONLOCK are 
insignificant. 
The significant positive relationship 
of INTERLOCK is consistent with the 
resource dependence theory as proposed 
by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), who argue 
that interlocking directorates occur for the 
inter-organisational coordination exchange 
of resources to overcome environmental 
uncertainty. The significant positive 
relationship of INTRA with ROE provides 
support for the postulation made by Phan 
et al. (2003) that intra-industry interlocking 
directorates are important for the coordination 
exchange of resources. Meanwhile, the 
significant positive relationships of INTER 
with ROE and ROA provide support that 
inter-industry interlocking directorates are 
important for a wide view of the business 
environment as suggested by Phan et 
al. (2003). Furthermore, the significant 
positive relationships of TOTALOCK and 
INDLOCK with ROE and ROA provide 
support for the argument by Fama and Jensen 
(1983) that holding multiple directorships 
increases directors’ ability as monitors due 
to experience and knowledge gained by 
serving on the boards of multiple companies 
and increases directors’ motivation to 
discharge their monitoring roles due to their 
concern about damage to their reputation. 
The insignificant relationships between 
the variables, EXECLOCK and NONLOCK, 
with two of the performance measures may 
be due to the possibility that these directors 
were appointed to sit on the boards of 
other companies due to their social group 
and thus, did not have any effect on the 
corporate performance as proposed by the 
class integration theory.
Related to the control variables, the 
variables BODIND and LEVERAGE are 
significant and negatively related to ROE, 
whilst ISSUE, GROWTH and FOREIGN 
are significant and positively related to 
ROE. Meanwhile, the variable LEVERAGE 
is significant and negatively related to ROA, 
whilst BOARD, ISSUE, GROWTH and 
FOREIGN are significant and positively 
related to ROA. This suggests that a higher 
proportion of non-executive directors on the 
board of directors and a higher proportion 
of total liability over total asset decrease 
corporate performance, while being listed on 
the Main Board, acquiring additional funds, 
seeing growth in sales and having a foreign 
subsidiary enhance corporate performance.
CONCLUSION
Earlier studies have shown mixed findings 
on the effect of interlocking directorates on 
corporate performance, which may possibly 
be due to the failure to recognise the 
nature and the direction of the interlocking 
directorates. 
Using data of 741 listed companies on 
Bursa Malaysia in 2007, it is found that the 
number of interlocking companies, inter-
industry interlocking directorates, multiple 
directorships and multiple directorships of 
independent directors have a positive effect 
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on corporate performance. The findings 
support the resource dependence theory that 
interlocking directorates are beneficial in 
overcoming environmental uncertainty and 
as well as the argument that inter-industry 
interlocking directorates are important for 
a wide view of the business environment. 
The findings are also consistent with the 
argument that holding multiple directorships 
enhances directors’ expertise and increases 
their motivation in discharging their roles. 
However, it is also found that multiple 
directorships by executive and non-executive 
non-independent directors do not have any 
effect on corporate performance, which is 
found consistent with the class integration 
theory. This is due to the possibility that 
these directors were appointed to sit on the 
boards of other companies based on their 
social group (consistent with the nature of 
their directorships) and therefore, do not 
have any effect on corporate performance. 
On the other hand, the argument of limitation 
of time and increased commitment due to 
holding multiple directorships as proposed 
in the corporate governance theory seems 
to be irrelevant, due to the restriction of 
directorships mandated in Malaysia.
Despite the negative perception of 
interlocking directorates by the public, the 
results suggest that interlocking directorates 
actually benefit shareholders by enhancing 
the performance of the corporation. The 
results also add to the growing body of 
literature on interlocking directorates and 
corporate performance. For future studies, 
it is recommended to consider using a wider 
data set or perhaps using a different data set. 
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to identify the determinants of dividend policy in Malaysian 
financial institutions. Panel data set were constructed from 33 financial institutions in 
Malaysia for a period of 10 years (2001-2010). The results show a statistically significant 
positive relationship between dividend policy and profitability, which implies that 
Malaysian financial institutions distribute higher dividends when they record higher 
profitability. Lagged dividend also shows a positive significant relationship with dividend 
policy, which implies that financial institutions in Malaysia follow a stable dividend policy 
that maintains regularity of dividend payments with gradual adjustments of dividend 
payments towards the target payout. On the other hand, leverage shows a significant 
negative relationship with dividend policy, which means that a riskier financial institution 
pays out lower dividends. In conclusion, profitability, lagged dividend and leverage are 
found to be the major determinants of dividend policy in relation to Malaysian financial 
institutions. The results support the agency cost theory, signaling theory and the free cash 
flow hypothesis.
JEL Classification: G35, G21
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INTRODUCTION
Black (1976) states in his study that, “the 
harder we look at dividend, the more it 
seems like a puzzle with pieces that just 
don’t fit together.” Until today, the dividend 
payout decision has always been a subject of 
interest to financial analysts, academicians 
and researchers as they are interested in 
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studying the extent to which the earnings of a 
company are distributed in dividends among 
shareholders or retained for future growth of 
the company. There are different arguments 
with regards to dividends in finance-related 
literature. Miller and Modigliani (1961) 
first raised the issue on dividend policy, 
arguing that in a perfect capital market, the 
dividend decision is irrelevant as it does 
not affect the value of the firm. However, 
this argument is opposed by financial 
practitioners as well as academicians due 
to the existence of market imperfections 
such as differential tax rates, information 
asymmetries, conflict of interest between 
managers and shareholders, transaction 
costs, flotation costs and irrational investor 
behaviour. Shiller (1984) observes that 
investor behaviour is largely affected by 
societal norms and attitudes. Furthermore, 
errors in judgement and trading activities by 
shareholders cannot be logically explained 
due to social pressures. On the other hand, 
Michel (1979) reports a systematic relation 
between industry type and dividend policy. 
This shows that the actions of executives 
of competitive firms do influence the 
determination of dividend payout levels 
made by managers. 
Companies pay dividends for three 
common reasons: taxation, asymmetric 
information and agency costs. In terms 
of taxation, investors may prefer stocks 
that have low dividend payouts if they 
have favourable tax treatment. This is 
supported by Brennan (1970), who found 
that higher pretax risk adjusted returns 
on stocks with higher dividend yields 
are required to compensate for the tax 
disadvantages of these returns. Furthermore, 
managers choose to increase the level 
of dividends as an indication of indirect 
confidential information to investors such 
as in a situation where they believe that the 
current market value of their firm’s stock 
is lower than its intrinsic value. Thus, the 
result of the dividend-signaling hypothesis 
is that firms that increase/decrease 
dividends will experience increasing/
decreasing share prices (Bhattacharya, 
1979). Agency relationship between 
managers and shareholders of the firm 
is also one of the causes why firms pay 
dividends. Easterbrook (1984) suggests that 
in order to lessen the agency costs between 
shareholders and managers, firms pay 
dividends. If the firm pays dividends, they 
can opt to raise money through the capital 
market. However, they will be subject 
to the scrutiny and disciplining effect of 
investment professionals. Thus, in exchange 
for the increased monitoring, shareholders 
are willing to accept higher personal taxes 
associated with dividends. 
The dividend decision reflects the 
market value of the firm, for there will 
be less availability of internal funds 
for expansion purposes of the firm as a 
direct consequence of dividend payments. 
Therefore, in deciding on dividend payment, 
there is a dilemma in balancing between 
the shareholder’s expectation and the 
firm’s long-term interest. Since Miller and 
Modigliani’s study, many other studies have 
been conducted to identify how dividend 
affects the firm’s value as well as how 
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dividend policy should be formulated by 
managers. In practice, different dividend 
payment models are used such as residual 
dividend policy, constant growth dividend 
policy, constant dividend payout ratio, 
low stable dividend and premium payout 
policy at the end of the year. These policies 
are normally chosen based on the size and 
profitability of the company. (Alekneviciene 
et al., 2006). 
 There are many factors that are seen 
to have an effect on the dividend decision. 
These factors may differ from country to 
country as well as from industry to industry. 
However, there has been little attention 
given to financial institutions in relation 
to the study on dividend policy. Financial 
institutions are normally excluded from the 
samples in studies of firms’ decision policy 
due to their characteristics of high leverage, 
tight regulation, capital structure and asset 
opaqueness. For example, the Malaysian 
Banking and Financial Institutions Act 
1989 (BAFIA) requires that every licensed 
institution apply in writing for the Central 
Bank’s approval with respect to the amount 
of dividend proposed for declaration. The 
Central Bank may approve the same, or a 
reduced amount, or even prohibit payment 
of any dividends, depending on the financial 
condition of the institution.  
 Previously, the financial sector 
was just an enabler of growth; however, 
it has morphed from being an enabler to 
a vital source of economic growth. The 
Malaysian financial sector has encountered 
significant transformation, together with 
reinvention. As a result of the restructuring, 
consolidation and rationalisation efforts 
that were undertaken in the banking sector, 
the Malaysian financial sector now rests 
on a stronger foundation. Furthermore, 
progressive deregulation and liberalisation 
have contributed to the increasing flexibility 
of financial institutions as well as created 
new business opportunities and increased 
competition. 
 This study aims to identify the 
determinants of dividend policy in Malaysian 
financial institutions. Even though there is 
an enormous volume of studies conducted 
on issues related to determinants of dividend 
policy, these studies have mainly focused 
on developed countries, and the conclusion 
reached may not be applicable in countries 
with different corporate cultures and 
economic frameworks. Furthermore, very 
little attention has been given to financial 
institutions in relation to study into dividend 
policy.  The rest of this paper is organised 
as follows: the next section provides a 
review of related studies in a literature 
review. The third section outlines the 
data and methodology. The fourth section 
discusses the results, and finally, the article 
is concluded in the fifth section.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Ross et al. (2008) define dividends as cash 
that is paid out arising from current or 
accumulated current earnings. This payment 
is divided among shareholders out of the 
cash surplus from their net income for the 
year, depending on management’s decision 
to retain it for re-investment purposes or to 
pay out as dividends. 
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Tax-adjusted models conclude that 
investors require higher expected returns 
for shares of dividend paying stocks. Due to 
the imposition of tax liability on dividends, 
dividend payment needs to be grossed up 
in order to enhance the shareholder’s pre-
tax returns. Masulis and Trueman (1988) 
view cash dividend payments as deferred 
dividend costs. They predict that investors 
differ in their ideal firm investment or 
dividend policy based on their tax liabilities. 
In a situation where there is an increase in 
tax liabilities, the dividend payments would 
decrease, while earnings reinvestment 
increases and vice-versa. Differences 
will then be minimised by segregating 
the investors into clientele. Farrar and 
Selwyn (1967) developed a model with the 
assumption that investors capitalise on after-
tax income, where in a partial equilibrium 
framework, investors have two options: 
either they select the amount of personal and 
corporate tax leverage or accept corporate 
distributions as dividends or capital gains. 
This model argues that share repurchase is 
supposed to be considered as distribution 
of corporate earnings rather than dividend. 
Miller (1986) criticises the tax-adjusted 
model as incompatible with rational 
behaviour. He suggests that individuals 
can avoid tax liability of these payments 
by refraining from purchasing dividend-
paying shares. Alternatively, shareholders 
can purchase dividend-paying stocks and 
receive distributions while at the same time 
use borrowed finances to invest in securities 
that are tax-free. 
Market imperfection of asymmetric 
information has become the foundation 
for three different efforts in explaining 
corporate dividend policy: 1) the signaling 
model, 2) the agency cost model and 
3) the free cash flow hypothesis. The 
dividend signaling model arises from the 
lack of information asymmetries between 
managers and owners through unanticipated 
changes in dividend policy. The signaling 
theory believes that compared to any 
other alternatives, the dividend policy is 
able to communicate information about 
the existing or expected level of earnings 
(Chen & Dhiensiri, 2009). They point out 
that share price reactions are not caused 
by the dividend payout itself, but by the 
information that investors understood with 
regards to the future prospects of the firm. 
A reduction in dividend is viewed as very 
bad news, as it is usually understood to arise 
after a sustained decrease in earnings, and 
it conveys the expectation of management 
of having less cash than it had in the past. 
Dividends also help investors in solving 
the asymmetric information problem of 
identifying between high-quality and low-
quality firms because high-quality firms will 
naturally be able to pay dividends.
The agency cost model assumes that 
firms pay dividends in order to solve 
the agency’s problems arising from the 
separation of corporate ownership and 
control (Megginson et, al., 2010). Dividend 
is perceived as an approach to lessen 
the agency’s costs that arise from the 
managers and owners of the firm, thus 
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offering a rationale for the distribution 
of cash resources to shareholders (Chen 
& Dhiensiri, 2009). Based on the agency 
theory, the need for monitoring managers 
increases in more dispersed ownership firms 
due to severe agency problems. However, in 
a firm that has high managerial ownership, 
agency costs are lower due to the better 
alignment of both the shareholders’ and the 
manager’s goals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Agency problems that might arise as a result 
of information asymmetries are wealth 
transfers from bondholders to shareholders 
as well as failure to accept projects that 
have positive net present value (Barnea, 
et.al, 1981). There are two ways in which 
dividend policy influences these situations. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) highlight that 
covenants that govern claim priority are able 
to mitigate the conflict between shareholder 
and bondholder. Besides that, Easterbrook 
(1984) suggests that the reduction of 
agency costs between shareholders and 
managers is the reason why firms pay 
dividends. If the firm pays dividends, they 
can opt to raise money through the capital 
market. However, they will be subject 
to the scrutiny and disciplining effect of 
investment professionals. In exchange for 
the increased monitoring, shareholders 
are willing to accept higher personal taxes 
associated with dividends. 
The free cash flow hypothesis combines 
market information asymmetrics and 
the agency theory (Jensen, 1986). The 
inefficient utilisation of funds in excess 
of profitable investment avenues by the 
management was first identified by Berle 
and Means (1932). Managers whose goal 
is to maximise shareholders’ wealth should 
invest in all profitable opportunities. The 
free cash flow hypothesis suggests that 
paying high dividends is one of the ways to 
hinder managers from investing in projects 
below cost of capital or wasting the cash 
on organisation inefficiencies with respect 
to firms that have growth opportunities 
and higher free cash flow. After financing 
all positive net present value projects, the 
remaining funds can bring conflicts of 
interest between managers and shareholders 
(Frankfurter & Wood, 2002). Therefore, 
debt interest payments and dividend 
payments will reduce the amount of free 
cash flow available to managers to invest in 
marginal net present value projects as well 
as consumptions that benefit the manager. 
Frankfurter and Wood (2002) conclude that 
comparing either one of the theories (market 
information asymmetric and agency theory) 
with better explains dividend policy rather 
than explaining dividend policy from an 
understanding of both theories combined.
Determinants of Dividend Policy
From the literature review, many factors 
may be identified as the determinants of 
dividend policy. This study, however, will 
focus on a few selected factors, which are 
profitability, liquidity, lagged dividend, 
growth opportunities and leverage.
Profitability
Lintner (1956) takes the qualitative approach 
in his study by conducting interviews with 
personnel of large firms in the United States 
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of America to address corporate dividend 
behaviour. Throughout the interviews, he 
found that the main determinants of dividend 
changes were the most recent earnings and 
past dividend paid. Management is more 
concerned with the change in rather than 
the amount of dividend and it tries to 
maintain a consistent level of dividend. 
Furthermore, there was a tendency to move 
towards some target payout ratio; however, 
the speed of adjustment varies among 
companies. Fama and Babiak (1968) used 
statistical techniques of regression analysis, 
simulations and prediction tests to study 
the determinants of dividend payments by 
individual firms during the period from 1946 
to 1964. They conclude that net income 
provides a better measure of dividend 
compared to either cash flow or net income 
and depreciation incorporated as separate 
variables in the model. 
This is further supported by Pruitt and 
Gitman (1991) who also take a qualitative 
approach by interviewing the financial 
managers of a thousand of the largest US 
companies and found that vital factors 
that influence dividend payments are 
current and past-year profits. They also add 
that firms with relatively stable earnings 
are more likely to distribute a higher 
percentage of their earnings as dividend 
compared to firms with fluctuating earnings. 
Furthermore, Fama and French (2001), 
who study the characteristics of dividend 
paying companies, found that firm size, 
profitability and investment opportunities 
affect the decision to pay dividends. Larger 
firms that are more profitable are expected 
to pay dividends. However, firms with more 
investment opportunities are less expected 
to pay dividends. 
Pandey (2003) in his study of corporate 
dividend policy and behaviour in Malaysia 
finds that payout ratios vary from industry 
to industry. Based on the results of 
multinominal logit analysis, it can be seen 
that the dividends of companies listed in 
KLSE are sensitive to changes in earnings. 
From a slightly different view, Baker et al. 
(1985) conclude that the levels of future 
earnings and past dividend patterns are the 
major determinants of dividend payments 
in their study of 318 New York Stock 
Exchange firms. This is further supported 
by Baker and Powell (2000). Based on 
their survey of NYSE listed firms, they find 
that determinants of dividends differ from 
industry to industry. Anticipated levels of 
future earnings are the main determinant of 
dividend policy. Moreover, in studying the 
dividend policy and payout ratio based on 
evidence collected from the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange, Al-Twaijry (2007) finds 
that there is no significant correlation 
between earnings and payout ratio, which 
is in line to past results of most Malaysian 
companies, where the link between the 
companies’ dividend policies and the 
companies’ income for the year is not clear.
Liquidity
Brittain (1966) suggests that the more 
suitable measure of a company’s capability 
to pay dividends is cash flow. Cash flow 
is derived from profit after tax plus 
depreciation expenses of the financial 
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year. He argues that dividend payment is 
considered a charge before depreciation and 
thus, should be related to earnings. Besides 
that, due to the changes in regulations and 
accounting practices related to depreciation 
allowance, net current earnings would fail 
to mirror the movement of true earnings, 
which is the ultimate basis of the ability 
to pay dividends. This is further supported 
by Alli et al. (1993), who disclose that 
dividend payments depend more on cash 
flow which reflect the firm’s ability to pay 
dividends rather than on current earnings. 
This is because current earnings are more 
heavily influenced by accounting practices. 
Thus, current earnings do not really reflect 
the firm’s ability to pay dividends. 
Furthermore, Jensen (1986) suggests 
that conflict of interest between shareholders 
and managers over payout policy is severe 
when the firm generates considerable free 
cash flow, in which situation the free cash 
flow hypothesis concludes that a firm should 
pay higher dividends if growth opportunities 
are fewer and free cash flow is higher in 
order to prevent managers from investing 
the cash at below cost of capital or wasting 
it on organisational inefficiencies. Thus, it is 
expected that there be a positive relationship 
between free cash flow and dividend payout. 
Chen and Dhiensiri (2009) analyse 
the determinants of the corporate dividend 
policy using a sample of firms listed 
in the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
using 11 independent variables, each 
representing the various dividend theories, 
which are signaling theory, agency theory, 
residual theory, dividend stability theory 
and imputation system. Ordinary least 
squares regression was adopted to test 
the relationship and the findings strongly 
support the agency theory, where the higher 
the management share holding, the lower 
the dividend payout ratio. Besides that, the 
more dispersive the ownership structure, 
the higher the dividend payout ratio. They 
also find a significant positive relationship 
between the level of free cash flow and 
dividend payout ratio in their truncated 
sample. However, their full sample shows 
that there is a positive but insignificant 
relationship between the level of free cash 
flow and dividend payout ratio. 
In addition, Mahapatra and Biswasroy 
(2002) study the influence of profit after 
tax and cash flow on the dividend policy 
of 59 Indian sample companies from four 
industries for a period of 12 years and find 
that dividend policy is mostly influenced 
by cash flow, where as profit after tax was 
found to be a less significant determinant. 
Furthermore, Anil and Kapoor (2008) 
examine the determinants of dividend 
payout ratios of the Indian Information 
Technology Sector. The sample selected 
for this study come from companies under 
the CNX IT, which have more than 50 % of 
their turnover contributed from IT-related 
activities such as software development, 
hardware manufacture, vending, support 
and maintenance. Data collectd over seven 
years (2000–2006) were then tested using 
a multiple linear regression technique. The 
results show a positive but insignificant 
relationship between profitability and 
dividend payout ratio. However, there is a 
S. Hutagalung, M. H. Yahya, F. Kamarudin and Z. Osman
134 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 21 (S): 127 - 148 (2013)
positive and significant relationship between 
cash flow and dividend payout ratio. On 
the other hand, corporate taxes, sales 
growth and market-to-book value show 
an insignificant relationship and thus, it is 
concluded that these are not the important 
factors that influence the dividend payout 
ratio of the Indian IT sector. 
 In contrast, Simon (1994) studies 
the determinants of dividend payments 
by US firms from the year 1984 to 1985 
by re-evaluating Lintner’s data with new 
independent variables related to cash 
flows. Though his results support Lintner’s 
view that changes in per share dividends 
are related to earnings and the previous 
year’s dividend payout, he finds that there 
is no relationship between cash flows and 
dividend policy. More firms that have 
a large portion of idle cash are likely to 
return part of the cash to their investors. 
When the amount of idle cash available 
to management is reduced, the ability of 
management to use that idle cash for their 
own interests rather than the interests of 
management will therefore be reduced. 
However, this effect might not be clear with 
regards to financial institutions as financial 
institutions have a wide range of short-term 
investment vehicles in which to place their 
idle funds. Yiedom and Agyei (2011), who 
conducted a study on the determinants of 
dividend policy of banks in Ghana by the 
use of panel methodology with random 
effects model, found that liquidity has a 
negative but insignificant relationship with 
dividend payout, and they highlight that this 
is probably due to the wide array short-term 
investment vehicles available to financial 
institutions. 
Lagged Dividend
Baker et al. (1985) and Farelly et al. (1986) 
survey 562 New York Stock Exchange 
firms and based on their analysis, they 
conclude that the major determinants 
of dividend payments are the pattern of 
past dividends and the expected future 
earnings. Furthermore, the results also 
show that managers are concerned with 
dividend stability and believe that dividend 
policy affects share value. In addition, 
Pal and Goyal (2007) study the leading 
determinants of the dividend policy of 
the Indian banking industry by applying 
various statistical models which include the 
Backward Elimination regression model, the 
Granger Causality Model and the Lintner 
Model. They eventually show some concrete 
results related to dividend decisions in the 
Indian banking industry, where the industry 
follows a stable dividend policy as lagged 
dividend that emerges as the significant 
factor. In addition, Yiadom and Agyei (2011) 
find that a change in dividend is one of the 
statistically significant factors that positively 
influences the dividend policy of banks in 
Ghana. In addition, Isa (1992) concludes 
in his study that firms in Malaysia follow 
stable dividend policies. In contrast, Darling 
(1957) argues that lagged dividend has no 
direct influence on the decision-making 
on dividends. This is because the weight 
assigned to it in the regression equation is 
a reflection of some other variables that co-
vary with the lagged dividends and thus, the 
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function based on lagged dividend is only 
useful for the short-run prediction. However, 
he suggests that lagged profit would offer a 
better explanation of the current dividend 
level. 
Growth Opportunities
Dhemeja (1976) tests the dividend 
behaviour of  Indian companies by 
classifying them into size group, industry 
group, growth group and control group and 
finds that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between dividend payout of one 
industry and size of another. Furthermore, 
growth is negatively related to dividend 
payout and is found to be significant. In 
addition, Rozeff (1982) argues that if past or 
anticipated future growth is rapid, managers 
tend to conserve funds for reinvestment 
purposes and thus, a lower payout ratio is 
established. This is further supported by 
a study conducted by Chen and Dhiensiri 
(2009) in their study using evidence from 
New Zealand. Krishnamoorthy and Sastry 
(1971) study the dividend behavior of the 
chemical industry for the period between 
1962 and 1967 using Lintner’s model 
with additional explanatory variables such 
as investment expenditure and external 
finance. The study shows that investment 
activity influences the dividend policy of 
the firms, implying higher savings when 
the investment climate is positive. This is 
further supported by Yiadom and Agyei 
(20011), who find that growth influences 
a bank’s dividend policy negatively and 
significantly. 
Smith (1963) studies the factors 
influencing corporate savings decisions of 
firms. These factors have been classified into 
two broad categories; the first factor is the 
investment decision and the second factor 
arises from dividend stability. He finds that 
income and lagged dividend play a vital 
role in corporate savings in the short run but 
demand for investment fund has a smaller 
role in deciding the behaviour of corporate 
savings. However, in the long run, demand 
for investment funds plays an important role 
in estimating corporate savings. This study 
shows slightly different views in terms of 
the short-run and long-run effect of growth 
towards making a dividend decision.
There are studies that show that 
the dividend decision is independent of 
investment policy. For example, Pruitt 
and Gitman’s survey (1991) based 
on 114 responses finds that managers 
make dividend decisions independent of 
investment and financing decisions. They 
find that the major influences on current 
dividends are profits and lagged dividend. 
In addition, Al-Twaijry (2007) also finds 
that in the case of companies listed in the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange , the payout 
ratio and the company’s future growth are 
negatively correlated, albeit insignificantly. 
Furthermore, Ahmed and Javid (2009) 
find that growth and leverage are not the 
determinants of dividend policies in listed 
firms of the Karachi Stock Exchange. In 
addition, Naceur et.al (2006), who conducts 
a study on the re-examination of dividend 
policy in a dynamic panel data analysis, 
finds that growth has negative insignificant 
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relationship with the dividend payout of 
financial institutions in Tunisia. 
Leverage
Financial institutions are typically leveraged 
and their debt contracts (deposits) are 
generally standardised, resulting in little 
chance for the imposition of indentures and 
specific covenants. In banks, particularly, 
deposits are highly demandable and 
depositors can withdraw their funds from the 
bank as a way of disciplining bank managers 
from expropriation and taking excessive 
risk. In addition, excessive risk taking is 
sometimes punished with higher required 
interest rates and slower deposit growth. 
Hence, it is understandable that banks 
use dividends for the purpose of signaling 
quality of their assets to debt holders and 
depositors. However, this can be very costly 
due to the regulation of capital adequacy 
requirements (Forti & Schiozer, 2011). 
Dhrymes and Kurz (1964), Mahapatra 
and Sahu (1993) and Mahapatra and Panda 
(1995) have identified debt equity ratio 
(represented by capital structure/financial 
leverage) as another factor that has strong 
impact on a firm’s dividend behaviour. A 
firm often demands external finances if 
there is a constraint on its internal resources, 
which are generated by net profits after tax 
and dividends. Thus, the higher the dividend, 
the higher the demand for borrowing. On the 
other hand, lower dividends will bring about 
a lower debt equity ratio due to less demand 
for borrowing. This is also supported by 
Aivazian and Booth (2003), where they find 
that US firms and emerging market firms 
which have higher debt ratios will have 
lower dividend payments. 
Al-Kuwairi (2009) confirms that the 
dividend policy is inversely related to 
the leverage ratio. Nonetheless, in their 
study of the determinants of the dividend 
policy for banks in Ghana, Yiadom and 
Agyei (2011) find that the use of debt 
has been associated with lower agency 
cost and enhanced firm profitability, 
both of which have the tendency of 
improving dividend payments. However, 
a study conducted by Abor and Bokpin 
(2010) on investment opportunities, 
corporate finance and dividend payout 
policy contradicts this opinion. They 
investigate the effects of investment 
opportunities and corporate finance on 
dividend policy with a sample of 34 
emerging market countries covering a 
17-year period using the fixed effects 
panel model. Although the results exhibit 
a positive relationship between financial 
leverage and dividend payouts, this 
relationship, however, is not significant. 
Ajmi and Hussain (2011), in examining 
corporate dividend decisions of Saudi 
Arabian firms, find that current profit, 
lagged dividends and life cycles are 
positive statistically and significant . 
However, leverage is found to be not 
an important determinant of dividend 
payments and this is explained by the 
fact that Saudi firms are generally low-
geared. Furthermore, Juhmani (2009) 
studies the determinants of dividend 
payout policy of 35 Bahraini firms. His 
results show that profitability has the 
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greatest effect on the current-year cash 
dividends change, followed by previous-
year dividends and lastly, by size of 
Bahraini companies. On the other hand, 
financial leverage does not influence the 
change in cash dividends. This is further 
supported by a study on the determinants 
of dividend policy in Pakistan conducted 
by Ahmed and Javid (2009).
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This study examines the determinants of 
dividend policy of financial institutions in 
Malaysia. Samples of firms that are listed in 
the Bursa Malaysia for the period of 2001 to 
2010 are considered. However, based on the 
availability of data in the DataStream and 
annual reports of each financial institution, 
out of 36 financial institutions listed in Bursa 
Malaysia, 33 were selected for this study. 
This includes financial institutions offering 
banking and financial services, investment 
banking and brokerage as well as insurance 
and reinsurance. The rationale for this is that 
all these financial institutions have common 
factors of being highly leveraged and highly 
regulated and act as financial intermediaries 
in the financial markets. This study includes 
both financial firms that pay dividends and 
those that do not so as to avoid selection bias 
(Kim & Mandala, 1992; Deshmukh, 2003). 
The dependent variable in this study is 
Dividend Payout, which is measured by the 
dividend payout ratio while the independent 
variables are profitability, liquidity, lagged 
dividend, growth and leverage. Table 1 
below provides a summary of the variables 
used.
The correlation coefficient measures the 
degree to which two variables are associated 
with each other. It can take any value 
between -1 and +1. A value of -1 means 
that the variables move in the opposite 
direction while a value of +1 means the 
variables move in the same direction. This 
test is conducted to determine the presence 
of multi-collinearity among the regressors. 
The model in this study is tested for a 
stationary series using the panel unit root 
test in order to ensure that an inconsistent 
and spurious relationship is not analysed. 
A series will not be stationary if it shows 
a stochastic trend, or even simply wanders 
around randomly, and thus it cannot be 
forecast in the future. Regardless of the 
starting point, a stationary series will 
constantly return to a given value and is 
also expected to attain that value in the 
long run (Hall, 1994). Two Panel Unit Root 
Tests were considered in this study, which 
are Levin et al. (2002) (LLC hereafter) and 
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) (IPS hereafter). 
LLC a l lows  fo r  he te rogene i ty 
of individual deterministic effects and 
heterogeneous serial correlation structure 
of  the error  terms,  which assumes 
homogeneous first order autoregressive 
parameters. The pooled t-statistic of the 
estimator is developed in order to evaluate 
the null hypothesis that each individual 
time series contains a unit root against the 
alternative hypothesis that each time series 
is stationary. The procedure imposes a 
higher power than the separate unit root test 
for each individual due to the imposition of 
a cross-equation restriction on the first-order 
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TABLE 1 
Summary of Variables
Variables Proxies
Dependent Dividend Policy Dividend Payout Ratio (DPR)
The ratio of dividends paid out of the total earnings. It is calculated 
as:
(Dividend/Earnings) or (DPS/EPS)
This variable is used in the study of determinants of dividend policy 
of banks in Ghana that was conducted by Yiadom and Agyei (2011) 
and is proved to be a significant determinant of dividend policy. 
Independent Profitability Return on Assets (ROA)
Since the financial institutions chosen for this study differ in size, a 
comparison based on absolute amount (i.e. net income) will not yield 
reliable results. Return on Assets is used as a proxy for profitability. 
It is calculated as: Net Income/Total assets 
Liquidity Cash Flow (LIQ)
As found by Brittain (1966) in his study, the more appropriate 
measure of a company’s ability to pay dividends is cash flow. The 
formula is as follows:
Cash and cash equivalent/Net total assets
Lagged Dividend Do (LAGDIV)
This refers to the cash dividend paid a year before the year under 
study. A company that follows a stable dividend policy, past dividend 
trend influences the current dividend payment. Most of the previous 
studies have taken this variable into account as a vital factor that 
determines dividend policy. 
Leverage Total Debt to Total Asset (LEV)
This variable was used by Ajmi and Hussain (2011) in their study 
of corporate dividend decisions: Evidence from Saudi Arabia. It is 
calculated as: Total Debt/Total Asset
Growth 
Opportunities
Asset Growth Rate (GROWTH)
Asset growth rate measures the average of expansion or contraction 
of a company. Generally, when growth is high, the distribution of 
dividends will be low because the company will retain most of its 
earnings to finance its investments. It is calculated as: 
(Total Asset ¹- Total Asset º) / Total Asset º
This proxy is used by Forti & Schiozer (2011) in their study of 
informed depositors and bank dividends, a case of Brazilian banks, 
and Naceur et al. (2006) in the re-examination of the dividend policy 
of Tunisian firms. 
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partial autocorrelation coefficients under the 
null. The LLC tests are conducted using the 
following model:
1 1
iP
it it it jj
y y yα β− −=∆ = +∑
it itX  δ ε′+ +             (1)
where, H0: α = 0 (there is unit root) and 
H1: α < 0 (no unit root).
Levin et al. (2002) noted that their 
panel based unit root tests are more relevant 
for panels of moderate size (i.e., 10 < N < 
250 and 25 <T < 250). However, the major 
limitation of LLC is that the autoregressive 
parameters are considered identical across 
the panel. This limitation has therefore 
been overcome by IPS, which proposes a 
panel unit root test without the assumption 
of identical first order correlation under the 
alternative. They suggested a more flexible 
and computationally simple unit root testing 
procedure for panels which allows for a 
simultaneous stationary and non-stationary 
series. IPS tests use the same model as 
the LLC except that its H0: αi = 0 for all i 
(existence of unit root) and H1: αi = 0 for i 
= 1, 2, …, N1 or αi < 0 for i = N+1, N+2,…, 
N (no unit root).
The cross-sectional character of the data 
allows the use of panel data methodology. 
Panel data involves the pooling of 
observations on a cross-section of units over 
several time periods and provides results 
that are simply not detectable in pure cross-
sections or pure time-series studies. Instead 
of only looking at the temporal behaviour 
of each company, the determination of 
temporal evolution of groups of companies 
is possible with the panel data technique. 
This technique takes into consideration 
the individual heterogeneity, which allows 
a larger number of data points, hence 
improving the efficiency of the estimates. 
Thus, the panel regression equation differs 
from a regular time series or cross-section 
regression by the double subscript attached 
to each variable. The general form of the 
panel data model can be specified as:
,it i i t itY Xα β ε= + +               (2)
Where the subscript i denotes the 
cross-sectional dimension and t represents 
the time-series dimension. In this equation, 
Yit represents the dependent variable in the 
model,  which is Dividend Payout Ratio 
(DPR). Xit, on the other hand contains the 
set of explanatory variables in the estimation 
model. α is the constant and β represents the 
coefficients.
In addition, the following model 
was used for this study to explain the 
relationships between dividend payout ratios 
and the determinants:
0 1 , 2 ,it i t i tDPR PROF LIQβ β β= + +
3 , 4 ,i t i tLAGDIV GROWTHβ β+ +
5 , ,i t i tLEVβ ε+ +             (3)
where:
DPRit = Dividend per share / earnings per 
share for firm i in period of t,
PROFit = Net income / total assets for firm 
i in period t,
LAGDIVit = Previous year divident for firm 
i in period t,
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GROWTHit = Asset growth rate for firm i 
in period t,
LEVit = Total debt / total asset for firm i in 
period t,
εit = Error term for firm i in period t
Panel data may have group effects, 
time effects or both, and these effects could 
either be fixed effects or random effects. A 
fixed effect model assumes differences in 
intercepts across groups or time periods, 
whereas a random effect model explores 
differences in error variances. In order to 
come to a decision on whether the fixed 
effects model or the random effects model 
should be adopted, the Hausman (1978) 
specification test is employed. The Hausman 
specification test compares the fixed versus 
random effects under the null hypothesis 
that the individual effects are uncorrelated 
with the other regressors in the model. If 
correlated (H0 is rejected at 5 % significant 
level, where P-value<0.05), a random 
effect model produces biased estimators, 
which violates one of the Gauss-Markov 
assumptions, thus a fixed effect model is 
preferred.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This research analyses the effect of 
profitability, liquidity, leverage, lagged 
dividend and growth towards the dividend 
policy of Malaysian financial institutions. 
Correlation Analysis
In determining whether the coefficient 
estimates may vary erratically with respect 
to minimal changes in the model or the data, 
the correlation coefficients of the variables 
are shown in Table 2. Dividend payout 
ratio shows positive correlation with return 
on assets, liquidity and lagged dividend, 
but negative correlation with growth and 
leverage. On the other hand, return on assets 
exhibits positive correlation with liquidity, 
lagged dividend and growth, but negative 
correlation with leverage. Next, liquidity has 
positive correlation with lagged dividend 
but negative correlation with growth and 
leverage. Lastly, growth depicts negative 
correlation with leverage. The results 
above also depict that the presence of 
multi-collinearity among the regressors is 
minimal, indicating that multi-collinearity 
is not a problem in the regression model.
TABLE 2 
Correlation Matrix of the Variables
Dividend 
Payout Ratio
Return on 
Assets
Liquidity Lagged 
Dividend
Growth Leverage
Dividend Payout Ratio 1
Return on Assets 0.1483 1
Liquidity 0.1609 0.0776 1
Lagged Dividend 0.4632 0.2197 0.0636 1
Growth -0.0149 0.2386 -0.0799 0.0324 1
Leverage -0.2739 -0.1285 -0.1135 -0.2518 -0.0067 1
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Panel Unit Root Test
Prior to testing for panel regression, the data 
are tested for stationarity. This is conducted 
in order to be sure that the researcher is 
not analysing an inconsistent and spurious 
relationship. Two panel unit root tests are 
employed in this study, which are the Levin, 
Lin & Chu (LLC) and also the Im, Pesaran & 
Shin (IPS). The results of the panel unit root 
tests for the chosen variables, both in level 
and first difference, are reported in Table 3. 
In addition, the null hypothesis H0: assumes 
a common unit root process. As shown in 
Table 3, both LLC and IPS tests show that 
dividend payout ratio, return on assets, 
liquidity, growth and leverage for Malaysian 
financial institutions are stationary at level 
I(0). However, lagged dividend is stationary 
in its first difference I(1).
Panel Regression
Table 4 shows the results of panel regression. 
In order to determine whether the fixed 
effects model or random effect model works 
for the panel regression, the Hausman 
(1978) specification test is employed. This 
test is under the null hypothesis that the 
correlation between the stochastic error 
term and explanatory variables is null and 
thus, the random effects model is more 
TABLE 3 
Panel Unit Root Test Results
Variables
LLC Test IPS Test
Level First Difference Level First Difference
Dividend Payout Ratio
-11.8308**
(0.0000)
-5.6807**
(0.0000)
Return on Assets
-11.8937**
(0.0000)
-6.06997**
(0.0000)
Liquidity -6.1368**
(0.0000)
-3.6103**
(0.0002)
Lagged Dividend -3.3844**
(0.0004)
-15.487**
(0.0000)
-0.5915
(0.2771)
-7.2953**
(0.0000)
Growth -24.8655**
(0.0000)
-14.8698**
(0.0000)
Leverage -24.4003**
(0.0000)
-8.4702**
(0.0000)
Notes: 
** denotes significant at 1% confidence level.
Numbers in parenthesis are p-value.
The null hypothesis of LLC test and IPS test is that all of the series in the panel must contain unit roots. 
The alternative hypothesis of LLC test is that all of the series in the panel are stationary, whereas the 
alternative hypothesis of IPS test is that at least one of the series in the panel is stationary. 
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suitable compared to the fixed effects model. 
The results of the regression are shown in 
Table 4, together with the results of the 
Hausman specification test. The Hausman 
specification test rejects the null hypothesis 
at 1 % significant level, thus denoting that 
the fixed effect model is better than the 
random fixed effect model. Hence, this study 
captures the determinants of dividend policy 
via the fixed effect model. 
TABLE 4 
Panel Data Methodology: Fixed-effect Model
33 Cross-sections x 9 years (after adjustments)
Dependent Variable: DPR
Independent Variables Coefficient
Constant 0.3079**
(0.0000)
ROA 1.3875**
(0.0034)
LIQ 0.2237
(0.1113)
LAGDIV 0.8556**
(0.0083)
GROWTH -0.0318
(0.6034)
LEV -0.4713**
(0.0000)
R² 0.1602
Number of Observations 306
Hausman Test Prob = 0.0001
Notes:
** denotes significant at 1% confidence level
The regression results indicate that 
profitability, as measured by return on 
assets, has a statistically significant positive 
relationship with the dividend payout. This 
signals the fact that the financial institution’s 
profitability is viewed as a vital factor 
in influencing the dividend payments. 
The positive relationship indicates that 
as the financial institution becomes more 
profitable, it is more likely to declare 
high dividends. Over time, profitable 
Malaysian financial institutions are capable 
of accumulating sufficient earnings, 
enabling them to distribute higher dividend 
payments to their shareholders. This finding 
is consistent with prior empirical studies 
(Lintner, 1956; Fama & Babiak, 1968; Pruitt 
& Gitman, 1991; Fama & French, 2001; 
Abor & Bokpin, 2010; Yiadom & Agyei, 
2011).
However, the results show that liquidity, 
as measured by ratio of cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets, has a positive 
effect on dividend payouts but the result is 
insignificant. This implies that Malaysian 
financial institutions that have ample 
liquidity are more likely to distribute higher 
dividends to shareholders, compared with 
those that have less liquidity. This conforms 
to the free cash flow hypothesis. However, 
the insignificant relationship between these 
two variables might be due to the fact 
that compared with companies in other 
industries, financial institutions have ample 
short-term investment opportunities. Thus, 
although they may have high liquidity, 
they will also take into consideration their 
short-term investment opportunities. This 
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is consistent with past studies conducted by 
Chen and Dhiensiri (2009) and Yiedom and 
Agyei (2011).
Lagged dividends have a significant 
positive relationship with the dividend 
payout of Malaysian financial institutions. 
This shows that financial institutions in 
Malaysia follow a stable dividend policy, 
where regularity of dividend payments 
is maintained, resulting to only a gradual 
adjustment of dividend payments towards 
a target payout ratio. This result supports 
the signaling theory, where most firms are 
reluctant to decrease dividend payments 
as it is normally viewed as terrible news 
indicating that the management might 
encounter reduction in its cash level. This 
result is also consistent with the findings of 
past studies (Baker et al., 2004; Farelly et 
al., 1986; Pal & Goyal, 2007; Yiedom & 
Agyei, 2011).
Growth, which is measured by the 
changes in assets, shows a negative influence 
on dividend policy. This indicates that 
when past or anticipated future growth 
is rapid, managers tend to conserve 
funds for reinvestment purposes, hence 
establishing a lower payout ratio. Managers’ 
reluctance to be short of funds and to rely 
on costly financing to protect against under-
investment is one of the possible reasons 
for this. Moreover, the retained earnings 
will increase their capacity in relation 
to profitable investment opportunities. 
However, the relationship is insignificant. 
This may be due to the financial institutions 
making dividend decisions independently of 
investment policy. This result is consistent 
with earlier empirical evidence (Pruitt & 
Gitman, 1991; Al-Twaijry, 2007; Ahmed & 
Javid, 2009).
Lastly, there is a significant positive 
relationship between leverage and dividend 
payouts of Malaysian financial institutions. 
This indicates that a riskier financial 
institution pays out lower dividends in order 
to lessen its reliance on external financing. 
This is similar to the findings recorded 
in finance-related literature (Dhrymes & 
Kurz, 1964; Mahapatra & Sahu, 1993; 
Mahapatra & Pandi, 1995; Aivazian & 
Booth, 2003; Yiedom & Agyei, 2011). 
Nevertheless, the R² of 0.1602 shows that 
16.02 % of the variation in the dividend 
policy can be explained by the independent 
variables, namely, profitability, liquidity, 
lagged dividend, growth opportunities 
and leverage, whereas the balance of the 
variation is explained by other internal or 
external forces or other variables. 
CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
This study is conducted to identify the 
determinants of the dividend policy of 
Malaysian financial institutions. The panel 
dataset is constructed from 33 financial 
institutions in Malaysia over a period of 10 
years (2001-2010). Due to the advantages of 
panel data analysis this study employs panel 
data analysis. In order to test the relationship 
between dividend policy and the chosen set 
of explanatory variables, the fixed effect 
model is used based on the result of the 
Hausman specification test. 
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The results show a statist ically 
significant positive relationship between 
dividend policy and profitability, which 
implies that Malaysian financial institutions 
distribute higher dividends when they 
record higher profitability, despite the 
regulations that they need to follow before 
declaration of dividends, outlined in the 
Banking and Financial Institutions Act 
1989 and Insurance Act 1996. Similarly, 
liquidity shows a positive association with 
dividend policy, which means that the 
financial institutions with ample liquidity 
will likely distribute higher dividends. 
However, this association is not significant 
as shown by the analysis. Lagged dividends 
also show a positive significant relationship 
with dividend policy, which implies that 
financial institutions in Malaysia follow 
a stable dividend policy that maintains 
regularity of dividend payments with 
gradual adjustments of dividend payments 
towards target payout. However, the results 
find that growth opportunity has a negative 
association with dividend policy. This attests 
that financial institutions in Malaysia with 
higher growth opportunities will likely 
retain their earnings in order to finance 
their growth. This association, however, 
is not significant in the case of Malaysian 
financial institutions. Finally, leverage 
shows a significant negative relationship 
with dividend policy, which means that a 
riskier financial institution pays out lower 
dividends.
In conclusion, profitability, lagged 
dividend and leverage are found to be the 
major determinants of dividend policy in 
relation to Malaysian financial institutions. 
The results support the agency cost theory, 
signaling theory and the free cash flow 
hypothesis. This study only focuses on five 
independent variables that aim to explain 
the determinants of dividend policy in the 
Malaysian financial industry. As a result, 
the variables chosen can only explain 
16.02 % of the variation in the dividend 
policy. However, based on the literature, 
there are other factors that can influence 
dividend policy such as size of firms and 
ownership structure, among others. Thus, it 
is recommended that more variables should 
be added in future studies in order to better 
analyse the determinants of dividend policy 
for more robust results.
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ABSTRACT
The introduction of the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system in the early 1990s 
was perceived as a new way of managing a business that could lead to better management 
of an organisation and improve its efficiency. However, studies have repeatedly reported 
a low success rate in ERP system adoption. This encouraged various research studies that 
sought to uncover factors that could have contributed to the system failure. A poor decision-
making process has been stated as one of the main reasons for ERP system failure. Clear 
objectives and good justification could, we believe, increase the ERP system adoption 
success rate. Hence, in this study, we extend the existing research on ERP by exploring the 
effect of institutional pressures and economic benefits on the decision-making process of 
the management. Specifically, we investigate the influence of external pressures and internal 
needs in ERP adoption decisions. Empirical analyses in this study are based on survey data 
obtained from 136 Malaysian companies. Overall, our findings indicate that only operational 
benefits and mimetic pressure have significant influence on ERP system adoption decisions. 
Other economic benefits such as managerial benefits and strategic benefits have no 
significant impact on the management’s decision to adopt the system. Similarly, institutional 
pressures, coercive pressures and normative pressures yield non-significant results. These 
results are important because the evidence highlights that the management’s decision to 
adopt the ERP system is based on the felt need for the organisation to improve its operational 
efficiency, and the influence of mimetic pressures further accentuates the importance for 
the organization of being competitive in its 
technological capabilities. 
Keywords: IT adoption factors, economic-based 
theory, Enterprise Resource Planning, Information and 
Communications Technologies , institutional theory
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INTRODUCTION
The advancement of Information and 
Communications Technologies (ICT) has 
significantly intensified market competition 
the  world  over.  Organisa t ions  are 
increasingly seen to rely on technology to 
enhance their business operations efficiency, 
either to achieve cost reduction or to 
improve operating performance. One of 
the most sophisticated information systems 
currently known to be able to satisfy 
the need for efficiency is the Enterprise 
Resource Planning system (ERP). However, 
many of the benefits attained from ERP 
adoption are intangible and difficult to 
measure (Spathis & Constantinides, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the strength of the ERP 
system lies in the system’s ability to provide 
accurate and real time data to facilitate 
decision-making is one that is too significant 
to be immediately disregarded (Spathis 
& Constantinides, 2003). Prior studies 
on ERP have repeatedly demonstrated 
that information system technology 
implementation requires appropriate skills, 
full support from management and adequate 
organizational capabilities (Francoise, 
Bourgault, & Pellerin, 2009; Basoglu, 
Daim, & Kerimoglu, 2007; Law & Ngai, 
2007). A large number of organisations are 
known to discontinue or stop the progress 
of a project although a large amount of 
money may have been spent due to obstacles 
being encountered during the phases of 
development (Davenport, 1998). Despite the 
many challenges identified relating to ERP 
system implementation, the adoption rate 
continues to increase (Basoglu et al., 2007). 
Therefore, this study aims to investigate 
and analyse the factors that may influence 
an organisation’s decision to adopt the ERP 
system, particularly in Malaysia.
In 2002, Computimes (Computimes, 
2002) reported that there was only a small 
number of SMEs in Malaysia which 
had adopted the ERP system. High cost, 
resistance to change and lack of awareness 
of the benefits of the system were identified 
as the key factors for the low adoption of 
ERP system. Kushairi (2000) highlighted the 
importance of top management initiatives in 
paving the way for ERP adoption. It has 
pointed out that rganisations that ignore 
the advantages of embracing information 
technology applications may find themselves 
in a difficult position in confronting global 
challenges (Kushairi, 2000). Hun (2005) 
reported that industry experts predicted that 
the global market value of the ERP system 
would increase to US$12 billion in 2008 
from US$9.1 billion in 2003. According 
to SSA Global Technologies, one of the 
largest producers of ERP system software 
in South Asia, Malaysia with its strong 
economic base emerged as the organisation’s 
(SSA Global Technologies) second largest 
clientele, accounting for 21 % of SSA Global 
customers, slightly behind India (Hun, 
2005). Hun (2005) also highlighted that 
there is increasing demand for ERP solutions 
in Malaysia. In addition, The Star newspaper 
(2010) reported that International Data 
Corporation (IDC) Malaysia had expected 
an increase in investments for information 
technology from the manufacturing sector 
and investment was expected to grow at a 
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rate of 5.6 % yearly. This positive outlook 
for the ERP system arose out of the urgent 
need for cost saving technologies such as 
ERP and 3D modelling technologies to cut 
down on the excessive costs experienced 
during the global financial crisis (The Star, 
2010).
A r e c e n t  s t u d y  c o n d u c t e d  b y 
Supramaniam and Kuppusamy (2010) 
shows strong demand for the ERP system in 
Malaysia. Various industries are seen to have 
ventured into adopting the system, led by 
the manufacturing industry. Nevertheless, 
only 50 % of the participating organisations 
reported full adoption last year or over a 
one-year period. This finding indicates that 
ERP system adoption is still fairly new in 
Malaysia. As in other developing countries, 
in Malaysia, the issue of ERP adoption 
decision has been largely unexplored 
(Spathis & Constantinides, 2003). 
In general, it is widely acknowledged 
that many studies have been focusing on 
finding the best approach to ensure ERP 
system success, for example, Zhang, Lee, 
Huang, Zhang and Huang , 2005; Katharina, 
Sabine and Fiona, 2009. However, there 
has been very limited study into the factors 
that could influence management in their 
decision to adopt the ERP system. Hence, 
this study aims to extend the existing 
research by exploring the effect of 
institutional pressures and economic benefits 
on management’s decision to adopt ERP. 
Specifically, we investigate the influence 
of external pressures and internal needs 
in ERP adoption decisions. The remainder 
of the paper is structured as follows: the 
next section discusses prior studies on ERP 
adoption from economics and institutional 
perspectives, followed by a discussion of 
the methodology used in this study. The 
results are subsequently presented while 
the last section concludes and highlights the 
implication of this research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
This section will briefly highlight the 
importance of adopting the ERP system 
for the right reasons in order to realise its 
full benefits and then go on to review the 
literature related to the economic-based 
benefit theory and institutional theory 
concepts and their relationship with ERP 
system adoption.
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
System
The introduction of the ERP system as a 
tool to create competitive advantage and the 
potential benefits derived from the system 
adoption have induced many organisations 
to adopt the system. ERP is a system that 
connects all of an organisation’s business 
operations through the information sharing 
concept (Gulledge, 2006). The system has 
been used worldwide to improve business 
process and business efficiency (Calisir, 
Gumussoy, & Bayram, 2009; Hendricks, 
Singhal, & Stratman, 2007, Price Waterhouse 
Cooper, 2009). However, implementing the 
ERP system is not merely installing a new 
programme. It requires careful planning, 
substantial effort from management and a 
large investment of time and money. ERP 
changes business operation and requires 
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a total overhaul on the organisation‘s 
processes and procedures. It needs to be 
embedded in the organisation’s culture, 
thus changing how things are normally 
conducted. Therefore, it is important for the 
organisation to adopt the ERP system for the 
right reasons. The benefits expected to be 
obtained from the system adoption should 
match the organisation’s needs. This is to 
ensure that significant returns are realised 
from the ERP system investments.
Many prior studies, for example, Koh, 
Simpson, and Padmore, 2006; Zhang et al., 
2005; Spathis and Constantinides, 2003, 
assumed that organisations make decisions 
entirely based on efficiency. However, 
this assumption is not well substantiated; 
it ignores other external forces that could 
hinder organisations from making rational 
decisions. Understanding motives for 
adopting ERP system is very important. 
Organisations that have a good justification 
and clear objectives for adopting the ERP 
system have better potential to realise the 
system’s benefits (Sammon, Adam, & 
Carton, 2003). Clear objectives enhance 
the organisation’s ability to systematically 
dictate the progress and success of the 
system. Therefore, it is essential for 
organisations to have pre-defined objectives 
prior to the adoption of the ERP system. 
This initiates the main agenda of this study, 
which is to examine the influence of both 
economic realities and external pressures 
on management’s decision to adopt ERP. 
Economic-based benefit theory perspective
There are three reasons that initiate the 
adoption of new technology, which are the 
organisation’s need to expand its existing 
system functions using new updated tools, to 
reduce its operational costs and to replace its 
current legacy software with a new system 
that provides better performance and speed 
(Newcomb & Doblar, 2001). The ERP 
system’s ability to integrate many processes 
within an organisation has long been awaited 
by managers who feel the need for such a 
system to help them organise and streamline 
all data and processes for efficiency (Nah, 
Lau, & Kuang, 2001; Davenport, 1998). 
Having an efficient, more accurate and 
updated data system has been among the 
most significant motivations that has led 
to ERP system adoption (Koh et al., 2006; 
Spathis & Constantinides, 2003). Other 
contributing factors such as cost reduction, 
increase in sales revenue, solving year 2000 
problems, attaining competitive advantage 
and survivability have also been identified 
as key determinants in ERP adoption 
(Emerson, Karim, & Rutledge, 2009; Law 
& Ngai, 2007; Zhang et.al 2005; Russell 
& Hoag, 2004; Spathis & Constantinides, 
2003).
Study into this area has also pointed 
out that an organisation’s internal and 
external strategies are significant driving 
factors for ERP system adoption (Jang, 
Lin, & Pan, 2009). Internal strategies 
include reduction of operations costs, 
enhancement of employees’ motivation, 
improvement of product cycle time and 
improvement of data management. External 
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strategies, on the other hand, enhance the 
organisation’s competitive ability as they 
push the organisation to continuously 
seek out opportunities and to consistently 
upgrade its technological capabilities. 
Laukkanen, Sarpola, and Hallikainen (2007) 
found that there were no external influences 
affecting these organisations’ decisions. The 
majority of the organisations confirmed 
that in-house analysis was adopted in their 
decision-making process.
A study on the adoption factors in a less 
developed country indicates that technical, 
operations, strategic and decision-making 
motives are important in the decision to 
adopt ERP (Kamhawi, 2008). The decision-
making and operational motives are found 
to be the most important reasons for ERP 
system adoption. These findings suggest 
that the ERP system is no longer mainly 
perceived to ease business operational 
and technical functions but also that it is a 
competitive tool in facing global challenges. 
This, of course, has enhanced its value 
greatly. 
The transaction cost theory was used 
to represent the hypotheses of economic 
benefi ts .  The theory explains  that 
organisations take into account various 
costs involved prior to their engagement of 
any transactions (Robin, 1987). Costs and 
benefits analyses are conducted to ensure 
rational economic justifications for every 
transaction undertaken. It is important for an 
organisation to ensure that benefits obtained 
from a transaction are higher than the cost 
of the products or services. Therefore, in 
the context of ERP system adoption, the 
transaction cost theory suggests that the 
organisation will undertake proper costs 
and benefits analyses to ensure that the new 
system adopted will be able to enhance the 
performance and value of the organisation. 
Collecting quantitative data on the 
exact costs and benefits expected from 
ERP adoption by an organisation would not 
only be very difficult but almost impossible 
because of data confidentiality. Therefore, in 
this study, measures of perceived economic 
net benefits were used to represent the overall 
costs and benefits analysis conducted by each 
organisation. Profit-oriented organisations 
are expected to conduct a systematic 
analysis on the costs (disadvantages) and 
the benefits (advantages) associated with 
an investment. Thus, perceived benefits 
represent the end-result of that rational 
economic decision based on careful costs 
and benefits analysis.
Institutional theory perspective
The institutional theory recognises that an 
organisation operates in an institutionalised 
environment in which prevailing rules 
and procedures rather than the rational 
efficiency factor determine the legitimacy 
of a business (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Legitimacy is public acceptance and a vote 
of confidence that a business is conducted 
in the best manner. An organisation that 
adheres to customary rules and procedures 
demonstrates its effort to do business 
in an adequate and socially acceptable 
manner (Fogarty, 1996). The display of such 
responsible conduct will enhance public 
support, which will eventually lead to the 
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survival and growth of the organisation. 
Thus, the theory provides an explanation 
for why organisations become homogeneous 
and the role played by myth and established 
values in driving many organisations to 
implement similar procedures and practices 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). 
A similar  t rend can be seen in 
information system adoption. Over time, 
many organisations are driven to adopt 
customary and established criteria. This is 
because the perceived benefits that can be 
obtained by conforming to the procedures 
and practices motivate many organisations 
to adopt them voluntarily. Additionally, 
it is suggested that organisations that 
institutionalise their products, services, 
policies and programmes may gain added 
advantages such as increased survival 
prospect, enhanced public acceptance 
and confidence in the legitimacy of their 
business operations (Rowan & Meyer, 
1977), reduction in uncertainty (Liao, 1996) 
improved capability in acquiring resources 
and improving relationships with business 
partners (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Furthermore, conformity to rules and 
procedures protects the organisation from 
unnecessary legal actions or claims of 
negligence in conducting its business 
operations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Nevertheless, failure to adapt to these 
socially established norms and values 
could expose the organisation to many 
issues that would potentially lead to loss 
of business and support (Fogarty, 1996). 
Therefore, organisations are motivated 
to obtain legitimacy through the three 
pillars of isomorphism, which are coercive 
isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism and 
normative isomorphism.
Coercive isomorphism
Coercive isomorphism commonly results 
from resource dependence factors (Teo, 
Wei, & Benbasat, 2003). Studies suggest 
that management is more willing to accept 
rules or procedures enforced upon them if 
they are highly dependent on the resource 
providers. These forces are mainly exerted 
by government, business partners and 
suppliers (Benders, Batenburg & van 
der Blonk, 2006). The acceptance of the 
procedures is based merely on the pressures 
imposed on them and not because of the 
economic benefits that could improve the 
organisation’s performance. Non-adherence 
or disregard for procedures could lead to 
loss of business and survival ability. 
Mimetic isomorphism
Mimetic isomorphism is based on the 
organisation’s ignorance and lack of 
information available on what is the best 
method or practice to solve an issue. When 
faced with uncertainties, many organisations 
resort to imitate and replicate the practices 
or structures of any organisation that 
they view as being the most successful in 
their field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Management may view imitating other 
successful organisationa as the best 
alternative available as it minimises search 
cost of identifying and experimenting with 
the best course of action and reduces the risk 
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of being the first adopters of a procedure 
or system. Additionally, overwhelming 
adoption of upcoming technology could 
also drive management into adopting such 
technology to avoid being left behind 
(Benders et al., 2006). 
Normative isomorphism
Finally, normative isomorphism exists as 
a result of duty or obligation as evidenced 
by members’ obligation to comply with 
a professional body’s requirements 
(Batenburg, Benders & Blonk, 2008). 
Organisations experience normative 
isomorphism when decision-making is 
influenced by prior education and training 
or from the professional bodies that they are 
associated with. 
A study on the mechanism that influences 
ERP adoption has led the researchers 
to adopting a technical isomorphism 
perspective (Batenburg et al., 2008). The 
study reveals how technical isomorphism 
together with coercive isomorphism 
leads to the standardisation of working 
procedures and systems adoption. This 
suggests that managers should be aware of 
the implications of isomorphism during the 
early stage of decision-making. 
It is argued that due to a high level 
of uncertainty associated with the ERP 
system and the fact that many of its benefits 
are intangible, increase the possibility of 
institutional influences on management’s 
decision (Ugrin, 2009). Management may 
choose to pursue institutionalised reasoning 
to legitimise their justifications to adopt the 
ERP system. 
An investigation on the impact of 
generalised competition and firm strategy 
choices on ICT adoption has indicated that 
investment in ICT does have a positive 
impact on firm value (Loukis, Sapounas, 
& Aivalis, 2008). The study also finds that 
only the bargaining power of suppliers, 
suggesting the existence of coercive 
isomorphism, and frequent introduction of 
new products and services are significant 
variables in ICT development. 
An ana lys i s  on  supply  change 
management  (SCM) sugges ts  tha t 
implementation of the ERP system resulting 
from coercive pressure offers more benefits 
to the implementing organisations, also 
known as the follower, as the adopted 
organisation, known as the initiator, tends 
to provide support and technical assistance 
to ensure successful implementation of 
the system (Lai, Wong, & Cheng, 2006). 
The followers are normally guaranteed 
business opportunities by the initiator. 
Alternatively, system adoptions arising from 
mimetic and normative pressures are more 
complicated and challenging. This is because 
organisations influenced by normative 
pressure need to adopt the standards set by 
the initiator and are less likely to receive 
additional support and business from the 
initiator. Similarly, organisations influenced 
by mimetic pressure have to struggle alone 
in implementing the system in the hope 
that by adopting the system, they may 
enhance business growth and encourage 
business opportunities with other adopting 
organisations. 
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A comparative analysis to examine 
if there were any significant differences 
between adoption factors infuencing SMEs 
and large organisations was conducted 
(Buonanno, Faverio, Pigni, Ravarini, 
Sciuto, & Tagliavini, 2005), and the findings 
suggest that business complexity does not 
affect an organisation’s decision to adopt the 
ERP system except for the size factor; large 
organisations are more inclined to adopt the 
system compared to SMEs. The decision of 
larger organisations is largely influenced 
by the need to improve business efficiency, 
and decisions are mainly made based on 
implications arising from both internal and 
external factors. The need to integrate all 
business functions and resolve management 
issues and high data redundancy have been 
the main objectives why the ERP system has 
been adopted. In addition, it is noted that 
38.2 % of larger organisations claim that 
they are forced by controlling companies to 
adopt the system (highlighting the influence 
of coercive pressure). 
Studies also acknowledge the notion 
that technology selection does not always 
involve a rigorous analytical and evaluation 
process (Tingling & Parent, 2004). It may 
be entwined with ceremonial rules and the 
organisation’s culture and experience. In 
selecting an appropriate system, extensive 
analysis must be conducted but, at the 
same time, what is considered acceptable 
and appropriate in the industry may also 
influence management’s decision.
In summary, the institutional theory 
provides an alternative explanation for the 
decision to adopt ERP i.e. the possibility 
that organisations would adopt a system 
not entirely based on economic rationality. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that 
the organisation could not achieve enhanced 
efficiency previously (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983) as “rational behaviour, efficiency 
and effectiveness” (Tingling & Parent, 
2004, pp 333) are still the fundamental 
concern in terms of the institutional theory. 
The difference lies in the way a subject is 
viewed as institutional theory concentrates 
on achieving legitimacy. The theory 
focuses on building relationship, trust and 
acceptance with customers, suppliers and 
other significant resource providers.
Based on the theories and empirical 
literature reviewed, this study proposes 
to investigate how both economic- and 
institutional-based factors may affect 
management’s decision to adopt the ERP 
system. As the perceived benefits from 
ERP adoption would aid attainment of 
organisational economic goals, economic 
considerations or economic-based factors 
are expected to influence ERP adoption. The 
following hypotheses are developed:
H1a: Expected operational benefits of ERP 
adoption significantly influence the 
decision to adopt the ERP system. 
H1b: Expected managerial benefits of ERP 
adoption significantly influence the 
decision to adopt the ERP system. 
H1c: Expected strategic benefits of ERP 
adoption significantly influence the 
decision to adopt the ERP system. 
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The pressure from customers, dominant 
organisations and suppliers could have 
a strong influence on an organisation’s 
decision to adopt the ERP system (Teo et al., 
2003; Krell et al., 2009; Lai et al., 2006), 
leading to the following hypothesis:
H2a: The greater the coercive pressure 
experienced by the organisation, the 
greater the likelihood of the decision 
to adopt the ERP system by the 
organisation.
The complexity of the tasks and 
additional efforts required in making the 
decision could induce management to resort 
to a more simplified method in arriving at 
a decision (Vessey, 1994). One of the most 
common methods is to mimic the actions of 
other successful organisations (Ugrin, 2009). 
Mimicking behaviour boosts the confidence 
of management that they are making the 
right decision as their decision is alligned 
with successful outomes experienced by 
other organisations in the same industry. 
This suggests that when management are 
faced with a high level of uncertainty and 
the cost and time required to search for the 
right decision are excessive, there is a high 
possibility that management will rely on the 
successful actions of other organisations to 
legitimise their decision.
 The most successful organisations 
in the field will be held as a benchmark 
(Gosain, 2004). Benchmarking other 
successful organisations can be classified 
as a mimetic process (Ketokivi & Schroeder, 
2004). This is supported by Dos Santos and 
Peffers (1998) who examined the impact of 
competitor and vendor behaviour on system 
selection decision-making. Dos Santos and 
Peffers (1998) find that competitors’ success 
in implementing an innovation encourages 
organisations to mimic the actions of those 
competitors that led to their success.
In addition, the risk of making the 
wrong decision could also lead management 
to imitate the practices of other organisations 
that have proven to be successful (Lindley 
& Topping, 2008). Organisations also adopt 
mimetic behaviour to gain recognition and 
acceptance (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
This commonly occurs when many other 
organisations value certain information 
system as  essent ia l  and feel  more 
comfortable working with organisations 
that use a similar system (Lai et al., 2006). 
This will further encourage management to 
implement similar technology to facilitate 
the initiation of new business contacts and 
to enhance business profitability. Thus, the 
second sub-hypothesis is:
H2b: The greater the mimetic pressure 
experienced by the organisation, the 
greater the likelihood of an ERP system 
adoption decision by the organisation. 
In  the  ERP context ,  normat ive 
isomorphism commonly arises out of the 
management’s association and membership 
with professional bodies, trade associations 
and business alliances (Krell et al., 2009). 
Management are commonly influenced to 
adopt certain ideology and best practices 
through communication with people within 
the same professional networks or during 
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discussions at trade conventions (Ketokivi & 
Schroeder, 2004). Professional association 
has long been offered as a means for 
managers to exchange views and vision 
that can help them in shaping the direction 
of their organisation (Gosain, 2004). The 
information and new knowledge learnt from 
these encounters may influence management 
judgement. Naturally, it is common for 
people with the same background and 
education to be more agreeable towards 
and receptive of one another’s ideas and 
suggestions (Liao, 1996), thus, resulting 
in normative behavior. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is formulated:
H2c: The greater the normative pressure 
experienced by the organisation, the 
greater the likelihood for an ERP system 
adoption decision by the organisation.
The research framework is summarised 
in Fig.1.
METHODOLOGY
A survey in the form of a questionnaire 
was used in this study. It is the most 
appropriate method to measure people 
attitudes, behaviour, knowledge and opinion 
(Cooper & Schindler, 2008; Totten, Panacek, 
& Price, 1999). The questionnaire consisted 
of a set of questions developed to measure 
the respondent’s perception of factors 
influencing an organisation’s decision to 
adopt the ERP system and the system’s 
impact on organisational performance. The 
question items were adapted from previous 
studies such as Kamhawi (2008), Law 
and Ngai (2007), and Teo et al. (2003). 
Some modifications were made to the 
questionnaire items to suit the research 
objectives and the ERP system setting in 
Malaysia. The questionnaire was pre-tested 
on several business managers to gauge the 
validity of the questionnaire items and to 
further improve the questionnaire design. 
Several comments were received and 
amendments were made accordingly. 
Economic-based benefit (H1)
1. Operational benefits (H1a)
2. Manegerial benefits  (H1b)
3. Strategic benefits  (H1c)
Institution-based benefit (H2)
1. Coercive (H2a)
2. Mimetic (H2b)
3. Normative (H2c)
ERP System Adoption
Fig.1: Research Framework of Factors Affecting the Decision to Adopt the ERP System
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A reliability test was conducted to 
measure the reliability of the instrument 
used in this study. A reliability test gauges 
the degree to which research results would be 
similar even if the research were conducted 
in a different environment (Cooper & 
Schindler, 2008). As a rule of thumb, a 
Cronbach Alpha value of 0.70 and above is 
viewed as acceptable (Nunnaly, 1978).
As indicated in Table 1, the reliability 
coefficients for strategic benefits and 
mimetic are above 0.90, while those of three 
of the other variables, operational benefits, 
managerial benefits and coercive, are above 
0.80. The normative pressure variable is the 
only variable with a Cronbach Alpha of less 
than 0.80 (0.794). Therefore, the Cronbach 
Alpha coefficients for all of the variables 
in this study have exceeded the acceptable 
level required.
TABLE 1 
Reliability Coefficient of the Research Variables
Variable
Number 
of Items
Cronbach 
Alpha
Operational benefits 8 0.864
Managerial benefits 6 0.867
Strategic benefits 8 0.928
Mimetic 3 0.926
Coercive 6 0.809
Normative 2 0.794
The sample size for this study consisted 
of all 976 companies listed with BURSA 
Malaysia. Of this number, 861 companies 
are listed in the main market of Bursa 
Malaysia and 115 companies are listed in 
the ACE market of Bursa Malaysia (Bursa 
Malaysia, 2010). Questionnaires were 
also sent to a sample of 200 companies, 
which were selected based on a systematic 
sampling procedure from the Federation of 
Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM) database.
The unit of analysis for this study 
was the organisational level and senior 
managers of organisations were the targeted 
respondents because they were likely to 
be involved in the ERP system adoption 
decision-making process. Organisations 
were selected from various industries and 
sectors as the ERP system is not exclusive 
to certain types of organisation. 
Questionnaires were mailed out in 
stages. The first sets of questionnaires were 
sent in the first week of April. Two weeks 
later, non-responding organisations were 
contacted via telephone and reminder emails 
were sent to them to encourage participation. 
This process was repeated until all the 
respondents had been contacted. At this 
point of time, a webbased questionnaire 
was also created. This was to provide 
wider options for managers to choose 
their preferred method of answering the 
questionnaire. By the end of June 2011, 136 
usable responses were received via mail 
and email. 
Measures
This study uses a five-point rating scale for 
measurement. The dependent variable of the 
organisation’s adoption level is measured 
based on the organisation’s intention to 
achieve automate level, informate level or 
transformate level (Zuboff, 1985). Automate 
level benefits is defined as replacing the 
existing system with a better and more 
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advanced technology that operates the 
same functions with less cost incurred. 
Informate, on the other hand, refers to the 
organisation’s capability to analyse and 
comprehend the information presented by 
the system to make better and informed 
decisions. Finally, transformate is the 
extent to which the ERP system can affect 
the organisation’s strategies and goals. 
Accordingly, in this study, automate is 
known as operational benefits focusing on 
process improvement and cost reduction; 
informate as tactical or managerial benefits 
comprising management’s ability to make 
better decisions, correctly identifying 
customer needs and requirements and 
increasing the organisation’s revenue; and 
transformate as strategic benefits which 
refer to the organisation’s ability to adapt to 
changes and improve market value (Chand, 
Hachey, Hunton, Owhoso & Vasudevan, 
2005).
Statistically significant ERP system 
benefits, empirically proven by Shiau, Hsu 
and Wang (2009), Kamhawi (2008) and 
Buonanno et al. (2005), were used as items 
to represent the independent variables. The 
benefits were subsequently categorised 
as economic-based factors comprising 
operational benefits (representing the 
automate objective), managerial benefits 
(representing the informate objective) 
and strategic benefits (representing the 
transformate objective) and institution-based 
factors consisting of coercive, mimetic and 
normative factors. Each benefit is assessed 
based on its perceived importance. 
Coercive pressure is defined as the 
influence asserted by dominant parties in 
the adoption of the ERP system. The source 
of this pressure may be the parent company, 
suppliers or customers. Mimetic pressures 
refer to voluntary and conscious action 
undertaken by an organisation that mimics 
its competitor’s actions (Shi, Shambare, 
& Wang, 2007). Normative behaviour, 
on the other hand, is the organisation’s 
unconscious act of imitating the actions and 
practices of its competitors (Shi et al., 2007; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Membership of 
professional bodies or trade associations was 
included as a proxy for normative influence. 
All the questions on institutional pressures 
were adapted and developed from studies by 
Teo et al. (2003) and Ugrin (2009).
RESULTS
Descriptive data analysis was conducted 
to provide an overview of the data pattern. 
Statistical analysis such as mean, median 
and mode are commonly adopted in this 
type of analysis.
Respondent profiles
As shown in Table 2, the majority of 
the respondents (70.59 %) held senior 
managerial positions such as accounts 
manager, branch manager, finance manager, 
human resource manager and information 
and technology manager. Respondents 
holding top management positions consisted 
of Chief Executive Officers, Directors and 
Vice Presidents and they constituted 26.47 
% of the total respondents. About 2.94 % of 
the responses were from deputy managers 
or assistant managers and management 
consultants. 
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TABLE 2 
Profile of Respondents and Organisations
Job Designation Total Percentage
Middle Manager 4 2.94
Senior Manager 96 70.59
Top Management 36 26.47
 136 100.00
Work Experience Total Percentage
Less than 10 years 30 22.06
11 to 20 years 62 45.59
Above 20 years 44 32.35
 136 100.00
Industry Category Total Percentage
Manufacturing 82 60.29
Trading and Services 25 18.38
Construction 18 13.24
Finance and Insurance 7 5.15
Mining and Plantation 4 2.94
 136 100.00
Number of employees Total Percentage
Less than 250 59 43.38
251 to 1000 54 39.71
Above 1001 23 16.91
 136 100.00
Legal Structure Total Percentage
Unincorporated 29 21.32
Incorporated 107 78.68
Ownership Structure Total Percentage
Privately-owned company 46 33.82
Local public-listed 67 49.26
Government-owned/
Controlled 8 5.88
Foreign-owned 15 11.03
 136 100.00
Most of the respondents had many years 
of working experience; 45.59 % of them 
had work experience of between 11 and 20 
years, 32.35 % had more than 20 years of 
work experience, and the remaining 22.06 % 
had less than 10 years of work experience.
The respondents came from five 
industry sectors: manufacturing sector, 
trading and services sector, construction 
sector, finance and insurance sector and 
mining and plantation sectors. The sample 
is dominated by organisations from the 
manufacturing sector, which includes the 
industrial products and consumer products 
industry (60.29 %), followed by those 
in the trading and services sector, which 
include the technology industry (18.38%), 
and the construction sector, which includes 
the property and infrastructure industries 
(13.24%). Organisations in the finance 
and insurance industry represented 5.15 % 
of this study sample. The remaining 2.94 
% were from the mining and plantation 
industry.
In this study, the size of the organisation 
is measured by the number of employees. 
About 43.38 % of the respondents were from 
the small industries sector with less than 250 
employees and the remaining 56.62 % were 
from larger organisations with between 251 
and more than 1,000 employees.
With regard to the legal structure, 78.68 
% of the organisations were incorporated 
entities, while the remaining 21.32 % 
were unincorporated entities. In terms of 
ownership type, almost half of the sample 
organisations (49.26 %) were public-
listed organisations, while 33.82 % were 
privately-owned organisations comprising 
local-family owned and local non-family 
privately-owned organizations. Foreign-
owned organisations and government 
controlled organisations constituted 11.03 
% and 5.88 % of the sample respectively.
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Correlation and Logistic regression results 
A correlation analysis tests the strength 
of linear relationships and the association 
between two variables. A correlation 
analysis was conducted for economic-
based benefits and Institutional factors 
influencing ERP adoption. Table 3 depicts 
the correlation results.
The results indicate that there are 
significant correlations between ERP 
adoption with all variables except for the 
normative and coercive pressure variables.
Logistic regression was conducted to 
investigate the effect of factors affecting the 
decision to adopt the ERP system. Logistic 
regression was used due to the categorical 
nature of the dependent variable. In addition, 
logistic regression is also designed to predict 
the probability of the occurrence of an event 
(Hair et al., 2006). 
Before reviewing the results, it is 
important to ascertain how well the model 
actually fits the observed data (Hair et 
al., 2006). Therefore, the Hosmer and 
Lemershow test was carried out. The 
subsequent step is to determine the impact of 
each variable on the decision to adopt ERP. 
The significance of the variable is indicated 
by the p-value of the result. However, the 
direction of the relationship is determined 
by the positive or negative sign for the 
beta coefficient (B), while the association 
between ERP adoption and the independent 
variables is determined by examining the 
odds ratio figure (Exp ‘B’). The odds ratio 
indicates the change in odds resulting from 
a change in predictor variables. As a rule 
of thumb, an odds ratio of more than 1 
indicates a high probability of ERP system 
adoption and an odds ratio of less than 1 
suggests the probability of non-adoption of 
the ERP system. Table 4 shows the results 
of logistic regression analysis.
Table 4 highlights that there are only three 
variables that are statistically significant and 
the variables are the operational benefits, 
strategic benefits and mimetic variables 
(p<0.1). However, the strategic benefits 
variable shows a negative sign, indicating 
that this variable is negatively associated 
with ERP system adoption. The chi-square 
value of 12.761 with a significant p-value 
of 0.120 further indicates that the model 
is good.
TABLE 3 
Result of Correlation Analysis
ERP Adoption Operation Managerial Strategic Mimetic Normative Coercive
ERP Adoption 1
Operational 0.200* 1
Managerial 0.253** 0.784** 1
Strategic 0.288** 0.723** 0.735** 1
Mimetic 0.321** 0.077 0.104 0.116 1
Normative 0.055 0.240** 0.205** 0.220** 0.541** 1
Coercive 0.062 0.164* 0.119 0.104 0.596** 0.657** 1
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
**Correlation is significant at the 0.02 level (1-tailed)
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In general, the result shows that only two 
variables, operational benefits and mimetic 
pressure, are significantly associated with 
the decision to adopt the ERP.
Table 5 indicates that the model could 
correctly classify 75.7 % of ERP system 
adoption cases.
DISCUSSION
Analysis on economic benefit factors 
shows that only operational benefits (H1a) 
is significant in the decision to adopt ERP, 
while managerial benefits (H1b) and strategic 
benefits (H1c) are not significant in ERP 
adoption. For institutional pressure factors, 
the results indicate that only mimetic 
pressure (H2b) is significant in ERP adoption. 
Normative pressure (H2c) and coercive 
pressure (H2a) are not significant.
Operational benefits have been widely 
acknowledged as the most important set of 
factors to influence ERP system adoption 
(Shiau et al., 2009; Jang et al., 2009). 
The increasing need to improve internal 
operations and activities is the prime reason 
that encourages many organisations to 
adopt the ERP system. It is also reported 
that internal requirements rather than the 
TABLE 4 
Results of the Logistic Regression Analysis
Variables B Wald Sig. Exp (B)
Constant -4.837 4.461 0.035 0.008
Organisation size -0.139 0.302 0.645 0.87
Industry Sector -0.234 1.549 0.213 0.791
Operational 1.526 6.629 0.01*** 4.598
Managerial 0.118 0.065 0.799 1.125
Strategic -1.291 8.698 0.003*** 0.275
Mimetic 0.809 5.92 0.015** 2.245
Normative 0.21 0.311 0.5 1.234
Coercive 0.371 0.52 0.471 1.45
Hosmer and Lemershow test: Chi square=12.761, p=0.120
Cox & Snell R Square=0.218
Nagelkerke R Square=0.306
***Significant at 0.01, **Significant at 0.1
TABLE 5 
Summary of Classification Table
Observed
Predicted
ERP ADOPTION
Percentage Correct
Yes No
ERP ADOPTION
Yes 84 9 90.3
No 24 19 44.2
Overall Percentage 75.7
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need to remain competitive have driven 
many organisations towards adoption of the 
system (Koh et al., 2006). Earlier studies 
have found that operational benefits such as 
improvement of processing time, integration 
of business process and ability to access, 
monitor and process wider data are among 
the most cited motivations for adoption of 
the system (Benders et al., 2006; Koh et 
al., 2006). Similarly, the results from this 
study indicate that the need to improve 
data accuracy and integrity and to speed 
up the preparation of financial reports has 
been among the most important operational 
benefits that motivate ERP system adoption. 
This suggests that operational benefits are 
still held as one of the key considerations in 
an organisation’s deliberation on adopting 
the ERP system.
This study, however,  f inds that 
managerial-benefits reasoning is not strong 
enough to encourage ERP system adoption. 
This finding indicates that both adopters 
and non-adopters of ERP system do have 
a similar perception of the system’s ability 
to enhance decision-making capabilities. 
Managerial benefits in this study covers the 
management’s decision-making quality in 
terms of speed and timely decision-making 
and collaborative performance in the 
decision-making process. The findings of 
this study however, are not consistent with 
previous research that reported improvement 
in decision-making as one of the important 
motives for ERP adoption (Kamhawi, 2008; 
Shiau et al., 2009). Even though managerial-
benefits consideration does not significantly 
impact the decision to adopt ERP in this 
study, both ERP adopters and non-adopters 
have ranked managerial benefits as one of 
the important benefits that can be attained 
from ERP system adoption (overall mean 
value = 4.094). 
In addition, a statistically significant 
negative result obtained for strategic benefits 
indicates that the variable of strategic 
benefits is not an important consideration 
in an organisation’s decision to adopt the 
ERP system. This finding suggests that 
ERP adoption in Malaysia still focuses 
on improving the organisation’s internal 
operation processes. The advantages that 
come from positioning itself strategically 
to face future challenges as may be 
attained from ERP system adoption are 
not compelling enough for an organisation 
to initiate system adoption. This finding 
is consistent with the finding of Chand 
et al. (2005), whose study noted that 
automate level benefits are the first to be 
seen from ERP adoption, followed by 
informate and transformate level benefits 
respectively. This study implies that an 
organisation’s key objective in adopting the 
ERP system is to improve their its internal 
processes (automate benefits) rather than to 
improve its capabilities to respond to market 
changes and build better relationships with 
customers and suppliers (transformate 
benefits). Some organisations, however, 
are usually contented when the automate- 
and informate-level benefits have been 
achieved. This further supports the notion 
that strategic benefits is the last economic 
factor that organisations expect to achieve 
with the adoption of the ERP system (Chand 
et al., 2005).
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As for institutional-based factors, the 
results show that the mimetic pressure 
hypothesis (H2b) is supported, while the 
normative pressure (H2c) and coercive 
pressure (H2a) hypotheses are not supported. 
 The results of this study indicate 
that mimetic pressure does influence an 
organisation’s decision to adopt the ERP 
system. This is consistent with various 
studies that highlight the existence of 
competitive pressure in the decision to adopt 
the ERP system (Ugrin, 2009; Salmeron & 
Bueno, 2006; Tingling & Parent, 2004). 
Organisations are known to be very reactive 
to external pressures, and this has been 
recognised to be a common motivating 
factor that influences technological 
innovation adoption (Benders et al., 2006). 
Management do look at their competitors 
for direction in their own decision-making. 
Thus, to remain competitive, it is important 
for organisations to be ahead in their 
technological capabilities. By replicating 
competitors, management may hope to 
reduce the risks of uncertainty and to 
appear more confident about their decision. 
More importantly, this study highlights the 
competitive drive of Malaysian organistions 
in shaping and improving their technological 
capabilities, particularly in ensuring that 
they are on par with their competitors.
Finally, the impact of both normative-
pressure and coercive pressure are found to 
be not significant. The findings are consistent 
with a study conducted by Laukkanen et al. 
(2007), which found out that there was 
minimal influence received from external 
parties in the decision to adopt ERP. The 
majority of the organisations in the sample 
studied in this work make decisions based 
on their own independent analysis. Thus, 
this suggests that Malaysian organisations 
are not too vulnerable to extenal pressures, 
particularly from normative and coercive 
influence, in their decision-making. Pressure 
from customers, suppliers, parent companies 
and professional associations has limited 
impact on their decision to adopt the ERP 
system. One of the possible reasons for this 
is that many Malaysian organisations which 
have adopted the ERP system are still at the 
early stage of the system implementation 
(Supramaniam & Kuppusamy, 2010). Thus, 
they do not have much authority to exert 
others to follow their lead.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The conceptual model in this study is 
based on two theoretical concepts. First, 
the economic-based transaction cost theory 
explains the rationale for ERP system 
adoption. Second, the institutional theory 
explains the influence of institutional 
pressure on ERP adoption. The results 
of this study provide further empirical 
evidence in addition to previous literature 
on the importance of a consideration of 
the economic benefits in management 
decisions on technology adoption. Even 
though there is no significant result for a 
consideration of managerial benefits and 
strategic benefits, the descriptive statistics 
indicate its perceived importance. With 
regard to institution-based factors, the study 
finds that mimetic pressure is a significant 
factor that in influencing an organisation’s 
decision-making. 
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This study highlights some important 
elements that might impact management’s 
decision-making. Generally, the results 
suggest that management do make decisions 
based on rational decision-making. The 
benefits of adopting the ERP system are 
carefully weighed and the system’s ability 
to further enhance the organisation’s 
operational objectives is evidently taken into 
consideration. This implies that management 
are generally cautious in their contemplation 
of adopting a technical system that involves 
huge investments and necessitates changes 
to their existing organisational activities.
This study also finds evidence of 
mimetic pressure that may influence the 
decision to adopt ERP. Even though the 
results indicate that both coercive pressure 
and normative pressure do not significantly 
influence an organisation’s decision to adopt 
the ERP system, they are however somewhat 
influenced by the need to mimic decisions 
of successful competitors. Mimicking 
other successful organisations could lead to 
various advantages as it minimises the cost 
of searching for the right information system 
and also reduces the risk of being the first 
adopter of any new innovation. In addition, 
adopting a system proven to be successful 
by other organisations would definitely 
lend some confidence to the management 
in making their own decision.
However, the risk of imitating other 
organisations cannot be undermined. This is 
because every organisation is unique in itself 
with its own flow of operational activities 
and processes. This also means that each 
organisation possesses specific needs and 
requirements. Imitating other organisations 
that have different requirements could cause 
major catastrophe. Management should also 
consider their existing capabilities when 
adopting a sophisticated information system 
such as ERP. It is important to be able to 
measure the organisation’s own capabilities 
prior to imitating another organisation’s 
actions. Therefore, it is particularly crucial 
for management to be aware of this type 
of influence. The act of imitating another 
organisation could be a best alternative, 
but the imitation must be conducted with 
caution. An indiscreet and thoughtless 
imitation could lead an organisation to a 
disastrous outcome.
Acknowledging the limitations of 
the study would actually create potential 
avenues for carrying out prospective future 
research. As this study only focuses on 
two types of organisation, public-listed 
companies and organisations listed with 
FMM, future studies can be conducted on 
other types of organisation such as small 
and medium enterprises, public-sector 
companies and non-profit organisations. 
Only the middle-to-top-management 
perspective was investigated in this study. 
Low-level management and employee 
perception were not taken into consideration, 
in particular, to determine the level of ERP 
system usage and the intensity of user 
satisfaction. Future studies looking at these 
perspectives may increase the understanding 
of the overall ERP system impact on 
organisational performance. 
Finally, conducting a case study analysis 
or qualitative research can further enhance 
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the value of this study. The variables 
presented in this study were obtained from 
prior literature on information system 
generally and the ERP system specifically. 
Since the ERP system is a unique and 
complex system, there is always a possibility 
that it would also have unique factors. 
Therefore, case study analysis and in-
depth interview with the right authorities 
may uncover new factors that may affect 
ERP system adoption and subsequently, 
the system’s impact on organisational 
performance. It could also further verify the 
findings of this study, thus providing greater 
validity for the research results.
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